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No. 20090277

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
PARKER JENSEN, a minor, through his parents/guardians Barbara and Daren
Jensen, BARBARA JENSEN, individually, and DAREN JENSEN, individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
KARI CUNNINGHAM, RICHARD ANDERSON, LARS M. WAGNER,
KAREN H. ALBRITTON, and SUSAN EISENMAN, in their respective
individual capacities.
Defendants-Appellees.

STATE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER BRIEF

State Defendants/Appellees Kari Cunningham, Richard Anderson, and
Susan Eisenman respectfully submit this answer brief.

Jurisdictional Statement
This Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(j) (West Supp. 2008).

Issues Presented
1.

Issue Preclusion/Law of the Case

Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues decided by a prior, final
judgment. Law of the case, in turn, contemplates the temiination of issues when

they arise again in the same case. In this action removed to federal court, Judge
Ted Stewart dismissed Plaintiffs' federal claims, finding Defendants Cunningham
and Eisenman absolutely immune; and finding that Defendants Cunningham and
Anderson violated no constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the federal court's final
order precluded it from relitigating the issues underlying Plaintiffs' dismissed
federal claims?
Standard of Review
Whether issue preclusion bars this action presents a question of law that this
Court reviews for correctness. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT
93, % 17, 16 P.3d 1214. Next, whether a trial court correctly interpreted a prior
judicial decision constitutes a questions of law, also reviewed for correctness.
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 56, 82 P.3d 1076.
2.

No Broader State Constitutional Rights.

Plaintiffs sued State Defendants for violations of Plaintiffs' inherent state
constitutional rights. The federal court dismissed Plaintiffs' similar claims under
the United States Constitution. Because Plaintiffs failed to establish under the
unique posture of this case that the Utah Constitution afforded them broader
constitutional protections, did the trial court err when it awarded State Defendants
summary judgment?

2

Standard of Review
Interpretation of the state constitution presents a question of law reviewed
de novo with no deference to the trial court. Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, % 5,
184P.3d592.
3.

No Flagrant Violation

An individual government employee is not liable for money damages under
the state constitution unless a plaintiff establishes that he suffered a flagrant
violation of a constitutional right. Plaintiffs must show that State Defendants
violated Plaintiffs' "clearly established" constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. If Plaintiffs' allegations establish violations of the
Utah Constitution, were those violations flagrant?
Standard of Review
The standard of review for this issue is the same as set out for issue two
above.
Preservation of Issues
State Defendants raised these issues in their motions for summary judgment
and supporting memoranda. R.947-1082, 1086-1129. The district court's final
order granting those motions is attached as Addendum A. R. 4199-4210.
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions
Article I of the Utah Constitution is attached as Addendum B. Sections 1,
7, and 14 being determinative.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs sued State Defendants, among others, for damages allegedly
suffered when the Division of Child & Family Services instituted action in Utah's
juvenile court to promote the best interests of PJ., a pediatric cancer patient.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On July 18, 2005, Plaintiffs sued State Defendants and others in Utah's
Third District Court for violations of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, and for the
common law torts of wrongful initiation of process and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. R.l-70. The action was removed to federal court. R. 106-08.
There, State Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, with supporting
memoranda that Plaintiffs opposed. U.S. District Judge Ted Stewart dismissed
Plaintiffs' federal claims and remanded their state claims to state court.
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Judgment and Remanding
State Law Claims (D & O), 2008 WL 4372933 (D. Utah, Sept. 22, 2008), attached
as Addendum C. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, where
the case is pending.
4

On remand, State Defendants again filed motions for summary judgment that
Plaintiffs opposed. R. 947-1082, 1086-1129, 1271 \ The trial court granted each
motion, and Plaintiffs timely appealed. R 4199-4210, 4211 -4213.

Statement of the Facts
Plaintiffs take their facts from the Statement of Additional Facts that Plaintiffs
filed in the state court.2 See R. 1130-1270. Conversely, State Defendants draw
their facts largely from the federal court's preclusive determination of the material
and undisputed facts.3 See Oman v. Davis Sch. DisL, 2008 UT 70, U 31, 194 P.3d
165,965.

1

The record index provides that Plaintiffs' Consolidated Memorandum is
contained at pp. 1271-3826. But the record contains only the caption page of that
memo. R. 1271. The remaining pages contain exhibits that Plaintiffs submitted
below. R. 1272-3826. State Defendants attach a copy of that memorandum at
Addendum D and submits a Stipulated Motion to Supplement the Record.
2

Plaintiffs filed a consolidated statement of additional facts in the district
court. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). State Defendants responded in detail to those
additional facts, many of which are misstated or unsupported. Those responses are
set out in full at R. 3843-3885; 3893-3917; 4006-4189.
3

Rule 7 mandates that "[a] memorandum opposing summary judgment
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted ...," id. at. 7(c)(3)(B), and deems admitted each fact set forth in a
moving party's memorandum "unless controverted by the responding party." Id. at
7(c)(3)(A). Plaintiffs offered no dispute to Defendants Eisenman's and
Anderson's verbatim restatement of facts that Judge Stewart recognized as
material and undisputed in the federal court proceedings. Compare R. 956-974;
1093-1102 with R. 1272-1286; 1451-1476. Those facts are thus deemed admitted
and this Court should strike Plaintiffs' assertions here that lack conformity with the
federal court's determination. Utah R.Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A).
5

On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old P.J. had a small growth removed from the floor
of his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. Christensen. Dr. Christensen sent the
excised tissue to Laboratory Corporation of America in Kent, Washington for
analysis. LabCorp determined that the sample was malignant and informed Dr.
Christensen, who referred P.J. to Dr. Harlan Muntz at Primary Children's Medical
Center (PCMC). [R. 515 (Doctors^ Ex 5, Christensen Dep. pp 10, 12-16, 20-21,
24-26); R. 3285-3286, May 9, 2003 LabCorp Path. Rep.].
The Jensens met with Dr. Muntz on May 9, 2003. After examining PJ., Dr.
Muntz referred him to PCMC's oncology department where he met with Dr. Lars
Wagner. Dr. Wagner also met with and examined P.J. on May 9, but could not
offer any diagnosis until after PCMC's pathology department completed its own
testing. [R. 6 Comp. U 24; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 1-3);
(Doctors' Ex 16, Wagner note p 5); R. 2335-2336, D. Jensen Dep.].
At PCMC's request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue sample to PCMC's pathology
department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Amy Lowichik completed a pathology report
on P.J.'s tissue and diagnosed the growth as Ewing's sarcoma based on
immunohistochemical staining and the tumor cells' appearance. Dr. Lowichik's
report indicated that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow pathologist] [Dr. Cheryl
Coffin] who concurs in this interpretation." Deposition testimony indicates that
both pathologists reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr.
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Lowichik estimated her confidence in the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent."
Dr. Coffin was also confident that the tumor was Ewing's sarcoma, and testified
that the diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. [R. 3292-3293, PCMC Path.
Rep.; R. 2794-2795, 2804, Dr. Lowichik Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 3, Dr.
Lowichik Dep. pp 67-68); (Doctors' Ex 2, Dr. Coffin Dep. pp 12-14, 148)].
In addition to immunohistochemical staining, Ewing's Sarcoma may be
diagnosed tlirough cytogenetic and molecular testing. Ewing's cells often manifest
a chromosomal translocation (an "11; 22 translocation"), which may be detected
through those tests. The presence of an 11;22 translocation indicates that a
specimen is Ewing's sarcoma. Cytogenetic testing may be performed only on
fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is placed in formalin or paraffin,
cytogenetic testing is not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing can be
performed on tissue samples that have been placed in formalin or paraffin. [R.
3292-3293, PCMC Path. Rep.; R. 3206-3207, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 2668, Dr.
Johnston Dep.].
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on
sarcoma tissue samples that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate
sample left over after the standard pathology examination." Molecular testing was
available through an affiliated institution. In 2003, it would not have been unusual
for a PCMC pathologist to send samples out for molecular testing to provide

7

further diagnostic information. [R. 3167-3168, 3170, 3208, 3210-3211, Dr.
Wagner Dep.; R. 2730-2733, Dr. Lemons Dep.; R. 1759-1760, Dr. Coffin Dep.; R.
1500, Dr. Albritton Dep.].
Because Dr. Christensen placed the tissue in formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic
testing could not be performed on that specimen. There were still tumor cells in
P.J.'s mouth, which could have been extracted for this purpose, but this would
have required further surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular testing
could have been performed on the tissue sample obtained by Dr. Christensen. [R.
1754-1755, Dr. Coffin Dep.; R. 3163-3164, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 2704, Dr.
Johnston Dep.].
Dr. Wagner discussed P.J.'s diagnosis with Dr. Coffin. She told him that she
was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According
to Dr. Coffin, where the cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining fit
"the criteria for the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma," it is not necessary to perform
cytogenetic or molecular testing to establish the diagnosis. [R. 3164-3165, 31753177, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 2, Dr. Coffin Dep. pp 43-44),
(Doctors' Ex 17, Dr. Wagner Case Summary p 1); R. 1798, Dr. Coffin Dep.].
On May 21, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens for more than an hour. Dr.
Wagner expressed his confidence in the diagnosis and explained the need to begin
chemotherapy right away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference between
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localized and non-localized Ewing's sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed
the Jensens that the cure rate for localized disease - where there is no evidence of
cancer in places other than where it was discovered - was approximately 70%
when treated with the recommended chemotherapy, but that the cure rate for nonlocalized - metastatic - disease was as low as 20%. Thus, Dr. Wagner explained
the necessity of beginning treatment right away to prevent the cancer from
spreading throughout P.J.'s body. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ.
pp 1-2), (Doctors' Ex 23, Wagner Aff. pp 1-2, andffi|4, 6-7), (Doctors' Ex 11, D.
Jensen Dep. pp 47-57, 138-140), (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 142),
(Doctors' Ex 16, Wagner note p 7); R. 3382, PCMC Chart Notes; R. 3607-3609,
Wagner Affj.
That same day, radiographic examinations were performed on P.J.'s neck,
thorax, chest, and skull to determine whether the cancer had spread beyond the
floor of P.J.'s mouth. Each exam was negative. Ms. Jensen testified that they
asked Dr. Wagner "if there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it
was Ewing's and he said no." "He was sure it was Ewing's." [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex
1, PCMC Lab Reports pp 6-12), (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. p 127), (Doctors'
Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 4-8), R. 2154-2155, B. Jensen Dep].
During that visit, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to have P.J/s tissue sample
sent to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second
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opinion. Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens that insurance companies often would
not pay for a second opinion and encouraged them to contact their insurance
provider. Nonetheless, Dr. Wagner agreed to the second opinion and sent the
tissue to Dana-Farber as requested. The Jensens ultimately cancelled the DanaFarber consultation.
[R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 34, 64-70); (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen
Dep. pp 96-97); (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ. p 2)].
The Jensens again met with Dr. Wagner on May 29, 2003. At this meeting they
asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan. Dr.
Wagner refused to order a PET scan, explaining that it would not be useful in
P.J.'s situation because there was no evidence of metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner
further explained to the Jensens that a negative PET scan would not change the
need for chemotherapy. The Jensens again asked Dr. Wagner if there were other
tests to confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said "no." [R. 3395, PCMC
Chart Notes; R. 3218-3219, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. (515 Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen
Dep. pp 95-96, 103-104, 120-121)].
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner differed significantly in their
views regarding P.J.'s medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the Jensens,
Dr. Wagner, Dr. Richard Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC
social worker, and PCMC's head of quality assurance was scheduled for June 9, at
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PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to begin treating P.J. with
chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the cancer from spreading. The
Jensens' statements during this meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend that
they refused to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for
further confirmatory tests. Dr. Wagner contends that they refused chemotherapy
because they wanted to pursue an alternative treatment called Insulin Potentiation
Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve the impasse. During the
meeting, the PCMC head of quality assurance told the Jensens that a referral to the
Division Child and Family Services (DCFS) might be necessary. The Jensens left
the meeting, telling the PCMC representative, "You're fired." [R. 515 (Doctors'
Ex 4, Dr. Wagner Dep. pp 148-149), (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner Case Summ.); (
Doctors'Ex 8, Dr. Lemons Dep. pp 91, 94-95, 106, 113-114, 123-125); R. 27612762, Lemons Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, Social Worker Notes p 16), (Doctors'
Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 178-183), (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. pp 118-119,
136-148)].
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy Families - a division of PCMC
responsible for ensuring that patients are not left untreated - became involved in
P.J.'s case. Around June 12, Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the
Jensens. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June
15, but were unable to reach an agreement as to P.J.'s medical care. Dr. Corwin
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and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss
the situation. At that point, PCMC decided to refer P.J.'s case to DCFS for
medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically necessary
treatment. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 15, PCMC Chart Notes pp 17, 19-20), (Doctors'
Ex 29, Dr. Corwin Dep. pp 52-53, 55-56, 60-61, 73, 76, 79-80, 90-91, 113-115,
119-120, 165), (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. p 215); R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex J,
Dr. Corwin Dep. pp 70, 117); R. 2424-2429, 2438, 2639, D. Jensen Dep.]
On June 16, a regularly-scheduled meeting was held at PCMC with
representatives from DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations in the
child welfare system. Dr. Wagner and Dr. Corwin were also present. At this
meeting, and in a case summary submitted to DCFS, Dr. Wagner summarized his
interactions with the Jensens. A formal referral to DCFS was made that same day.
The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or Dr. Wagner who actually
submitted the referral. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the district
court presumed the latter. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17. Wagner Case Summary);
(Doctors' Ex 29, Dr. Corwin Dep. p 165); R. 1075 (Cunningham Ex A,
Cunningham Dep. pp 90-93, 114-117)].
DCFS assigned P.J.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a DCFS social worker. Drs.
Wagner and Corwin provided Cunningham with information regarding their
understanding of P.J.'s situation, both orally and in written case summaries.
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Cunningham was also present at the June 16 meeting at PCMC. Based on
communications with Dr. Wagner, Cunningham believed that P.J.'s situation
constituted a medical emergency and that something needed to be done within a
matter of hours or days. Cunningham possessed no information that additional
tests existed that could confirm P J.'s diagnosis. And Dr. Wagner reported to
Cunningham that he had talked to Dr. Coffin, who believed that no further tests
were required. [R. 1075 (Cunningham Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 74-81, 114117, 150-155, 162-165); R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex K, Cunningham Dep. p 110, 112113); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner's Case Summary); R. 3407-3411, Wagner
email to Cunningham].
On June 18, 2003, Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General (AAG)
Julie Lund, filed a Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and
Guardianship (Verified Petition) in the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake
County, Utah. Cunningham filed this petition on the information provided to her
by Drs. Wagner and Corwin. She did not conduct an independent investigation of
PCMC's referral or into whether P.J., in fact, had Ewing's sarcoma. But
Cunningham believed that P.J.'s case was an emergency and also that she was
entitled to rely on PCMC's diagnosis and Dr. Wagner's medical opinion. [R. 1075
(Cunningham Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 147-148, 150-151, 153-154); R. 34353446; Juv. Ct. Pldg, Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and
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Guardianship].
Cunningham vacillated about whether she should contact the Jensens directly.
But she ultimately decided not to contact P.J. or his parents, because they obtained
counsel before the CPS case opened. Id. Cunningham also believed that because
P.J.'s case constituted and emergency, DCFS policy precluded her from contacting
the Jensens until after the Verified Petition had been filed. [R. 1075 (Cunningham
Ex A, Cunningham Dep. pp 158-161); R. 3431-3432, DCFS Medical Neglect
Policy; R. 3711-3712, DCFS Activity Records].
On June 20, the Jensens first appeared before the juvenile court. Eisenman
represented DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the primary AAG on P.J.'s
case. [R. 1011 Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 6-9, 14-17].
At the June 20 hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Frank Mylar, represented that
they were interested in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr.
Christensen. The Court continued the hearing until July 10, as the parties indicated
that a stipulation regarding P.J.'s treatment was possible. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex
B, Eisenman Dep. pp 38-41, 106-109, 115-117); R 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-A, Juv.
Ct. Trans., generally and pp 7-9); R. 3454-3455, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Pre-Trial Order].
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Jorg Birkmayer, who practiced in
Vienna, Austria. After reviewing P.J.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated
to the Jensens that he was not "totally convinced" that P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma
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or that chemotherapy was necessary. [R. 3530, Birkmayer letter]
After the June 20 hearing, the Jensens expressed their desire to have Dr.
Birkmayer supervise P.J.'s treatment, and on or about June 30, Mylar provided
Eisenman and P.J.'s then Guardian ad Litem (GAL) attorney with a copy of a June
23, 2003 letter from Dr. Birkmayer. On July 2, Eisenman sent an email to Dr.
Birkmayer in which she asked questions regarding, among other things, Dr.
Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria had a standard of
care similar to that used by the American Academy of Pediatrics.4 Dr. Birkmayer
forwarded Eisenman's email to Mylar, who contacted Eisenman and instructed her
not to contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquires regarding Dr.
Birkmayer to Mylar. According to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire
to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at that time because DCFS was requiring that
P.J.'s medical care be provided by a board-certified pediatric oncologist. [R. 1011
(Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 118-121, 125-133); R. 3529, Birkmayer letter
to Eisenman; R. 3530, Birkmayer email to D. Jensen; R. 3535, Eisenman email to
Birkmayer; R. 2451, 2571-2572, D. Jensen Dep].
Also in late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a new job in Ohio. He

4

The Jensens attempt to construe those guidelines and to suggest that
Eisenman came upon the guidelines through independent research. The record
does not support those claims. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 118121, 126-129); R. 3232, Wagner Dep.].
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informed Eisenman that he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or
Dr. Karen Albritton if she needed anything. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman
Dep. pp 54-55, 149-150); (Eisenman Ex O, p 2)].
In preparation for the July 10 hearing, Eisenman filed a bench brief and
disclosed to the juvenile court and counsel that she intended to prove DCFS's case
using three medical experts: Drs. Coffin, Wagner, and Albritton. Eisenman
provided the court and counsel with a copy of Drs. Coffin's, Wagner's, and
Albritton's CVs and with the PCMC lab results and Dr. Wagner's case summary.
Also in preparation for that hearing, Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton with
materials related to the case, including Dr. Wagner's case summary and a list of
questions that might be asked. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex O, Email from Dr. Wagner
to Eisenman); R. 3150, Dr. Wagner Dep.; R. 1490-1491, Dr. Albritton Dep.; R.
515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldgs., Witness List at 46-48); (Notice of Intent to
Use Experts at 49-52); (Doctors' Ex 17, Wagner's Case Sum.); (Doctors' Ex 33-B,
Juv. Ct. Trans., July 10, 2003)].
The Jensens were represented by Mylar and attorney Blake Nakamura at the
July 10 hearing. At the outset, Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony
because he believed the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference and not an
evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court sustained the objection and Drs. Albritton
and Coffin did not testify. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds, Nakamura
Notice of Appearance at 178-179; Objection to Pre-Trial Disclosures at 220-222;
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Juv. Ct. Minutes at 227-228; Juv. Ct. Pre-Trial Order at 229-233)].
The Jensens again raised the issue of whether P.J. really had Ewing's sarcoma.
And at the hearing's outset, the Jensens submitted a second letter from Dr.
Birkmayer, dated July 9, 2003. But neither the Jensens nor their counsel requested
leave of the court to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. Instead, after a short recess, the
parties stipulated that P.J. would be examined by doctors at the Children's Hospital
of Los Angeles (CHLA) and that the Jensens would abide by CHLA's treatment
recommendations. The juvenile court set another pretrial conference for July 28,
2003. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex X, Birkmayer letter to Eisenman); R 515 (Doctors'
Ex 33-B, Juv. Ct. Trans., July 10, 2003), (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Records, Juv.
Ct. Pre-Trial Order at 229-233)].
Per the stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met with
Dr. Tishler on July 21. At this meeting, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he
was recommending chemotherapy based on prior pathology tests, but that CHLA
would do its own pathology analysis and genetic testing to confirm the Ewing's
sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were unhappy with this result because they
believed that Dr. Tishler was not performing an independent evaluation, but was
merely deferring to the PCMC doctors. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 41, Dr. Tishler Dep.
p 25); R. 3088-3089, 3096-3099, Dr. Tishler Dep; R. 2499-2500, D. Jensen Dep.;
R 2179, 2234, 2254, B. Jensen Dep.].
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens never returned to CHLA, but sought
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medical care from Dr. Charles Simone, a New Jersey physician. Dr. Simone
initially agreed to treat P.J., but on learning of the legal battle in which the Jensens
were entrenched, Dr. Simone declined involvement. Nonetheless, the Jensens
believed that Dr. Simone would still agree to treat P. J., if the juvenile court would
permit it. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 42, Dr. Simone Dep. pp 11-15, 24-25, 41);
(Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 315-323, 974-975); (Doctors' Ex 41, Tishler
Dep. pp 60-61); (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 491); R. 3616, Tishler email to
Eisenman; R. 2188-2189, 2243, 2246, B. Jensen Dep].
On July 28, the court received a report from Dr. Tishler, via telephone,
regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge
the CHLA testing was not yet complete. But he also stated that there was no
question that P.J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy right
away and that the remaining pathological and radiologicial tests would serve only
to clarify what type of tumor he had for purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy to
P.J.'s needs. Nakamura advocated the Jensens' concern that not all of the testing
had been completed. Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the juvenile
court ordered that P.J. commence chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without
regard to the CHLA test results. The court also provided that should the test
results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the Jensens were free to bring
that fact to the juvenile court's attention. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct.
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Trans, July 28, 2003, generally and at 17-18, 23-24, 41-42); R. 3481-3484, Juv. Ct.
Pldg., Order for Treatment].
Nakamura also represented, on July 28, that the Jensens were uncomfortable
with Dr. Tishler and preferred that P.J. be treated by Dr. Simone. The court asked
Dr. Albritton whether Dr. Simone could be the primary treating physician:
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. My understanding, in
fact, is that he is not board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical
oncology. He's - from what little I know, he's a specialist in
complimentary and alternative medicine. So the gist I get is that he would
be asking someone in Utah or in L.A. to be prescribing the chemotherapy
and then he would be suggesting the complimentary approaches that might
diminish side effects and so on. I do not think there will be an oncologist in
Utah or L.A. who would let him prescribe the chemotherapy from New
Jersey.
[R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep p 978); (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct. Trans,
July 28, 2003 at 50-51)].
The juvenile court also asked Dr. Tishler whether P.J.'s primary treating
physician needed to be a board certified oncologist: "Definitely. There's no other
physician that could lead the care and provide the care." Based on this, the
juvenile court ordered that P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified
pediatric oncologist or hematologist, but that Dr. Simone was authorized to work
with P.J.'s other treating physicians. The court also scheduled an evidentiary
hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in the event P.J.'s situation
was not yet resolved. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-C, Juv. Ct. Trans, July 28, 2003 at
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53-54); (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Signed Minute Entry at 234-235)].
The Jensens maintain that prior to July 10, Eisenman advocated that P.J.
receive treatment only from a board-certified physician. The transcripts from the
June 20 and July 10 court hearings contain no evidence that Eisenman took that
position. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-A, Juv. Ct. Trans, June 20, 2003); (Doctors' Ex
33-B Juv. Ct. Trans, July 10, 2003)]. It was attorneys Mylar and Nakamura who
first discussed P.J. being treated by a board-certified physician on July 10. [R. 515
(Doctors' Ex 33-B Juv. Ct. Trans, July 10, 2003 at 6)]. Eisenman did insist that
P.J. receive treatment from a board-certified pediatric oncologist after the juvenile
court made that part of its July 28 order.
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to receive the ordered
chemotherapy. Instead, around August 6, they contacted the Burzynski Clinic in
Houston, Texas to inquire whether P.J. could be treated there. A clinic employee
contacted the Jensens on August 7 to indicate that the clinic would see PJ. and
scheduled an appointment for August 12. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep.
pp 424-425); (Doctors' Ex 51, Burzyinski Clinic Intake Sheet p 1); R. 2248-2249,
2264, B. Jensen Dep.].
The Jensens apparently believed that they did not have to comply with the
juvenile court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003, and that this
would result only in that court holding the August 20, evidentiary hearing on the
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Verified Petition. Thus, on August 8, the Jensens took P. J. and the rest of their
children to Bear Lake in Idaho to go boating. From Idaho, they planned to travel
to Houston for P.J. to be evaluated in the Burzyinski Clinic on August 12. [R.
2466-2467, 2518-2522, 2534, 2541, D. Jensen Dep.].
Having not received confirmation that PJ.'s chemotherapy was underway,
Eisenman sought a hearing with the juvenile court on August 8, 2003, for the
purpose of seeking authorization to take P.J. into protective custody. Eisenman
called Nakamura to notify him of her intentions. The court heard directly from
Eisenman, Cunningham, and P.J.'s GAL, and from Nakamura, who participated
by telephone. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 198-201, 218-229),
(Eisenman Ex Q, Nakamura Dep. pp 444-445); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 55, McDonald
Dep. pp 49-50, 223-225); (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds., Order for Treatment at
237-240); (Doctors' Ex 10, Application for a Warrant with Aff at 241-251);
(Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Minutes of 8/13/03 at 297-298); (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv.
Ct. 8/13/03 Phone Conference Trans, at 192-209); (Doctors' Ex 34, Nakamura
Dep. pp 101-106, 115, 244-245, 446); (Doctors' Ex 28, Dr. Albritton Dep. pp 109113)].
Nakamura indicated that PJ. was not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens
did not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that they were taking P.J. to the
Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response, Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton,
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who joined the hearing by phone. The court and counsel asked Dr. Albritton
whether the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to treat P.J. Dr. Albritton indicated
that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his
clinic was known for providing extremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton
further indicated that she was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the clinic,
but would have to confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that to her
understanding, the clinic was not an appropriate treatment option for a newlydiagnosed cancer patient who had not exhausted standard treatment options. [R.
515 (Doctors' Ex 28, Dr. Albritton Dep. pp 109-113), (Doctors' Ex 55, McDonald
Dep. pp 223-225), (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans., 8/13/2003); (Doctors' Ex
34, Nakamura Dep. pp 101-106, 115); R 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp
201-205,219-220,225-226)].
Eisenman filed an Application to Take a Child Into Protective Custody, which
was supported by Cunningham's August 8, 2003 affidavit, and the attached
affidavit of Dr. Wagner, dated July 22, 2003. The juvenile court then signed an
order authorizing DCFS to take P.J. into protective custody, finding that was in his
best interest. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy City Police Officer, Travis
Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day to serve the court's order, but he
was unable to do so because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake. [R. 515
(Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg, Application & Aff.'s pp 241-251; Order to Take
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Child Into Protective Custody pp 253-254); R. 2020-2021, Eisenman Dep.; R.
3642-3643, Sandy City PD Red],
After the hearing, a court clerk told Eisenman and the GAL that a juvenile court
warrant would not be placed on a national database, which required an adult
warrant. Thereafter, Eisenman told the Jensens' counsel and the GAL that if the
Jensens failed to cooperate with the juvenile court orders, she would have to seek
assistance from local and federal enforcement authorities. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10,
Juv. Ct. Reds., Guardian ad Litem Motion for OSC pp 259-298); (Doctors' Ex 33
D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03 pp 192-209); R. 2904, McDonald Dep.; R. 3728-3729,
Eisenman 8/11/03 letter].
Nakamura informed the Jensens of the court's "pickup order" and of the fact
P.J. was to be placed in DCFS' legal custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this,
the Jensens decided to stay in Idaho and seek an independent opinion of P.J.'s
condition in preparation for the August 20 evidentiary hearing. [R. 2529-2531 &
2535-2539, D. Jensen Dep.; R. 2273, B. Jensen Dep.; R. 3013-3014, Nakamura
Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-D, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct. Trans)].
On August 11, the GAL and Eisenman co-authored a letter to the Burzynski
Clinic, notifying it that the juvenile court had placed PJ. in State's legal custody
and stating that the State did not consent to P.J. receiving treatment there. And on
August 13, P.J.'s GAL filed a motion for an order to show cause. The juvenile
court held a hearing the same day. [R. 3732, McDonald/Eisenman letter; R. 201123

2014, Eisenman Dep.; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Reds., GAL Motion for
OSC pp 259-298); (Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03)].
Nakamura informed the court that he had made telephone contact with the
Jensens, and that he had advised them of the court's August 8 order and told them
to comply. Eisenman notified the court and counsel that the Salt Lake County
District Attorney's (DA) Office planned to screen the matter for criminal charges.
The juvenile court then issued bench warrants for Daren and Barbara Jensens'
arrest and ordered them to appear and to present P.J. Id. [R. 515 (Dr.s Ex 10, Juv.
Ct. Reds, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct. Min. pp 297-298), (Doctors' Ex 33-D, 8/13/03 Juv. Ct.
Trans, pp 192-209)].
On August 15, 2003 and based, in part, on information provided by Eisenman to
Officer Peterson, the DA's Office held a criminal case screening that Eisenman,
Cunningham, and the GAL attended. Eisenman provided the DDA with a copy of
the juvenile court's August 8 custody order and told the DDA that Eisenman was
most concerned with getting P.J. into treatment. The same day, a Deputy DA filed
one count each of custodial interference and child kidnaping against Daren and
Barbara Jensen. [R. 1011 (Eisenman Ex B, Eisenman Dep. pp 230-237); (Eisenman
Ex T, Micklos Dep. pp 36-38, 84-86); R. 3744, 3774-3781, SL DA File; R. 36583661, SCPD File; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03 p 12)].
Utah's child kidnaping statute does not require that a person "flee" with a minor
child, but states that a person commits child kidnaping if he or she "intentionally or
24

knowingly, without authority at law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes,
confines, detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of
the victim's .. . guardian . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (West 2004).
The DDA's understanding that Parents left the state after the warrant was
entered came from her conversations with law enforcement. [R. 1011 (Eisenman
Ex T, Micklos Dep. pp 37-38); R. 974, Eisenman SOUF % 40].
On August 16, Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho, where he spent four days in
jail before making bail. Ms. Jensen left Idaho and took P.J. to Houston to meet
with the Burzynski Clinic. But the clinic refused to see P.J. because Eisenman and
the GAL had informed it that the State of Utah had legal custody over P.J. and did
not consent to his treatment there. [R. 2534, 2569, D. Jensen Dep.; R. 2206-2207 &
2320, B. Jensen Dep.; R. 3732, McDonald letter to Burzynski Clinic].
On August 20, the juvenile court held a non-evidentiary hearing. Nakamura
read a letter authored by Mr. Jensen into the record and explained to the court that
the Jensens wanted an opportunity to present evidence. The court agreed to set an
evidentiary hearing, but refused to lift the warrants. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33-E, Juv.
Ct. Trans, 8/20/03); (Doctors' Ex 48, D. Jensen letter to Yeates pp 1-4)] .
Shortly after this hearing, Eisenman assumed a new position in the AG's office
and no longer participated in P.J.'s case. Mark May, then Division Chief of the
AG's Child Protection Division, assumed primary responsibility for the Jensen
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matter. [R. 2028-2029, Eisenman Dep.].
Also at this time, a representative of Utah's governor asked Anderson, DCFS'
then-Director and who had only recently learned of PJ.'s case, to personally assist
in negotiating a resolution to PJ.'s case. On August 27, Anderson flew to Idaho to
meet with the Jensens, where negotiations continued for several days. [R. 1129
(Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep. pp 65, 67, 72-73, 84-86, 101-104); R. 515
(Doctors' Ex 33-E, Juv. Ct. Trans, 8/20/03)].
By this date, the juvenile court had orders in place: (1) directing P.J. to
commence chemotherapy and to be treated by a board-certified pediatric
oncologist/hematologist; (2) placing P. J. in the state of Utah's legal custody for
purposes of commencing that treatment; and (3) authorizing the arrest of PJ.'s
parents for their violation of the juvenile court's prior court orders. [R. 1075
(Cunningham Ex O, D. Jensen Warrant & OSC); (Cunningham Ex P, B. Jensen
Warrant & OSC pp); R. 3735-3736, Juv. Ct. 7/28/03 Minutes; R. 515 (Doctors' Ex
33-D, Juv. Ct. Trans. 8/13/03)].
When asked by then Governor Leavitt to resolve the situation between the
Jensens and DCFS, Anderson also reviewed DCFS policies relative to medical
neglect. And though not asked to do so, Anderson reviewed Cunningham's
handling of PJ.'s case - including her failure to independently investigate
PCMC'S referral before seeking court action - to determine whether it complied
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with DCFS policy for addressing medical neglect in an emergency. Anderson
believed that it did. [R. 1129 (Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep pp 39, 43, 53,
62, 125, 232, 234)]. Relevant DCFS Policy provides that "[i]n cases where the
consequence of the parents' failure to follow treatment may be death or significant
permanent physical or mental damages, the worker will take steps to initiate
emergency court proceedings by contacting the [AAG] immediately and will not
attempt to resolve the situation through voluntary services alone." [R. 3431-3432,
DCFS Medical Neglect Policy].
When asked by the governor to intervene in the Jensen matter, Anderson's goal
was to help the Jensens assemble a plan to present to the juvenile court that would
meet both PJ.,'s needs and the court's prior orders. Anderson told the Jensens that
he did not believe they were neglecting the situation, but that he also believed that
they needed to get a treatment plan in place that was in P.J.'s best interest before
the matter could be resolved. Anderson also believed that although the Jensens
were addressing P.J.'s situation, they could still be guilty of medical neglect by
failing to provide P.J. with standard treatment that was designed to maximize P.J.'s
chances for survival. [R. 1129 (Anderson Ex B, Ex 1, Anderson Dep. pp 72-73, 8788); R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 801, 809-810)].
Accordingly, on September 5, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the
Jensens agreed to submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Martin Johnston, a board certified
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pediatric oncologist at St. Luke's Hospital in Boise, Idaho and to abide by Dr.
Johnston's treatment recommendations. DCFS, in turn, agreed to ask the juvenile
court to return full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate the warrants. Upon
receiving assurances from the Jensens that they would submit P.J. to chemotherapy
if it was recommended, the juvenile court approved the stipulation. [R. 515
(Doctors' Ex 33-H, Juv. Ct. Trans. 9/5/03), (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg.,
Stipulated Agreement pp 375-378), (Doctors' Ex 10, Minute Entry p 374),
(Doctors' Ex 10, Order pp 379-381)].
Dr. Johnston performed the evaluation and concluded that P.J. needed
chemotherapy. The Jensens refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy and claimed
Dr. Johnston had rubber-stamped PCMC's diagnosis. Mr. Jensen told Dr. Johnston
that if P.J. did receive chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure it's a
hellish experience for everybody involved." [R. 3807-3810, Johnston 9/26/03 letter;
R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen Dep. pp 389, 697-698, 700-702), (Doctors' Ex
14, B. Jensen Dep. pp 349, 354, 451-454)].
The juvenile court held another hearing on October 8, where Dr. Johnston
testified and confirmed that P.J. had Ewing's sarcoma and that the Jensens had
rejected his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemotherapy. AAG Mark May
indicated the parties would attempt to reach a settlement. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 33J, Juv. Ct. Trans., 10/8/03, generally and at 6-10, 78); R. 2029, Eisenman Dep. p

28

242].
But having determined that the Jensens would not submit P.J. to chemotherapy
under any circumstances, DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss the Verified Petition on
October 22, 2003. There, DCFS stated that its decision to dismiss the petition was
made with full recognition that without chemotherapy, P.J.'s chances of survival
would fall dramatically. Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was simply
unworkable to attempt to force a 13 -year-old boy to undergo chemotherapy
unwillingly. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 10, Juv. Ct. Pldg., Motion & Memo to Dismiss
Verified Petition pp 438-455)].
On October 2, the Jensens entered a plea agreement on the criminal charges.
The Jensens each pled guilty to one count of custodial interference. In exchange,
the DA's Office dismissed the kidnaping charges. The Jensens' pleas were held in
abeyance for one year and were later dismissed. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 11, D. Jensen
Dep. pp 733-735) (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep. p 591)]. Neither entered an
Alford plea. [R. 1011 Eisenman (Ex V, D. Jensen Plea in Abeyance reds pp 6, 8-12;
B. Jensen Plea in Abeyance reds pp 15-23; Ct Minutes pp 24-25), (Ex W 10/2/03
Plea Hearing Trans.)]. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); State v.
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1993).
Daren Jensen testified on deposition in 2007 that the facts alleged in the
criminal information and probable cause statement were true. [515 (Doctors' Ex 11,
D. Jensen Dep pp 733-735)]. And Barbara Jensen agreed that she interfered with
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the State's custody of P.J. [R. 515 (Doctors' Ex 14, B. Jensen Dep., p 591)].

Summary of the Argument
The trial court correctly granted State Defendants' motions for summary
judgment because Plaintiffs' similar claims under the U.S. Constitution were fully
and fairly litigated and were dismissed as a matter of law in the United States
District Court. That decision is sound and should be affirmed by this Court
because, as a threshold matter, all of Plaintiffs' claims are barred alternatively by
the doctrines of issue preclusion or law of the case. Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot
establish that they possess greater constitutional rights under Utah's Constitution
than under the U.S. Constitution; thus their claims are unfounded in law. And were
this not the case, State Defendants should nonetheless prevail because Plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate a "flagrant" violation of their rights. Finally, Plaintiffs failed to
adequately raise or to brief any claims against Defendant Eisenman or to support
their common law claims on appeal. For this reason alone, the trial court's
dismissal of Defendant Eisenman and of Plaintiff s tort claims should be affirmed.
State Defendants therefore ask this Court to affirm the trial court's order
granting summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims. But to the
extent the Court may determine that Plaintiffs possess broader constitutional rights
as a matter of state law and that the federal court's issue determinations are not
binding here, the Court should remand this matter to the state court for further
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consideration of the facts and record evidence adduced below in the first instance.

ARGUMENT
I. RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF LAW OF
THE CASE BAR RELITIGATION OF THE ISSUES
UNDERLYING PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW CLAIMS.
Utah law recognizes two interrelated doctrines regarding the finality of judgments:
res judicata and the law of the case. See Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, 194
P.3d 956; IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmL, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 196 P.3d 588.
Res judicata, in turn, embraces issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Oman, 2008 UT
70, T) 28. Only issue preclusion pertains here.5
Issue preclusion and law of the case are kindred concepts designed to limit the
relitigation of issues. Traditionally, law of the case contemplates the termination of
issues when they arise again in the same case, see D & KMgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, %
26, and issue preclusion contemplates the termination of issues when they arise in
subsequent, related litigation. See Oman, 2008 UT 70,fflj28, 31. But this is not a
traditional case. Instead, given its unique procedural posture, this Court can affirm the

5

Plaintiffs" dismissed federal claims were predicated on the U.S.
Constitution. Their dismissed state claims rest upon the Utah Constitution and
state common law torts. Because those claims differ, issue, not claim preclusion
applies. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, ^| 31 (issue preclusion properly bars relitigation
of issues that have been finally determined, even where the claims for relief may
differ) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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trial court's summary judgment, alternatively, under either concept.6
A. The Federal Court Determined All of the Issues Underlying Plaintiffs' State
Law Claims.
Plaintiffs filed suit in Utah's Third District Court for violations of the state and
federal constitutions and other common law torts. R. 1-70. All of the defendants
removed the case under federal question jurisdiction. R. 106-08. There, the State
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiffs'
claims. The federal court determined the material facts were not in dispute and that
State Defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. That court
dismissed Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims and remanded the state claims to state court.
Plaintiffs timely appealed the federal court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On remand, the district court determined that because Judge Stewart conclusively
found that no disputed issues of material fact existed on the same evidence and
arguments, it was bound by the federal court's determination. Judge Stewart's issue
determinations bear repeating here:
Defendant Eisenman. Plaintiffs sued Eisenman for alleged "non-prosecutorial
functions" relative to P.J.'s case, including investigative and complaining witness
functions. R. 4, CompL ^ 15. In both federal and state court, Plaintiffs alleged that (1)

6

This Court may affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
State Defendants on any ground apparent from the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002
UT 58,ffif10, 13,52 P.3d 1158.
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Eisenman made factual misrepresentations or omissions to the state juvenile court, to
her clients and co-counsel, and to a deputy district attorney, Add,. D, Consol. Memo,
pp 43-51; and (2) Eisenman engaged in other, investigative functions. Id. at pp. 74, 78.
But in the prior litigation, Judge Stewart concluded that all of Eisenman's conduct fell
squarely within her role as the state's attorney and that she was absolutely immune
from suit. Add. C, D & O, 2008 WL 4372933 at * 12-13.
Judge Stewart determined that "[e]ven assuming that Ms. Eisenman intentionally
misrepresented facts to the Juvenile Court, those misrepresentations were made in her
role as an advocate. There is no evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations
were made under oath or as a witness." Id. at *12; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp.
14-26. He found that Eisenman's relationship with Cunningham and Anderson was
that of attorney-client and that her relationship with AG Shurtleff was as co-counsel.
Judge Stewart concluded that Eisenman's "communications with th[o]se persons were
all directly related to the Juvenile Court proceedings," D & O at *12, and held that
even assuming the alleged misrepresentations, the communications were "directly
related to [Eisenman's] ability to present the State's case, [and] satisfied] the guiding
principle of prosecutorial immunity - proximity to the 'judicial process and the
initiation and presentation of the state's case.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d
897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000)).
The federal court also recognized that though Eisenman provided information to the
DDA, she did so to effectuate the juvenile court's order of protective custody: "It is
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clear to this Court that th[o]se actions were intimately connected to her duties to the
Juvenile Court." D & O at * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra pp. 23-25. The court
reached the same conclusion respecting a letter Eisenman co-authored with P.J.'s GAL
and sent to the Burzynski Clinic. D & O at * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 2324.
Finally, Judge Stewart examined the actions that Plaintiffs describe as investigatory.
Respecting Dr. Albritton, the court notably observed that Plaintiffs failed to "show how
providing documents to a witness in the course of preparing for a hearing is
investigative." D & O * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 16. And as to the letter
to Dr. Birkmayer, Judge Stewart determined that even when viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs, the alleged facts precluded even an inference that Eisenman
obtained and forwarded an errant standard of care "through her own investigative
efforts." D & O * 13; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp.15.
Because the federal court determined the threshold issue of Eisenman's absolute
immunity in prior litigation, the district court correctly estopped Plaintiffs from
relitigating that issue. The district's court decision is sound and should be affirmed.
Defendant Cunningham. Next, Plaintiffs complain that Cunningham violated
their state and federal constitutional rights by: (1) initiating a child welfare proceeding
without first independently investigating P.J.'s diagnosis and Dr. Wagner's report of
medical neglect, Add. D, Consol. Memo, pp. 51-55; (2) making material
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misrepresentations and omissions in the verified petition7 and affidavits she filed with
the juvenile court, id. at pp. 56-58; and (3) acting as a complaining witness with respect
to criminal charges filed by a deputy district attorney. Id. at p. 78. Judge Stewart
ruled in Cunningham's favor on each issue. D&O, 2008 WL 4372933 at ** 21-24,
26-30.
Judge Stewart found "[t]he Jensens have produced no evidence that Ms.
Cunningham had reason to suspect that the information and opinions given to her by
Drs. Wagner and Corwin were misleading." Id. at * 21; see Statement of Facts, supra,
pp. 12-13. The court also determined Cunningham reasonably believed that P.J.'s case
constituted an emergency and that as such, she "was reasonable in relying on the
information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of further
investigation/' D & O * 22 (citing Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d
1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The federal court analyzed Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and
omissions, and found that "[a]ssuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the
misrepresentations . . . do not establish a constitutional violation," id. at * 23, and that
"[t]he alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, consequence."

7

Judge Stewart also determined that Cunningham functioned as a
prosecutor and was thus entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to file the
Verified Petition in the juvenile court. Add. C, D & 0, 2008 WL 4372933, *14 .
Plaintiffs' have not addressed that finding here and any argument that they may
have made below is waived. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^ 23, 16 P.3d 540.
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Id; see R. 3918-29 (Add 2 to Cunningham's Reply in Supt of MSJ).
Judge Stewart found that two of the allegations "were not misrepresentations or
omissions at all, as demonstrated by the [July 28] hearing transcript itself," D & O *
23; see Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 18-20; R. 3918-29, and that when viewed in their
proper context, the remaining misrepresentations were not germane to the issues then
before the juvenile court and thus "were plainly immaterial." D & O at * 23. Instead,
the federal court noted the allegations amounted to nothing more than "nitpicking". Id.
at * 26. Respecting the alleged misrepresentations and omissions, Judge Stewart
concluded
. . . Cunningham instituted process before a State court of competent
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against [Plaintiffs].
In this proceeding, [Plaintiffs'] fundamental rights to direct the custody,
care, and control of their son were carefully balanced by a neutral judge.
There is simply insufficient evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately
misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Juvenile Court.
Id at * 24; see also * 26.
That Court also addressed and rejected Plaintiffs' claim that they possessed a
separate liberty interest in Utah's child welfare statutes. D & O at * 27. And, finally,
Judge Stewart determined that upon the undisputed evidence that Cunningham neither
initiated nor continued the criminal action against the Plaintiff parents. Id. at * 29; see
Statement of Facts, supra, p. 24.
Defendant Anderson. Plaintiffs complained that Defendant Anderson violated
their state and federal constitutional rights by (1) interfering with the Plaintiff parents'
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ability to take P.J. to a physician of their choice, Add. D., Consol. Memo, pp. 59-63;
(2) refusing to immediately dismiss the juvenile court action, id. at p. 63; (3) failing to
disclose information to the juvenile court, id. at pp. 63-64; and (4) failing to properly
train or supervise Defendant Cunningham. Id. at pp.58-9; 65-66. But Judge Stewart
addressed and then rejected each, discrete issue. Add. C , D & O, 2008 WL 4372933
at ** 24-27.
Specifically, he found that Anderson's involvement in P.J.'s case did not begin until
late August 2003 and was limited to negotiating a resolve to the case between the state
and the Plaintiff parents. Id. * 24; see Statement of Facts, supra, p 26-27. The Court
determined that by the time Anderson became involved, the juvenile court previously
had already "ordered P.J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a board-certified
pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003," D & O *24, and had placed P.J. in the state's
protective custody because the Plaintiff parents had, by then, missed that deadline. Id.;
see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26. Judge Stewart found that Anderson's position
that P.J. be treated by a board-certified pediatric oncologist was in accord with both the
juvenile court's orders and the opinion of Dr. Tishler, a physician whom Parents selfselected. D & O * 24; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 18-20, 26-27. Judge Stewart
thus determined that Anderson's conduct was "narrowly tailored to serve the State's
compelling interest in protecting P.J." Id.; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 27-28.
Judge Stewart next observed Anderson's remark that Plaintiffs were "great

37

parents," but found that comment did not infer that Anderson believed Plaintiffs had
not medically neglected PJ. D & O at * 25; see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26-27.
The court remarked, instead, that when viewed in context in which Anderson made this
statement, it "in no way interfered with [Plaintiffs'] right to familial association or to
[Parents'] right to direct P.J.'s care. D & O at * 25.
Judge Stewart also underscored that Plaintiffs did "not direct[] the Court to
evidence that Mr. Anderson knew the Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility of
genetic testing or that genetic tests were 'definitive.'" Id. "Moreover," that court
observed, Plaintiffs "repeatedly stated their desire for further testing during the
Juvenile Court proceedings." Id. Finally, Judge Stewart found that Plaintiffs had
adduced no evidence that Anderson understood that if Dr. Johnston diagnosed P.J.
before genetic testing was complete that that breached the September 5 stipulation or
resulted in a violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights because, as the court observed:
"[Plaintiffs] refused to follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, which lead
to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly thereafter. The only action taken by the
Juvenile Court subsequent to Dr. Johnston's recommendation was to dismiss the case."
Id.; Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 28-29.
Judge Stewart then rejected Plaintiffs' claim that Anderson failed to train and
supervise Defendant Cunningham, finding that (1) Plaintiffs brought no evidence to the
Court's attention that could show, if true, that Anderson acted with "deliberate
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indifference" to the rights of others in failing to train Ms. Cunningham; and (2)
Plaintiffs failed to establish that Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional
rights, a prerequisite to Anderson's liability as a matter of law. D & O * 26 (citations
omitted); see Statement of Facts, supra, pp. 26-27..
Finally, Judge Stewart observed that Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim also
failed, because Plaintiffs' provided no evidence that DCFS possessed a policy of not
investigating medical neglect referrals received from PCMC physicians and that the
evidence Plaintiff did possess failed to support even the inference of such a policy. Id.
* 27; see Statement of Facts, supra, 26-27. But the court found instead, that even if
Plaintiffs had provided such evidence, it would merely indicate that DCFS policy
permitted a caseworker to initiate an action, without further investigation when the
caseworker possessed objectively reasonable evidence that the case constituted an
emergency. Id.
B. Issue Preclusion Bars Plaintiffs' Claims.
Issue preclusion provides that a court's final decision on an issue actually litigated
and necessarily decided in a previous suit is conclusive on that issue in subsequent
litigation. Oman, 2008 UT 70,fflf31-32 ("The issue was squarely before the federal
court, was litigated by the parties, and was necessary to the court's final judgment on
the § 1983 claim"); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The
doctrine is more than a court management tool, but is intended to relieve parties of the
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cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage
reliance on adjudication. Id. at ^ 28.
Issue preclusion applies when:
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the
action in question, (2) the prior action has been fully adjudicated on the
merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the prior action.
Barrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations and emphasis
omitted); see Oman, 2008 UT 70, ^ 28 n.5 (federal law applies to determine preclusive
effect of federal court decision on a subsequent state court proceeding). Each element
is satisfied.
First, the federal court's Decision and Order represents a final adjudication on the
merits of Plaintiffs' federal claims and of the issues underlying those claims.8 Next,
the parties are identical in each action. Third, the prior summary judgment proceedings
afforded Plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues at controversy here.
And, the determinative issues decided by Judge Stewart are identical with the

8

Plaintiffs take exception with that assertion. But Plaintiffs confuse issue
preclusion with claim preclusion. The federal court did not adjudicate Plaintiffs'
state law claims) the court remanded them. But where Plaintiffs' state claims
embody the same facts and dispositive issues that the federal court determined by a
final order, issue preclusion applies. Oman, 2008 UT 70, % 31.
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determinative issues presented here. See supra, pp 32-39.9
Despite this, Plaintiffs contend that issue preclusion does not apply to bar
relitigation of issues decided within the same case. To support this claim, Plaintiffs
rely on inapposite case law and dicta, that this Court can distinguish and disregard. See
Appnt. Br. pp 63, 66 (citing Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (7th
Cir. 1998) (finding under 28 U.S.C. § 1450 that in context of removal, prior state order
was not conclusive, but was binding until set aside); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal
Corp., 204 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 & n. 1 (10th Cir. 2000) (dicta).
In neither case was the appellate court faced with whether a final order dismissing a

Plaintiffs contend that, in part, the issues presented in the state court
differ from those presented in the federal court and assert that in Utah a party's
intent presents an issue of fact. Namely, Plaintiffs argue that "the federal court's
findings that misrepresentations made by . . . Cunningham were not made
deliberately would be impermissible on summary judgment in state court." Appnt.
Br., pp 65-66. But that argument misstates the federal court's determination.
Judge Stewart ruled that to the extent Plaintiff proved Cunningham made
misrepresentations, they were not germane to the matters then before the juvenile
court and they were therefore immaterial. Add. C , D & 0, 2008 WL 4372933,
*23-24. The court also found that despite alleging that Cunningham engaged in a
scheme of deliberate misrepresentations, Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence
to support that claim. Id.
Plaintiffs likewise insist that the state court was not bound to follow the
federal court's determination that defendants acted "reasonably," because
questions of "reasonableness" pose issues of fact best left to the jury. Appnt. Br,
pp. 67-68. First, that contention is overbroad. See D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, fflj
18-19 (courts should proceed with caution on fact-dependent questions, but courts
are not required to draw remote or improbable inferences in favor a non-moving
party). Second, none of the instances cited pertain to State Defendants. See
Appnt. Br., pp. 68-69.
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claim could preclude relitigating the issues essential to that claim on remand.10 But the
majority of courts that have considered that issue, have found that issue preclusion may
prevent relitigation of issues inside the same suit. See, e.g., Vines v. Univ. of
Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 710-11 (5th Cir. 2005) (collateral estoppel
precludes plaintiff from relitigating issues in remanded state case where they involve
the same issues of ultimate fact determined by a prior, final federal judgment); Thacker
v. City ofHyattsville, 762 A.2d 172, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (when federal court
disposes of federal claim before trial, on remand to state court, collateral estoppel
precludes relitigating issues the federal court actually decided); cf. Jaskolski v. Daniels,
905 N.E.2d 1,13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no preclusion because federal court did
not adjudicate determinative issue). See also, Haase v. R &P Indus. Chimney Repair,
Co., 409 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (issues determined by summary
judgment dismissing co-defendant are binding and conclusive at later stage of same
litigation), rev. denied', Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray-Line Sight Seeing Co., 120
Cal.App.Ct.3d 622, 628-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation of issues determined by prior summary judgment dismissing crosscomplaint filed in same action); Hicks v. Hicks, 176 S.W. 2d 371, 374-75 (Term. Ct.
App. 1943) (when issue has been finally determined, res judicata prevents relitigation

10

This Court was also not faced with that issue in D & K Management,
Inc., 2008 UT 73, ^| 26 & n.20 (differentiating, in dicta, law of the case from res
judicata).
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of that issue whether in same or independent suit).
It is black letter law that "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
27 (1982). That rule was created to ward off endless litigation and to ensure the
stability of judgments. See 46 AM.JUR.2D Judgments § 515 (1994). And while the rule
usually applies when an issue has been decided in one action and subsequently arises in
a second, nothing in the rule's rationale prevents its application within the four comers
of the same litigation. The doctrine is intended to limit needless relitigation of issues.
Because that rationale is not limited to only subsequent or independent actions, this
Court should find that issue preclusion can apply to subsequent proceedings within the
same action. See e.g., Oman, 2008 UT 70,fflj28, 31.
Here, the same material issues to Plaintiffs' state law claims were squarely before
the federal court; the parties actually litigated those issues; and the federal court's final
resolution of the issues was essential to that court's section 1983 determination. See
Discussion, supra, pp. 32-39. Those issue determinations became binding in the
subsequent state court action. See Oman, 2008 UT 70 atffl|32-33.
Finally, Plaintiffs have not shown that sufficient policy reasons exist to ignore the
preclusive effect of the federal court's rulings. Plaintiffs urge that the state court
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"should have viewed [Plaintiffs'] state constitutional claims independently of their
federal claims," Appnt. Br., pp 42-43, and that by viewing Plaintiffs' state
constitutional claims against the backdrop of issue preclusion, Judge Fratto subrogated
Utah's constitution to its federal counterpart. Id. at 37-43, generally. That argument
misses the mark.
Judge Fratto, in fact, considered the scope of Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims.
But the court determined, that in the absence of evidence that Article I, sections 1, 7,
and 14 provide these Plaintiffs with greater rights as a matter of state law, issue
preclusion barred relitigation of the claims. See R. 4202-03, Memorandum Decision at
pp. 4-5; R. 4220, Trans, of Hrg. at pp. 20-21, 27-28, 32-34, 39, 55, 69-72. That
analysis was proper and was compelled because all of the defendants pled res judicata
as an affirmative defense to Plaintiffs' remanded state law claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that as a threshold matter, a court must
review the presented claims to determine the scope of the alleged constitutional right.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Judge Fratto did that. To determine the
necessary scope of Plaintiffs' Article I claims, the trial court examined the conduct that
Plaintiffs maintain violated those rights. But because Plaintiffs, themselves, alleged
the same conduct in support of their state law claims as they did in furtherance of their
section 1983 claims, the federal court's final determination of those issues became res
judicata in the state court. See Oman, 2008 UT 70, <[J 31. The factual underpinnings of

44

Plaintiffs' state law claims being conclusively established, Judge Fratto correctly
granted summary judgment under the doctrine of issue preclusion.
C. The Law of Case Precludes This Court From Re-examining Issues
Determined by the Federal Court
The doctrine of law of the case also directs the finality of issues and provides that
"a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages
of the same litigation." D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, \ 26 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). That doctrine, like issue preclusion, "was developed in the
interest of economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in
repetitious contentions and reconsideration or rulings on matters previously decided in
the same case." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). The
law of the case can be discretionary or mandatory. D &KMgmt.f 2008 UT 73, ^J 27.
The law of the case is discretionary when a court is asked to reconsider its own,
prior ruling or that of a co-equal judge or coordinate court in the same case. See
Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1038; D & KMgmt, 2008 UT 73, \ 27. But when judgment is
rendered, appealed, and the case remanded, the issues presented to the appellate court
and the final rulings logically necessary to sustain
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those conclusions also constitute law of the case. Its application under those
circumstances is mandatory. D & KMgmt., 2008 UT 73, ^ 28.
The mandate rule provides that final decisions become the law of the case that must
be adhered to in subsequent proceedings in the same case. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 103738. The rule is inflexible and "must be followed even though the lower court
subsequently addressing this issue may believe that the issue could have been better
decided in another fashion." Id.
Here, Plaintiffs sought the state court's review of issues finally determined by the
federal court - a non-coordinate court. This case thus tends toward the mandate rule.
To hold otherwise permits a state court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a federal
court's final decision - something the state court lacks jurisdiction to do. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (West Supp. 2008) (setting out state district court
jurisdiction).
But should this Court determine that the mandate rule does not apply, the trial
court's decision remains sound. Because under the discretionary rule, a court may
depart from the law of the case only "(1) when there has been an intervening change of
controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the
court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, ^J 9, 31 P.3d 543.
None of those exceptions applies here.
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Whether under issue preclusion or law of the case, the district court correctly
found that it was bound by the federal court's final and conclusive determination of the
issues essential to Plaintiffs' state and federal claims. That decision, by any name, is
sound. State Defendants ask this to Court to affirm it.
II.

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PLAINTIFFS IN
THIS CASE WITH NO BROADER PROTECTION THAN
ITS FEDERAL COUNTERPART.

Because Plaintiffs' state law claims rest upon the same, essential facts and factual
underpinnings as their federal claims, should this Court find the federal court's issue
determinations binding, the Court should refrain from addressing Plaintiffs' state
constitutional claims. This Court's precedents make clear that whenever possible, the
Court avoids making a constitutional ruling when another basis exists for deciding.
See State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Co., 786 P.2d 1343,
1349 (Utah 1990); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 289 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
In the federal court, Judge Stewart carefully analyzed Plaintiffs' section 1983
claims and found that even when viewed in a light most favorable to them, the
material, undisputed facts established no violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. In the district court below,
Judge Fratto found, in part, that because Plaintiffs established no basis in law or in
Utah's history that the state constitution affords them greater protections than under the
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federal constitution, summary judgment was proper. Plaintiffs still cannot make that
showing nor have they shown that the district court erred. The district court's decision
should be affirmed.11
Since deciding Society ofSeparationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah
1993), this Court has continually refined its approach to reviewing claims under Utah's
Constitution. Most recently, in Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, 184 P.3d 592, the Court
determined:
In interpreting provisions of the Utah Constitution, [the Court] beginfs]
with a review of the constitutional text. [The Court] also informs [its]
interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent.' Finally,
[the Court] may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made
by courts of last resort in sister states with similar constitutional
provisions.
Id., 2008 UT 29, U 11 (footnotes and citations omitted).
A. The Text of Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 Do Not Create Broader Rights
as a Matter of State Law.
Plaintiffs have sued State Defendants under the state's inalienable rights clause
(Art. 1, § 1), the due process clause (Art. 1, § 7), and the search and seizure clause
11

Plaintiffs' opening brief misstates the federal court's conclusion and
contends that "[b]ecause Judge Stewart ruled that the federal constitution did not
protect the Jensens at all from the defendants' actions, if this Court concludes that
the Utah Constitution does afford such protections, by necessity its protections are
broader than those of its federal counterpart." App. Br. at 37. But Judge Stewart
did not find that Plaintiffs were entitled to no federal protections; instead, that
court determined that Plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence establishing that the
defendants violated any of Plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. See Add. C, D & O, 2008 WL
4372933, passim.
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(Art. 1, § 14). To get to a jury on those claims, Plaintiffs were required, but failed to
show, that those sections afford them greater protections than the U.S. Constitution.
Nothing in those sections' text creates new, more expansive, or different rights than
the fundamental rights that existed in 1896. Instead, the text and plain language of
each section reflects only the constitutional architects' intent to incorporate
fundamental rights into the state's constitution. That intent is reflected not only in the
text of each clause, but in Utah's quest for statehood itself.
1. Article I, section 1.
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution enumerates certain fundamental rights:
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances, to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
UTAH CONST.,

art. I, § 1. Plaintiffs' section 1 claim rests on "the right to enjoy and

defend their lives and liberties." R.60-61, Compl.fflf205-07. The text reflects an
expression of fundamental law that neither expands nor diminishes Plaintiffs' claimed
right of familial association. But the right is similar to the expression of fundamental
law found in most state constitutions.
We shall expect a declaration of rights for the protection of individuals
and minorities. This declaration usually consists of the following classes
of provisions: . .. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the
citizen; as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty . ..
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Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the
Legislative Powers of the States of the American Union 36-37 (Leonard W. Levy, ed.,
De Capo Press (1868)). The text of section 1, therefore, provides no basis for this
Court to infer that that section grants Plaintiffs broader rights than those commonly
recognized in 1896.
2. Article I, section 7.
Article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution was also not intended as a unique
expression of due process rights. Instead, after a single amendment, the drafters copied
section 7 from the U.S. Constitution for the purpose of incorporating already
established fundamental rights into the Utah Constitution. See Official Report of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Utah Constitutional Convention, 257 (1898 (Star
Printing Co. 1898)). Section 7 reads, with its sole amendment: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." UTAH CONST, art. I,
§ 7. Compare U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Article I, section 14.
Article I, section 14 enumerates Utah's counterpart to the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searched and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
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UTAH CONST,

art. 1, § 14. Compare U.S. CONST, amend. IV. Section 14 was approved

without comment or amendment. See Utah Constitutional Convention at 319. And
save for two variations in capitalization and an eliminated "and," section 14 is identical
in text of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, like sections 1 and 7, nothing in the text
suggests the drafters intended its passage to expand rights beyond those secured by the
U.S. Constitution.
B. The History of Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 Does Not Support the
Intent to Create Broader Rights.
Constitutional rights are not created upon drafting, but they are based upon "'the
pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought'" in existence at the
time of drafting. American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ^j 12, 140
P.3d 1235 (quoting Cooley, supra, at 36-37). Historical sources thus form a proper
reference for determining intent. Id. at 1J 10.
Utah experienced a lengthy struggle toward statehood, with the state drafting the
first of seven constitutions in March 1849. See John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable
State Government - The History of Utah 's Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311,317.
And even from its earliest drafts, one of the most notable aspects of Utah's
Constitution is its conformity to the other state constitutions that existed at that time.
See Christine Durham, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, and Kathy Wyer, Utah's Constitution,
Distinctly Undistinctive at 651, 654-61, published in The Constitutional States of
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America (George E. Conner, Christopher Hammons, eds. Univ. of Missouri Press
2008); see also, Flynn, supra, at 324-25 (Utah's Constitution is "a patchwork of bits
and pieces borrowed from other state constitutions by a gradual process of attempting
to placate a hostile Congress.")
Utah's first petition for statehood foundered on issue of slavery. Flynn, supra, at
316. Its subsequent efforts ran aground on the practice of polygamy. Id. And by the
time the State submitted its fourth effort in 1872, the drafters began focusing in earnest
on modeling Utah's constitution after states whose efforts had recently passed muster.
Id. at 317.12 During this time, Utah experienced both local and national opposition to
statehood, with the Mormon church being the moving force behind Utah's statehood
quest. See Society ofSeparationists, Inc., 870 P.2d at 922; Durham, supra, at 651, 654.
But in the early 1890s the Mormon Church began to retreat from the practice of
polygamy and to signal an openness toward the non-Mormons who had begun to settle
the Utah territory. Durham, supra, at 654; see Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and
the Utah Constitution, The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy Raids, 1995 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1,13. At this time, the Mormon church officially renounced the practice of
polygamy; state-funded non-sectarian schools were established; the Chamber of

12

Even the portion of Article I, section 24 that Plaintiffs' underscore, that
"[f|requent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of the government," was borrowed from
another state's constitution. Durham, supra, at 8 (citing Utah Constitutional
Convention at 1:362).
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Commerce began to integrate Mormon and non-Mormon economic interests alike; and
the Mormon church disbanded its political party in favor of a two-party system.
Cassell, supra, at 13-14.
By the time of the successful 1895 constitutional convention, all parties in Utah
were in pursuit of statehood. Durham, supra at 654. That convention had 107
delegates - twenty-nine of whom were non-Mormon - who held two primary concerns
(1) drafting a constitution that would gain Congress' ultimate acceptance, id., and (2)
promoting an "aura of inclusiveness." Id. at 660. "Thus, while the Mormon people's
desire for statehood may have originally been motivated . . . by a desire for autonomy,
the years of struggle ultimately led to a genuine effort to join the mainstream." Id.
This era of cooperation is echoed in the comments of Caleb West, one of Utah's
territorial governors, who cautioned delegates not to "plunge into an unexplored field
or traverse a vast and barren and uninhabited wilderness," but "the nearer you keep" to
the U.S. Constitution "and follow its enunciations and fundamental principles, the
nearer you will come to the hearts of the people, and commend the new State of Utah
to her associates." Official Report, supra, at 11.
Plaintiffs' claim that Utah's Constitution was drafted for Utah by Utahns is correct.
But their belief that Utah's constitutional history is bounded only by the Mormon
majority's experience with religious persecution is not.
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C. The Common Law Does Not Create Broader Rights as a Matter
of State Law.
1. Article I, section 1.
Article I, section 1 possesses no federal counterpart. But Utah's courts have not
found that it offers any unique protections. "The Constitution declares in Article 1,
section 1, men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights
among which are the pursuing of happiness, and safety, and property." Golding v.
Schubach Optical Co., Inc., 70 P.2d 871, 875 (Utah 1937). Those rights are not
absolute and this Court has held that they can be subject to "such reasonable police
regulation as may be enacted to promote the public good." Id.
Section 1 thus lays out the general and well-understood notion that people are free.
And cases interpreting that section typically adhere to federal law interpreting
analogous provisions of the federal constitution or to cases addressing more specific
Article I provisions. See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah
1994) (Art. I, §§ 1, 15); State v. Parker Corp., 297 P. 1013 (Utah 1931) (Art. 1, §§ 1,
25); In re Adoption ofB.O., 927 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Art. I, §§ 1, 25).
Plaintiffs have not cited nor have State Defendants found any cases that address a
person's right to familial association under Article I, section l.13 That right has,

13

Plaintiffs couch this Court's 1904 decision in Block v. Schwartz, 76 P.
22, 24-5 (1904), as supporting their claimed liberty interest in the right of personal
and familial privacy. But the Block court did not examine familial rights. Instead,
the Court examined the right of persons to hold, sell, or dispose of personal
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instead, been viewed by Utah's courts under Article I, section 7.
Article I, section 7.
u

[T]here is nothing in Utah's Constitution that suggests that it provides greater due

process rights than the United States Constitution." State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, \ 25 n.7,
127 P.3d 1213. But this Court has recognized that "[decisions of the Supreme Court
of the U.S. on the due process clause of the Federal Constitution are 'highly
persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our state constitution." Untermeyer
v. State Tax Comm % 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942). And Utah's courts generally
have found that section 7 provides protections equal to the U.S. Constitution.14
Respecting the substantive rights that Plaintiffs advanced below - a right to familial
association and to direct their child's medical care - no Utah court has held that Utah's
Constitution offers broader protections to Utahns than they enjoy under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But in the only cases to have considered those

property. Id.
Plaintiffs likewise misapprehend the Court's statements in State v. Kent,
432 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1964), wherein the Court addressed a criminal defendant's
claim that by surreptitiously viewing him through a ventilation duct, law
enforcement violated his right to privacy secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. Neither case expresses this Court's
opinion respecting the proper scope of the Article I, section 1 rights at issue here.
14

In limited incidents regarding procedural process due to criminal
defendants, this Court has analyzed section 7 differently than the federal due
process clause. See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 39, 162 P.3d 1006; State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991); Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808
P.2d 734, 734-35 (Utah 1991). Those cases do not aid Plaintiffs.
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rights, the Court has equated them with the rights afforded by federal law.
For example, in In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff challenged,
under both the state and federal constitutions, a state statute permitting temiination of
parental rights upon only a showing that termination was in the child's best interest.
Id. at 1365-66. This Court noted that a parent's right to the care and custody of his or
her child is fundamental. Id. at 1372. The Court found that the right is protected under
the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, but held the right to be no different under each
constitution:
[W]e conclude that the Utah Constitution recognizes and protects the
inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain parental ties to his or
her child under Article I, § 7 and § 25 and that the United States
Constitution recognizes the same right under the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Id. at 1377 (emphasis added); see also In re Black, 283 P.2d 887, 894 (Utah 1955)
(analyzing claim that child neglect proceeding violated the 14th Amendment and Article
I, section 7 under the same standard).
Fourteen years later, the Utah Court of Appeals in In re B.O., 927 P.2d 202 (Utah
App. 1996), considered the constitutionality of a state statute that permitted parental
termination upon a showing that the parent exercised only token efforts to maintain a
parent-child relationship. Id. at 207-09. Following this Court's analysis in In re J.P.,
the Court of Appeals equated a parent's rights under the Utah Constitution with the
same rights under the U.S. Constitution. Id.
Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, the only thing that is clear from Utah's case law
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is that a right to familial association (which encompasses a right to direct medical care)
exists. But that right mirrors the identical right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. The right arises from the same common law antecedents, see
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372-73, grants Plaintiffs' co-equal protections under both
constitutions, and is subject to the same level of scrutiny. Id.
Nor does Plaintiffs' reliance on antiquated decisions of this Court and cases from
other states aid them. None of the cases Plaintiffs cite on pp. 50-56 of their Brief
describe the constitutional rights at issue here. See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^f 32,
996 P.2d 546 (inapposite case examining section 14 rights; no mention of polygamy
prosecutions at ^f 32 or elsewhere; but see ^J 26 "This state's early settlers were
themselves no strangers to the abuses of general warrants."); Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P.
83, 108 (Utah 1926) (inapposite child custody proceeding addressing whether parent,
accused of adultery on suspect evidence, can properly be denied custody of minor child
- no constitutional questions raised); Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907)
(inapposite dicta statement in action challenging constitutionality of lengthy industrial
school commitment for juvenile delinquent charged with stealing box of cigars). See
also In re CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 1973) (inapposite case examining
what constitutes medical neglect, not whether challenged action constituted a
constitutional violation); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 754-55 (N.J. 1951) (dicta
statement having no application to case; parents put forth no medical evidence, but
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proffered religious grounds for refusing blood transfusion; court ruled appointment of
guardian to authorize medical treatment constitutional); Matter ofHofbauer, 393
N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (N.Y. 1979) (case analyzing constitutional factors for determining,
under state statute, whether child had been deprived of adequate medical care;
constitutionality of state's conduct not at issue); In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa.D. 561
(Pa. Q. 1912) (inapposite case examining allegation of medical neglect, not
constitutionality of state action); Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 37 P. 660
(WA. 1884) (inapposite case regarding challenge by mother for return of custody of
child whom she voluntarily placed in an orphanage).
The federal court found that State Defendants violated none of Plaintiffs'
substantive federal rights. Absent a showing by Plaintiffs of greater rights here, the
result is the same under the Utah Constitution.15 And because nothing in Utah's
Constitution or its case law indicates that State Defendants' conduct would be
considered unreasonable under Utah law, the trial court's order granting summary
judgment is correct and should be affirmed.

15

At best, Plaintiffs have shown that this Court has long construed the state
and federal due process clauses as substantially the same, but that the Court has not
ruled out its '"ability to decide in the future that our state constitutional provisions
afford more rights than the federal Constitution.'" Appnt. Br., p 49 (quoting
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 11, 52 P.3d 1158). To establish State Defendants'
liability for money damages, Plaintiffs must do more than show that this Court
may, at some date in the future, find that the Utah Constitution offers parties
broader rights at state law than under the federal constitution. See Spackman v.
Bd. of Ed., 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533 and discussion at Point III, infra.
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3. Article I, section 14.
This Court has observed that "federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ
from those guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution." Brigham City v. Stuart,
2005 UT 13, ^ 10, 122 P.3d 506 (emphasis added), rehearing denied (July 18, 2005),
reversed and remanded on different grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006); accord
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^| 34. But historically, this Court has "considered the
protections afforded one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1998). And when the Court has examined an issue independently under the state
constitution, the Court has adopted Fourth Amendment doctrine. See DeBooy, 2000
UT 32, f 19 (adopting 4th Amendment "analysis and rationale" to highway
checkpoints); Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (finding, that like Fourth Amendment, section
14 provides no protection against private searches); see also Sims v. Collection Div. of
Utah State Tax Comm yn, 841 P.2d 6, 10, 14-15 (Utah 1992) (plurality opinion)
(adopting U.S. Supreme Court reasoning that quasi-criminal proceedings are subject to
exclusionary rule).
Defendants have found only one case where a majority of this Court has determined
that section 14 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. And that case
is inapposite. In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), this Court held that
section 14 recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. Id. at 41718. And even then, the protection that this Court recognized was also provided by state
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statute. Id. The only other case addressing advocating broader section 14 rights
garnered support from only a plurality of this Court. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460, 464-71 (plurality) (car thief possesses privacy interest in stolen car).
Nothing in either analysis suggests that Plaintiffs possess greater protection against
unlawful seizure under Article I, section 14 than Judge Stewart acknowledged that they
possessed under federal law. Nor does either case suggest that analyzing Section 14
claims anew would produce a different result than Judge Stewart reached under the
federal constitution.
Moreover, nothing in Utah's unique history supports a broadening of Plaintiffs'
section 14 rights. Rather, Utah's history reveals no connection between the antipolygamy raids and the inclusion of Article I, section 14 in the state's constitution.
Cassell, supra, at * 2-7. Likewise, the cases that have examined whether Article I,
section 14 may provide broader protections, have focused not on Utah's unique history,
but on shielding Utah citizens "from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given
the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8; see also
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-17; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469.
Plaintiffs were unable to establish a violation of their federal rights federal court
and the court below recognized that Plaintiffs were also unable to establish that they
possessed broader rights under Utah's Constitution. That decision is correct and
should be upheld.
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III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL THE FLAGRANT
VIOLATION TEST FOR HOLDING STATE ACTORS
LIABLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs can establish the existence, here, of broader rights
under the Utah Constitution, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal for
want of a "flagrant" violation required by Spackman v. Board of Education, 2000 UT
87, Tj 20, 16 P.3d 533, 537. There, this Court held that before imposing liability on
individual government employees under the state constitution, the plaintiff must first
show that the alleged violation was "flagrant." Id. at ^ 23.
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a flagrant violation
of his or her constitutional rights. In essence, this means that a defendant
must have violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. To be considered clearly
established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] was doing
violates that right. The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be
flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary
human frailties of forgetfiilness, distractibility, or misjudgment without
rendering him or herself liable for a constitutional violation.
Id. (citations, alterations, and internal quotations marks omitted).
Plaintiffs' claims fail this test. Plaintiffs have not shown - nor have these
defendants found - any binding Utah decision or clearly established weight of authority
from other jurisdictions that establish the contours of Article I, sections 1, 7 and 14 as
Plaintiffs now allege them. Cf. Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1189 n. 13 (10th
Cir. 2001) (stating in context of federal constitution, "[f]or the law to be clearly
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the
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clearly established weight of authority from other courts must be as plaintiff
maintains.") In the absence of such a showing that would have alerted State
Defendants that their conduct violated Plaintiffs' Article I rights, Plaintiffs fail to meet
Spackman as a matter of law.
A.

Article 1, section 1.

No precedent exists for Plaintiffs' assertion that Article I, section 1 creates rights
broader than the federal constitution. Similarly, no Utah court has applied Article 1,
section 1 as the basis for an alleged violation of the right to familial association or to
direct medical care. See Point II.C. 1., supra. In the clear absence of such precedent,
State Defendants could not have understood, that by advocating the State's parens
patrie interests in a state juvenile court, they were violating Plaintiffs' section one
rights.
B. Article I, section 7.
Plaintiffs have also not shown that State Defendants flagrantly violated their
substantive or procedural due process rights secured under Article I, section 7. And
despite their allegations to the contrary, "there is nothing in Utah's Constitution that
suggests that it provides greater due process than the United States Constitution." State
v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, ^| 25 n.7, 127 P.3d 1213.
1. Procedural Due Process.
The minimum requirements of procedural due process include "adequate notice and
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an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.'' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f
68, 100 P.3d 1177. "To be considered a meaningful hearing, the concerns of the
affected parties should be heard by an impartial decision maker." Id. Juvenile Court
Judge Yeates was an impartial decision maker when he heard and considered
Plaintiffs' and State Defendants' arguments during the multiple hearings that he
conducted. [See R.515 Doctors' Exs. 33A-33K, Juv. Ct. Trans., generally].
But Plaintiffs still maintain State Defendants violated their due process rights by
making material misrepresentations or omissions during the juvenile court proceedings.
Even if true, Plaintiffs have not shown those actions were "flagrant" under Spackman.
Plaintiffs cannot point to any decision holding that when a government actor makes
misstatements, misrepresentations, or omissions in open-court, in a civil proceedings
where the opponent is represented by counsel, that procedural due process has been
violated. But see Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1380-85 (10th Cir. 1989),
cited as authority by Cline v. State, 2005 UT App. 498, 142 P.3d 127, rehearing &
cert, denied.u

16

Plaintiffs set out several, inapposite cases that they maintain support their
procedural due process claim here. But the federal court considered those cases
and, notwithstanding, determined that Plaintiffs had not shown how State
Defendants' conduct, even if true, violated a constitutional right of which those
defendants would have known. Add. C , D&O, 2008 WL 4372933, * 27; see also
Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ^| 23 ("To be considered clearly established, the contours
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he [or she] was doing violates that right.")
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2. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs also cannot show a flagrant violation of their substantive rights under
Article I, section 7. To defeat State Defendants here, Plaintiffs were required to show
State Defendants actions constituted clear and flagrant violations of the Utah
Constitution. But as discussed at pages 55 to 59, supra, Plaintiffs cannot make that
showing.
The only thing that is clear from Utah's case law is that Plaintiffs' rights to familial
association under the state constitution mirror those same rights under the federal
constitution. They arise from the same common law antecedents and they extend the
same measure of protection against unreasonable conduct. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d at
1373 (parental rights are rooted not in statutes or constitutions but "in nature and
human instinct"). The federal court found State Defendants acted reasonably as a
matter of law when balancing Plaintiffs' particular rights with P.J.'s specialized needs.
D & O, 2008 WL 4372933, * 22-24. And even where State Defendants mistaken in
their dealings with Plaintiffs, the law forgives them for such human frailties. See
Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ^ 23 ('The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be
flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary human frailties of
forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering him or herself liable for
a constitutional violation"); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 1996) ("The only
common feature of all of these cases is that they hold that simple negligence is not
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sufficient justification for a [constitutional] damages claim.")
What's more, Plaintiffs also fail to support their claim that Plaintiffs possess a
separate, protected liberty interest in Utah's child welfare statutes. But these
defendants have searched and have found no case holding that a state, procedural
statute provides a party with a substantial, protected liberty interest. Because Plaintiffs
have failed to comply with Spackman, their Article I, section 7 claims must also fail.
C.

Article I, section 14.

Plaintiffs cannot show a flagrant violation of Article I, section 14. First, no
"seizure" resulted from the juvenile court proceedings, and second, the criminal
charges against the Plaintiff Parents were supported by probable cause.
Plaintiffs continue to urge this Court to construe the Utah constitution to create
protection against Plaintiffs' "continued seizure" as result of being a party to the
juvenile court proceedings. And they continue to cite only the concurring opinion in
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 277-78 (1994), and to ignore that the majority in that
case or the fact that both the federal court here and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2007), explicitly refused to adopt Plaintiffs'
theory. See Add. C, Memo D&O, 2008 WL 4372933 at * 28-29; Becker, 494 F.3d at
915. Because those decisions make clear that Plaintiffs' theory of a continuing seizure
is not now the law and, more importantly, was not the law in 2003, Plaintiffs cannot
show that their participation in the state juvenile court proceedings constitutes a
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flagrant violation of their section 14 claim as required by Spackman. 2000 UT 87, TJ
23.
Instead, the only "seizure" that occurred in this case was Daren Jensen's arrest. But
that arrest - and Barbara Jensen's initial appearance and booking - was well supported
by probable cause.17 Plaintiffs have adduced no case holding that an arrest (or the
filing of charges) supported by probable cause constitutes a flagrant violation of the
Utah Constitution. And State Defendants have found none. Because Plaintiffs also
cannot establish a flagrant violation of their Article I, section 14 rights, the trial court's
dismissal should be affirmed.
D. Defendant Eisenman is Entitled to Absolute Immunity.
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot show that Defendant Eisenman committed a flagrant
violation of their known constitutional rights, because all of Plaintiffs' claims stem
from Eisenman's job as Assistant Utah Attorney General (AAG), and she is therefore

17

On July 28, 2003, the juvenile court entered an order directing that P.J.
begin treatment by August 8. See Statement of Facts, supra, p 19. The Plaintiff
Parents were present in court when this ordered issued. Id., pp. 18-19. Parents
failed to abide by the order and on August 8, the juvenile court issued an order
giving the State legal custody of P.J. for the purpose of commencing treatment.
Id., pp. 20-22. Parents were apprised of this order by their counsel and advised to
comply. Id., p. 23. They did not, but elected to remain with P.J. in Idaho. Id.
There was thus undisputed probable cause for the criminal charges brought against
Parents. And despite their contrary assertion, the undisputed evidence fails to
establish that the criminal charges were predicated upon misrepresentation or
fraud. Id., pp. 24-25. Moreover, the Plaintiff Parents admitted that the elements of
each charge were established. Id., pp. 29-30.
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entitled to absolute immunity. For "[t]he efficient operation of the judicial process
requires that those closely associated with it be afforded some form of immunity from
civil liability." Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993) (citation
omitted).
Immunity is essential to the integrity of the judicial process. Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985). Utah's courts have adopted that reasoning and recognize
absolute judicial immunity for persons who perform "functions closely related to the
judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001 UT 78, ^| 19, 37 P.3d 1052 (applying
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985));
see e.g., Black v. Clegg, 938 P.2d 293, 296 (Utah 1997) ("official immunity applied
under federal and state law"); Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280 (adopting Supreme Court's
functional analysis). Absolute immunity extends to state's attorneys, see e.g., Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1976); see also Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280, and
"attaches to [an attorney's] function, not the manner in which [s]he perform[s] it."
Black, 938 P.2d at 296. Thus, if the "challenged acts fall within the categories
constituting a prosecutor's duties, the acts are part of [her] official function, even if
[s]he acts imperfectly." Id.
Plaintiffs complain that in the course of her representation, Eisenman
misrepresented or omitted information before the juvenile court, and others and
personally gathered and disseminated information to others relative to P.J.'s case. But
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Plaintiffs' objections to the manner in which Eisenman perfonned her role as AAG are
of no consequence and do "not change the fact that [she] acted in the course of [her]
official duties." Id.
Whether characterized by Plaintiffs as argument, proffers, or testimony, Eisenman's
court filings and statements in court are protected. Irnbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n. 34;
see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90, 492 (1991) (prosecutors and other
lawyers were immune for making false or defamatory statements during judicial
proceedings); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-35 (immunity for witnesses and
parties for in-court testimony is well-established). She is also immune from Plaintiffs
complaints about her contact with Drs. Birkmayer and Albritton and of the letter she
sent to the Burzynski Clinic. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 ("the duties of a
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the
initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom"); see also Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993). Finally, Eisenman's contact with the DA's
Office were "integral" both to Eisenman's position as AAG and to the "judicial
process" itself. Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280; see Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4a-105(6), 113(l),(2)(a).18

18

Utah's DCFS is charged with enforcing the state's child welfare laws,
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a -105 (6) (West 2004), and is authorized to take "all
legal action that is necessary" to meet that end, id. at § 62A-4a-l 13(1), and to
"take all initiative in all matters involving the protection of abused or neglected
children." Id. at § 62A-4a-105(6). And, as an AAG, Eisenman was required to
enforce those laws. Id. § 62A-4a-l 13(2)(a). Finally, as an officer of the court,
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Eisenman acted as an advocate and officer of the court. She is thus entitled to
absolute judicial immunity from all of Plaintiffs state law claims. See Bailey v. Bayles,
2002 UT 58, atfflj10, 13 (appellate court may affirm on any ground apparent from the
record).
i n . PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED ANY ARGUMENTS
NOT RAISED IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL.
Plaintiffs make a lengthy recitation of facts allegedly pertaining to Defendant
Eisenman in their Statement of Facts. But in the body of their Brief, Plaintiffs make no
mention of Eisenman, nor do they advance any arguments suggesting how she violated
any of the Plaintiffs' state constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have therefore waived any
arguments that pertain to Defendant Eisenman and the trial court's grant of summary
judgment should be affirmed. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, H 23,16 P.3d 540
(issues "that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not
be considered by the appellate court."); see also Utah R. App. 24(a)(5), (9).
Similarly, Plaintiffs advanced two, state common law tort law claims in the trial
court below. But Plaintiffs make only a glancing reference to those claims in their
Brief and thereafter ignore those causes of action. Those claims have also been
waived. Id.

Eisenman was duty-bound to enforce the juvenile court's custody order.
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Conclusion
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court erred when it granted State
Defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' state claims.
That decision is correct and State Defendants ask this Court to affirm the trial court's
Final Judgment and Order. But to the extent the Court may determine that Plaintiffs
possess broader constitutional rights as a matter of state law and that the federal court's
issue determinations are not binding, State Defendants ask this Court to remand the
matter to the state court for further consideration of the facts and record evidence
adduced in the first instance.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of October, 2009.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL pi:frf£C Z.tJ
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,,, _

FEflMMW
T U \ R H DISTRICT COURT
T
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

BARBARA JENSEN et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case

No.

050912502

Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.
STATE OF UTAH; et al.,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant
Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Wagner and
Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Eisemanfs
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motions on January 26, 2009.

Following the

hearing, the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda,
arguments of counsel, as well as the decision of Judge Stewart,
finds it clear that Plaintiffs have pled the same factual basis
for their Causes of Action and further, that all the claims arise
from a single set of operative events.

Indeed, the factual

events pled in the instant mirror those which supported
Plaintiffs' federal - claims.

Moreover, Judge Stewart,

after an

extensive analysis of the facts, made findings and conclusions
based on the issues underlying Plaintiffs' claims.
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The aforementioned in mind, the Utah Supreme Court in the
similar case of Oman v. Davis

Sch.

Dist.

, 2008 UT 70, (Utah 2008)

stated the following:
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two
distinct theories: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion.1' Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78,
P 12, 99 P.3d 842. This appeal raises only
the latter principle of issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion, which is also known as
collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or
their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in the second suit that were fully
litigated in the first suit." id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The purposes of
issue preclusion include "(1) preserving the
integrity of the judicial system by
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes;
(2) promoting judicial economy by preventing
previously litigated issues from being
relitigated; and (3) protecting litigants
from harassment by vexatious litigation." Id.
P 14.

Id.

at P28.
The Oman court continued stating:
Issue preclusion applies only when the
following four elements are met: (I) the
party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted must have been a party to or in
privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the
one presented in the instant action; (iii)
the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. Collins v.
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P
12, 52 P.3d 1267 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
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at P2 9.
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, there

can be no question each of the elements has been satisfied.
While Plaintiffs argue there was no final adjudication on the
merits because the federal court never reached the state law
claims, a review of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the federal court's
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the factual contentions and
issues supporting the state claims are identical to those
underlying the federal claims and were necessary to Judge
Stewart's decision-

Indeed, in response to a similar argument by

the plaintiff in Oman regarding his breach of contract claim, the
Court stated:
Underlying the § 1983 claim was the
dispositive issue of whether the District
breached the Classified Agreement when it
fired Oman for cause. Indeed, when Oman filed
his complaint in federal court, his basis for
the § 1983 cause of action was twofold: (1)
that the District's "pre-termination conduct
deprived him of due process rights secured by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution," and (2) that the
District's "decision to suspend/ and later
terminate, his employment violated the terms
of the Classified Agreement." Thus, a
resolution of the § 1983 claim, as framed by
Oman, required the federal court to resolve
the underlying issue of whether the District
violated the Classified Agreement when it
fired Oman. The issue was squarely before the
federal court, was litigated by the parties,
and was necessary to the court's final

JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH

Page 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

judgment on the § 1983 claim. Accordingly,
the federal court made findings and
conclusions regarding the alleged breach of
contract--including the previously quoted
conclusion that the District had a sufficient
basis for firing Oman for cause under the
Classified Agreement--and these findings and
conclusions are binding in subsequent actions
under the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Although Oman's breach of contract claim was
not litigated in the federal court, it is
based upon the same underlying issue that was
resolved by the federal court: whether the
District had a sufficient basis for
terminating Oman for cause under the
Classified Agreement. The state district
court was therefore bound by the federal
court 1 s conclusion that "[Oman]'s
representations to the District regarding his
work hours provided a sufficient basis for
termination for cause." Accordingly, even if
Oman had argued to the district court that
his conduct did not give the District a basis
for terminating him for cause, the argument
would have failed based on the federal
courtf s prior ruling.

Id.

at P33.
As noted, the issues in this case arise from a single,

distinct set of events and as demonstrated by the Memorandum
Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual contentions that underlie
the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants have been
conclusively decided.
This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar Plaintiffs'
claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical
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or textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional
provisions in this case differently from the Federal
Constitution.

Moreover, no Utah appellate decision supports

interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or
different rights in this case.
In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of
Plaintiffs' state law claims are the same as those already
considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and, there being no
additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution,
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well.
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Defendant Eiseman's Motion for Summary Judgment are^-€tranted.
DATED this

it
A

day of February, 2009
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Constitution of the State of Utah
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people of Utah, in order to secure and
perpetuate the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights,] All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.
Sec. 2. [AH political power inherent in the people,] All political power is inherent in the people; and
all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have
the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union,] The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty,] The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall
be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any
person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There
shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but
the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law.
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong.
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines. Cruel punishments.] Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
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Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded.
Sec. 11. [Courts open. Redress of injuries.] All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment. Grand jury.] Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The grand jury shall consist of seven
persons, five of whom must concur to find an indictment; but no grand jury shall be drawn or summoned
unless in the opinion of the judge of the district, public interest demands it.
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden. Issuance of warrant] The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press. Libel.] No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press. In ail criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in
evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the fact.
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt. Exception.] There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free. Soldiers voting.] All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be prescribed by law.
Sec. 18. [Attainder. Ex post facto laws. Impairing contracts.] No bill of attainder, ex post facto law,
or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Sec. 19. [Treason defined. Proof.] Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it,
or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] The military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within this State.
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity.
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or
deny others retained by the people.
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
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H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Utah,
Central Division.
P.J., a minor, by and through his parents and natural guardians, Barbara and Daren JENSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
State of UTAH, et al., Defendants.
No. 2:05-CV-739 TS.
Sept. 22, 2008.
Barton H. Kunz, II, Karra J. Porter, Roger P.
Christensen, Sarah E. Spencer, Christensen Sc
Jensen PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiffs.
Joni J. Jones, Bridget K. Romano, Scott D. Cheney,
Utah Attorney General's Office, Kristin A. Vanorman, Jennifer R. Carrizal, Jeremy G. Knight,
Strong & Hanni, Andrew M. Morse, David G. Williams, R. Scott Young, Richard A. Vazquez, Snow
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS
TED STEWART, District Judge.
*1 This § 1983 case arises from a protracted dispute
between Plaintiffs Daren and Barbara Jensen and
the State of Utah regarding the proper medical care
for their son, Plaintiff P.J. Currently before the
Court are the summary judgment motions of Defendants Richard Anderson, Kari Cunningham,
Susan Eisenman, Dr. Lars Wagner, and Dr. Karen
Albritton. After carefully considering the parties'
submissions and having heard oral argument, the
Court will grant the summary judgment motions

with regard to the Jensens' § 1983 claims for the
reasons discussed below. As the Jensens' state law
claims involve important issues of Utah law, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
and will remand the state claims to the Utah court
from which they were removed.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party
can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.FNM In considering whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence
presented.™2 The Court is required to construe all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.™3
FN1. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
FN2. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
411 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig,
924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991).
FN3. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 925F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991).

II. FACTS
The following is a summary of the factual background in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the Jensens: On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old
P.J. had a small growth removed from the floor of
his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr.
Christensen. The tissue removed by Dr. Christensen
was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America in
Kent, Washington for analysis. LabCorp informed
Dr. Christensen that the sample was malignant. Dr.
Christensen then referred P J . to Dr. Harlan Munz
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at Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC") in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Jensens met with Dr. Munz on May 9, 2003.
After examining PJ ., Dr. Munz referred him to
PCMCs oncology department where he met with
Dr. Wagner. Dr. Wagner first met with and examined P. J. that same day, but could not offer any
diagnosis until after PCMCs pathology department
completed its own testing.
Upon PCMCs request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue
sample to PCMCs pathology department. On May
20, 2003, Dr. Lowichik completed the pathology report on PJ. f s tissue, diagnosing the growth as
"EWING SARCOMA/PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE
NEUROECTODERMAL
TUMOR" FN4 {i.e.,
Ei/wing's Sarcoma). This diagnosis was rendered
based on immunohistochemical staining and the appearance of the tumor cells. The pathology report
indicates that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow
pathologist] [Dr. Coffin] who concurs with this interpretation." FN5 The deposition testimony of the
pathologists likewise indicates that both of them reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr. Lowichik estimated her confidence in
the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent." FN6
Dr. Coffin reviewed the testing and was also very
confident that the tumor was Ewing's Sarcoma. In
fact, Dr. Coffin testified that the diagnosis was
rendered with near certainty.
FN4. Docket No. 345, Ex. 32.
FN5. Id.
FN6. Docket No. 334, Ex. 4, at 31.
*2 In addition to immunohistochemical staining,
Ewing's Sarcoma may be diagnosed through cytogenetic and molecular genetic testing. Ewing's cells
often manifest a chromosomal translocation (an
"ll;22 translocation"), which may be detected
through these tests. The presence of an 11;22 translocation indicates that a specimen is Ewing's Sarcoma. Cytogenetic testing may be performed only

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No

on fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is
placed in formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic testing is
not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing can be performed on tissues samples that have
been placed in formalin or paraffin.
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on sarcoma tissue samples
that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate sample left over after the standard pathology
examination." FN7 Molecular testing was available
through an affiliated institution. In 2003, it would
not have been unusual for a PCMC pathologist to
send samples out for molecular testing to provide
further diagnostic information.
FN7. Docket No. 345, Ex. 15, at 23.
Because the tissue removed from P.J.'s mouth by
Dr. Christensen was placed in formalin or paraffin,
cytogenetic testing could not be performed on that
specimen. There were still tumor cells in P.J.'s
mouth, which could have been extracted for this
purpose. However, this would have required further
surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular
testing could have been performed on the tissue
sample obtained by Dr. Christensen.
Dr. Wagner discussed the diagnosis of P.J.'s tissue
sample with Dr. Coffin. She told him that she was
confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According to Dr. Coffin, where the
cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining
fit "the criteria for the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma," it is not necessary to perform cytogenetic or
molecular testing to establish the diagnosis.FN8
FN8. Docket No. 334, Ex. 3, at 43-44.
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens
for more than an hour. Dr. Wagner expressed his
confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis and
explained the need for chemotherapy to begin right
away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference
between localized and non-localized Ewing's Sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed the Jen-
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sens that the cure rate for localized disease-where
there is no evidence of cancer in places other than
where it was discovered-was approximately 70%
when treated with the recommended chemotherapy,
but that the cure rate for non-localized (metastatic)
disease was as low as 20%. Thus, Dr. Wagner explained the necessity of beginning treatment right
away to prevent the cancer from spreading
throughout P.J.'s body.
That same day, radiographic examinations were
performed on P.J.'s neck, thorax, chest, and skull to
determine whether the cancer had spread beyond
the floor of P.JVs mouth. Each of these tests returned negative. Ms. Jensen testified that at this
point they asked Dr. Wagner "if there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it was
Ewing's and he said no." FN<) "He was sure it was
Ewing's." FNl°
FN9. Docket No. 345, Ex. 12, at 127.
FNlO./tf. at 134.
*3 During the May 21, 2003 visit, the Jensens
asked Dr. Wagner to have P.J.'s tissue sample sent
to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner informed
the Jensens that insurance companies often would
not pay for a second opinion and encouraged them
to contact their insurance provider. Nonetheless,
Dr. Wagner agreed to the second opinion and sent
the tissue sample to Dana-Farber as requested. The
Jensens ultimately cancelled the Dana-Farber consultation.
The Jensens met with Dr. Wagner again on May 29,
2003. At this meeting the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography
("PEP1) scan. Dr. Wagner refused to order a PET
scan, explaining that it would not be useful in P.J.'s
situation because there was no other evidence of
metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner further explained to
the Jensens that a negative PET scan would not
change the need for chemotherapy. The Jensens
again asked Dr. Wagner if there were other tests to

confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said no.
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner
differed significantly in their views regarding P.J.'s
medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the
Jensens, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC social worker, and
PCMC's head of quality assurance was scheduled
for June 9, 2003, at PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to begin treating P.J. with
chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the
cancer from spreading. The Jensens1 statements during the meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend
that they refused to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for further confirmatory tests. Dr. Wagner contends that they refused
chemotherapy because they wanted to pursue an alternative treatment called Insulin Potentiation Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve
the impasse. During the meeting, the PCMC head
of quality assurance told the Jensens that a referral
to the Division of Child and Family Services
("DCFS") might be necessary. The Jensens left the
meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're
fired." FNM
FNll./tf, Ex. 13, at 181.
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy
Families-a division of PCMC with the responsibility of ensuring that patients are not left untreated-became involved in P.J.'s case. Around June 12, 2003,
Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the Jensens. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June 15, 2003, but were unable to reach an agreement as to P.J.'s medical care.
Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation. At that point, the decision was made to refer
P.J/s case to DCFS for medical neglect in refusing
what the doctors believed was medically necessary
treatment.
On June 16, 2003, a regularly-scheduled meeting
was held at PCMC with representatives from
DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations
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in the child welfare system. Dr. Wagner and Dr.
Corwin were also present. At this meeting, and in a
case summary submitted to DCFS, Dr. Wagner
summarized his interaction with the Jensens. A
formal referral to DCFS was made that same day.
The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or
Dr. Wagner who actually submitted the referral. For
purposes of the summary judgment motions, the
Court must presume the latter.
*4 DCFS assigned PJ.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a
DCFS social worker. Dr. Wagner and Dr. Corwin
provided Ms. Cunningham with information regarding their understanding of PJ.'s situation, both orally and by written case summaries. Ms. Cunningham was also present at the June 16, 2003 meeting
at PCMC. Based on communications with Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham was under the impression
that PJ.'s situation was a medical emergency and
that something needed to be done within a matter of
hours or days.
On June 18, 2003, Ms. Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General Lund, filed a Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship (the "Verified Petition") in the Third District
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (the
"Juvenile Court"). Ms. Cunningham filed the Verified Petition based entirely on the information
provided to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin. She
did not do any independent investigation of PJ.'s
referral.
On June 20, 2008, the Jensens first appeared before
the Juvenile Court. Ms. Eisenman represented
DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the
primary Assistant Attorney General on PJ.'s case.
At that hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Mr. Frank
Mylar, represented that the Jensens were interested
in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr. Christensen. The Court continued the
hearing until July 10, 2003, as the parties indicated
that a stipulation regarding PJ.'s treatment was possible.

mayer, who practiced in Vienna, Austria. After reviewing PJ.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated to the Jensens that he was not "totally convinced" that P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that
chemotherapy was not necessary.FN12 The Jensens
expressed their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer supervise PJ.'s treatment. On July 2, 2003, Ms. Eisenman sent an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she
asked questions regarding, among other things, Dr.
Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria had a standard of care similar to that
used by the American Academy of Pediatrics. After
receiving Ms. Eisenman's email from Dr. Birkmayer, Mr. Mylar instructed Ms. Eisenman not to contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquiries
regarding Dr. Birkmayer to Mr. Mylar. According
to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire to
have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at that time because
DCFS was requiring that PJ.'s medical care be
provided by a board-certified pediatric oncologist.
FN12. Docket No. 345, Ex. 48. Notably,
Plaintiffs represent that they submit Dr.
Birkmayer's statements only to illustrate
the effect they had on the Jensens' mental
state and not for the truth of the matter asserted.
In late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a
new job in Ohio. He informed Ms. Eisenman that
he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or Dr. Albritton if she needed anything. In preparation for the July 10, 2003 hearing, Ms. Eisenman disclosed to the Juvenile Court that she intended to prove her case using three medical experts:
Drs. Coffin, Wagner, and Albritton. In preparation
for the hearing, Ms. Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton with materials related to the case, including Dr.
Wagner's case summary and a list of questions that
might be asked. Mr. Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony at the July 10, 2003 hearing because the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference
and not an evidentiary hearing. The Juvenile Court
affirmed the objection and Drs. Albritton and
Coffin did not testify at that time.

Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Birk-
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*5 At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the Jensens again
raised the issue of whether P.J. really had Ewing's
Sarcoma. The parties stipulated that the Jensens
would have P.J. examined by doctors at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles ("CHLA") and that
the Jensens would abide by their treatment recommendations. The Juvenile Court set another pretrial
conference for July 28, 2003. Per the stipulation,
the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met
with Dr. Tishler on July 21, 2003. At this meeting,
Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he was recommending chemotherapy based on the prior
pathology tests, but that CHLA would do its own
pathology analysis and genetic testing to confirm
the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were
unhappy with this result as they believed that Dr.
Tishler was not performing an independent evaluation, but was merely deferring to the PCMC doctors.
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens did not return again to CHLA, but instead sought medical
care from Dr. Charles Simone. Dr. Simone initially
agreed to treat P.J. However, upon learning of the
legal battle in which the Jensens were entrenched,
Dr. Simone declined involvement. Nonetheless, the
Jensens believed that Dr. Simone would still agree
to treat P.J. if the Juvenile Court would permit it.
At the hearing on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court
received a report from Dr. Tishler via telephone regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge the CHLA testing was
not yet complete. However, he also stated that there
was no question that P.J. had a malignant tumor
that would require chemotherapy right away and
that the remaining pathological and radiological
tests would serve only to clarify what type of tumor
he had for purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy
to P.J.'s needs. The Jensens' new attorney, Mr.
Blake Nakamura, advocated the Jensens' concern
that not all of the testing had been completed. Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the Juvenile Court ordered that P.J. commence chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to

the CHLA test results. The Juvenile Court also
provided that should the test results indicate that
chemotherapy was not needed, the Jensens were
free to bring that fact to the Juvenile Court's attention.
Mr. Nakamura also represented to the Juvenile
Court at the July 28 hearing that the Jensens were
not comfortable with Dr. Tishler and would prefer
that P.J. be treated by Dr. Simone. During the hearing, the Juvenile Court asked Dr. Albritton whether
Dr. Simone could be the primary treating physician.
Dr. Albritton answered:
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist.
My understanding, in fact, is that he is not board
certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical
oncology. He's-from what little I know, he's a
specialist in complimentary and alternative medicine. So the gist I get is that he would be asking
someone either in Utah or L.A. to be prescribing
the chemotherapy and then he would be suggesting the complimentary approaches that might diminish side effects and so on. I do not think there
will be an oncologist in Utah or L.A. who would
let him prescribe the chemotherapy from New
Jersey.™13

FN13. Docket No. 334, Ex. 33-C, 50-51.
*6 The Juvenile Court also asked Dr. Tishler
whether P.J.'s primary treating physician needed to
be a board certified oncologist. Dr. Tishler
answered: "Definitely. There's no other physician
that could lead the care and provide the care."
FNH
Based on this, the Juvenile Court ordered that
P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified
pediatric oncologist or hematologist, but that Dr.
Simone was authorized to work with P.J.'s other
treating physicians. The Court also scheduled an
evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in the event P.J.'s situation was not
yet resolved.
FNH. M a t 53-54.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 7 of33

Page 6
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4372933 (D.Utah)
(Cite as: 2008 WL 4372933 (D.Utah))
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to
receive the ordered chemotherapy for PJ. Instead,
they sought evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic in
Houston, Texas. Around August 6, 2003, the Jensens contacted the Burzynski Clinic to inquiry
whether it could treat P.J. On August 7, 2003, an
employee of the Burzynski Clinic called the Jensens to indicate that the Clinic was willing to see
him. Accordingly, an appointment was set for August 12,2003.
At this point, the Jensens apparently believed that
they did not have to comply with the Juvenile
Court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8,
2003, and that this would only result in the Juvenile
Court's holding the August 20, 2003 evidentiary
hearing on the Verified Petition. Thus, on August 8,
2003, the Jensens took P.J. and the rest of their
children to Bear Lake in Idaho to go boating. From
Idaho, they planned to travel to Houston for PJ. to
be evaluated at the Burzynski Clinic on August 12.
Having not received confirmation that P.J.'s chemotherapy was underway, Ms. Eisenman sought a
hearing with the Juvenile Court on August 8, 2003,
for the purpose of seeking authorization to take PJ.
into protective custody. Ms. Eisenman called Mr.
Nakamura to notify him of her intent to obtain a
protective custody order. Present at the August 8,
2003 hearing were Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, P.J.'s guardian ad litem, and Mr. Nakamura.
Mr. Nakamura participated in the August 8 hearing
by telephone. Mr. Nakamura indicated that P.J. was
not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens did
not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that they
were taking PJ. to the Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response to the disclosure of the Jensens'
intent to seek evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic,
Ms. Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton, who then
participated in the hearing by telephone. The Juvenile Court and counsel asked Dr. Albritton whether
the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to provide P J / s
treatment. Dr. Albritton indicated that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic is known for providing ex-
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tremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton further
indicated that she was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the Burzynski Clinic, but would need
more time to confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that the Burzynski Clinic was not an
appropriate option for a newly-diagnosed cancer
patient who had not exhausted standard treatment
options.
*7 Ms. Eisenman then filed an Application to Take
a Child Into Protective Custody. This application
was supported by an affidavit signed by Ms. Cunningham on August 8, 2003. Attached to Ms. Cunningham's affidavit was an affidavit executed by
Dr. Wagner on July 22, 2003. The Juvenile Court
signed an order authorizing DCFS to take PJ. into
protective custody, finding that it was in P.J.'s best
interest. Ms. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy
City Police Officer Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day, to help serve the warrant. Officer Peterson was unable to serve the warrant because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake
earlier that day.
Mr. Nakamura informed the Jensens that the Juvenile Court had signed a "pickup order" and that P.J.
was to be placed in DCFS custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this, the Jensens decided to stay in
Idaho and seek an independent opinion of PJ/s
condition in preparation for the evidentiary hearing
scheduled for August 20, 2003.
On August 13, 2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a
motion for an order to show cause. After hearing
the motion that same day, the Juvenile Court
entered a bench warrant for the Jensens' arrest and
ordered them to appear and present P J. However, a
Juvenile Court clerk told Ms. Eisenman and P.J.'s
guardian ad litem that a Juvenile Court warrant
would not be placed on a national database, which
would require an adult warrant. Perhaps recognizing this, Ms. Eisenman announced to the Jensens'
attorneys and P.J.'s guardian ad litem that if the
Jensens did not cooperate with the Juvenile Court
orders, she would have to go to local and federal
law enforcement authorities.
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Based on information provided by Ms. Eisenman to
Officer Peterson, the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office agreed to screen the Jensen matter
for criminal charges on August 15, 2003. Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, and P.J.'s guardian ad
litem attended the August 15 screening. That same
day, the District Attorney's Office filed criminal
charges against the Jensens, including one count of
custodial interference and one count of kidnaping.
On August 16, 2003, Mr. Jensen was arrested in
Idaho where he spent four days in jail before he
was released on bail. Upon Mr. Jensen's arrest, Ms.
Jensen left Idaho and took P.J. to Houston in an attempt to meet with the Burzynski Clinic. However,
the Burzynski Clinic refused to see P.J. because
Ms. Eisenman and P.J.'s guardian ad litem informed
the clinic that the State had been granted protective
custody over P.J. and did not consent to his treatment.
The Juvenile Court held a non-evidentiary hearing
on August 20, 2003. In that hearing, Mr. Nakamura
read a letter written by Mr. Jensen and explained
that the Jensens wished to have an opportunity to
present evidence. The Juvenile Court agreed to set
an evidentiary hearing, but refused to lift the warrants.
Shortly after this hearing, Ms. Eisenman assumed a
new position in the Attorney General's Office and
no longer participated in P.J.'s case. Additionally,
Mr. Anderson, Director of DCFS, was asked by a
representative of Utah's Governor to personally assist in negotiating a resolution to P.J.'s case. Accordingly, on August 27, 2003, Mr. Anderson flew
to Idaho to meet with the Jensens where negotiations continued for several days.
*8 On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a
stipulation in which the Jensens agreed to submit
P J . to the care of Dr. Johnston-a board-certified pediatric oncologist-of St. Luke's Hospital in Boise,
Idaho, and to abide by his treatment recommendations. DCFS agreed to ask the Juvenile Court to return full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate

the warrants. After receiving assurances that the
Jensens would submit to chemotherapy if Dr. Johnston recommended it, the Juvenile Court approved
the stipulation.
After performing his evaluation, Dr. Johnston concluded that P.J. needed chemotherapy. The Jensens
again refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy,
claiming that Dr. Johnston was merely rubberstamping the diagnosis of the PCMC doctors. Mr.
Jensen told Dr. Johnston that if P.J. ever did receive
chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure
it's a hellish experience for everybody involved." FN,S
FN15. Docket No. 344, Ex. 11, at 700-01.
Another hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on
October 8, 2003. At the October 8 hearing, Dr.
Johnston testified that he had confirmed P.J. had
Ewing's Sarcoma and that the Jensens had rejected
his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemotherapy. Assistant Attorney General Mark May, who
replaced Ms. Eisenman on P.J.'s case, indicated that
the parties would attempt to reach a settlement.
Having determined that the Jensens would not submit P J . to chemotherapy under any circumstances,
DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition
on October 22, 2003. In its Motion, DCFS stated
that its decision to dismiss the Verified Petition was
made with full recognition that without chemotherapy P.J.'s chances of survival would fall dramatically. Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was
simply unworkable to attempt to force a
13-year-old boy to undergo chemotherapy unwillingly.
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered a plea
agreement with the State on the criminal charges.
The Jensens agreed to enter a guilty plea and abeyance on the custodial interference charge in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss the kidnaping charge.

III. DISCUSSION
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In July 2005, the Jensens filed a Complaint in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Utah, against the State of Utah, Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson,
Dr. Wagner, Dr. Corwin, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Albritton,
and Ms. Eisenman. In their Complaint, the Jensens
allege the following causes of action: (1) §
1983-violation of the substantive due process right
to direct medical care (2) § 1983-violation of the
substantive due process right to familial association; FNI6 (3) § 1983-malicious prosecution under
the Fourth Amendment; (4) § 1983-violation of the
Ninth Amendment; (5) violation of article I, section
1 of the Utah Constitution; (6) violation of article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution; (7) violation of
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; (8) violation of article I, section 25 of the Utah Constitution; (9) wrongful initiation; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

sociation is grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment
concept
of
liberty")
(unpublished
decision); Suasnavas
v.
Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 654 (10th Cir.
Aug. 25, 2006) ("The right of familial association is a substantive due process right
...."))(unpublished decision); Chatwin v.
Barlow, 2008 WL 501109, at *4 (D.Utah
Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Tenth Circuit has recognized that the freedom of familial association is a substantive right guaranteed by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.")
(unpublished
decision).
Based on the long line of cases employing
the standards set forth in Griffen, the Court
Finds that the Jensens' familial association
claims arise from and are appropriately
analyzed under Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

FN 16. In their Complaint, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their right to
familial association under both the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in
the Tenth Circuit "the familial right of association is properly based on the 'concept
of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.' "
Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547
(10th Cir .1993). The Court recognizes that
the Tenth Circuit has, in dictum, recognized a First Amendment right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private
relationships." Grace United Methodist
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
358 (10th Cir.2006) (dealing with expressive association). Nonetheless, the Tenth
Circuit has consistently analyzed familial
association claims within the substantive
due process framework, even in cases decided subsequent to the Grace United
Methodist Church case. See Estate of Herring v. City of Colorado Springs, 233 Fed.
Appx. 854, 856 (10th Cir. May 18, 2007)
(recognizing that "the familial right of as-

*9 After removing the case to this Court, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an Order dated
June 16, 2006, the Court dismissed the State of
Utah on the basis of sovereign immunity and Drs.
Corwin and Coffin on the basis of absolute immunity. The Court also dismissed the fourth and
eighth causes of action in their entirety and the first
and third causes of action to the extent they were
asserted by P.J. IHC has since been voluntarily dismissed.
After the close of discovery on the issue of liability,
Mr. Anderson, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman,
Dr. Wagner, and Dr. Albritton filed the motions
presently before the Court, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal
claims based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
"Rooker-Feldman precludes federal district courts
from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction
over claims 'actually decided by a state court' and
claims 'inextricably intertwined1 with a prior state-
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court judgment.11 FNI7 The doctrine arises from 28
U .S.C. § 1257(a), which allows review of statecourt judgments by the United States Supreme
Court and, by negative inference, precludes lower
federal courts from exercising such jurisdiction.™18
FN 17. Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441
F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir .2006) (quoting
Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d
468, 473 (10th Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FNI 8. Id.
Noting that the doctrine had, at times, been applied
by lower courts far beyond its original contours, the
Supreme Court declared in the case of Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,Fm9 that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited
to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." FN2° The Tenth Circuit
summarized the Exxon Mobil holding as follows:

292-94).
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman
applies only where
the relief sought in the federal case would "reverse
or undo the state court judgment." FN22
FN22. Id.
Rooker-Feldman has been applied to constitutional
claims arising from child custody proceedings in
state courts. For example, in Warnick v. Briggs,
FN23
this Court applied the doctrine to a § 1983
claim alleging various constitutional violations
against several state actors, seeking review of the
circumstances surrounding the removal of the
plaintiffs child by the state without a pre-removal
hearing.FN24 The Court found that "if it adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims relating to [the child's] removal, [it] would effectively act as an appellate
court in reviewing the juvenile court's disposition."
FN25
Applying Rooker-Feldman
in that situation
made sense as the juvenile court heard and decided
the issue of whether the circumstances justified the
child's removal, and the plaintiff did not challenge
the "integrity of the evidence" before the juvenile
court.FN26

FN19. 544 U.S. 280(2005).
FN23. 2007 WL 3231609 (D.Utah Oct. 30,
2007).

FN20. Id. at 284.
\s the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobil,
the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply
"simply because a party attempts to litigate in
federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court." To the contrary, a party may lose in state
court and then raise precisely the same legal issues in federal court, so long as the relief sought
in the federal action would not reverse or undo
the relief granted by the state court: "if a federal
plaintiff c present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state
court has reached in a case to which he was a
party ..., then there is jurisdiction.... 7 " FN21
FN21. Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237
(quoting Exxon
Mobil,
544 U.S. at

FN24. Id. at*9-10.
FN25. Id. a t * 10.
FN26. Id.
*10 However, where a plaintiffs federal cause of
action is for injury sustained as a result of actions
taken during the course of the custody proceedings
that are separate from the judgments of the state
court, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. The case of
Brokaw v. Weaver*HZ1 of the Seventh Circuit is
particularly persuasive on this point and is closely
analogous to the Jensens' case. In Brokaw, the
plaintiff was removed from her parents and placed
in state custody by order of a state court after a social worker and others fabricated a charge of child
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neglect.FN28 Subsequently, another state court
found no continuing basis to hold the plaintiff in
state custody and released her to her parents.™29
Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the
plaintiff brought suit in federal court against the social worker and the others who made up the neglect
charges, alleging violations of her right to familial
relations under substantive due process, violation of
the Fourth Amendment in her removal, and violation of procedural due process.FN3° The district
court dismissed the case based on application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
FN27. 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir.2002).
FN28. Id. at 662.
FN29. Id. at 663.
FN30. Id
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the actions of the defendants "violated her constitutional
rights, independently of the state court decision."
FN31
The court recognized that the plaintiffs injuries would not have happened without the state
court's order directing her removal and placing her
in state custody. Nonetheless, the court found that
the plaintiffs claims were independent of the state
court judgments, emphasizing that even if the
plaintiff "would not have suffered any damages absent the state order ... her claim for damages [was]
based on an alleged independent violation of her
constitutional rights. It was this separate constitutional violation which caused the adverse state
court decision." FM2 Thus, the true cause of the
plaintiffs injuries was the defendant's actions, even
though the injuries would not have occurred absent
the state court's order.FN33
FN3i./^.at665.
FN32. Id. at 667; see also Holloway v.
Borsh, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 '(6th
Cir.2000) (finding § 1983 suit against
caseworker independent of state custody
proceedings based on actions taken by the

caseworker during the course of the state
proceedings).
FN33. Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 667.
In this case, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the Jensens' claims,
as they seek relief independent from any judgements rendered by the state courts. The Jensens do
not seek to reverse or undo any judgments of the
state courts. After all, the Verified Petition was ultimately dismissed and full custody of P.J. returned
to the Jensens. Rather, the Jensens' claims are based
on the separate conduct of the Defendants previous
to and during the course of the proceedings in the
state courts. Although the Juvenile Court was
surely called upon to balance the parental rights of
the Jensens with the State's interest in protecting
P.J.'s welfare, nothing in the record indicates that
either the Juvenile Court or the state criminal court
heard and ruled on claims that the Defendants deliberately misrepresented and omitted material facts
to the state courts, to each other, to the District Attorney's Office, or others involved in the events surrounding P.J.'s medical care in 2003.
*11 Thus, the Jensens allege independent claims
similar to those in the Brokaw case. Although much
of the injury alleged by the Jensens would not have
resulted in the absence of the Juvenile Court's orders, the Jensens argue that the underlying cause of
those orders was the Defendants' factual misrepresentations and omissions. The Jensens' claims are
different from those in the Warnick case, where the
state court entered specific findings of fact on the
very events complained of by the plaintiffs and
where there was no challenge to the integrity of the
evidence. It is true that granting relief to the Jensens in this case might require the Court to enter
findings that contradict issues decided by the state
court. However, this does not, of itself, invoke the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.FN34 Thus, the constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is separate and
independent from any orders of the state courts,
precluding application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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FN34. Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237.
It must be noted, however, that the Jensens' claims
are properly before this Court only to the extent
that they allege the Defendants engaged in conduct
that was not brought before the Juvenile Court or
conduct that materially affected the integrity of the
evidence on which the Juvenile Court relied. It is
not for this Court to decide whether P.J. actually
had Ewing's Sarcoma or whether the Juvenile Court
properly balanced the State's interest in protecting
children and the Jensens' constitutional rights.
Those issues, and other similar matters, were
squarely ruled on by the Juvenile Court and could
only be properly challenged by the Jensens through
an appeal.

termine whether activities are sufficiently connected with the judicial process to merit absolute immunity. FN38 A prosecutor is entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity "when performing the traditional functions of an advocate." FN39 Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity even when he or
she is accused of making misrepresentations to the
court, as long as the actions were taken in the role
of an advocate.FN4° "However, absolute immunity
does not extend to actions 'that are primarily investigative or administrative in nature,' though it
'may attach even to such administrative or investigative activities when these functions are necessary
so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an
officer of the court.' " FNm
FN38. Id. at 686.

B. Absolute Immunity

FN39. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
131(1997).

"The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of
absolute immunity from civil rights suits in several
well-established contexts involving the judicial process." FN35 "[S]tate attorneys and agency officials
who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 concerning
activities intimately associated with the judicial ...
process." FN36 The Tenth Circuit has recognized
that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when they meet this criteria. FN37
FN35. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686
(10th Cir. 1990).
FN36. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908
(10th Cir.2000) (quoting Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490
(10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

FN40. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n. 34.
FN41. Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (quoting
Pfeiffer, 929 F.2d at 1490) (internal quotation marks omitted).
*12 As a general rule, witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding, whether during trial or before,
are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from suit
arising from their testimony.™42 However, absolute witness immunity is not available to
"complaining witnesses"-"the person (or persons)
who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff'-for testimony "that is relevant
to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or perpetuated the prosecution." FN4X
FN42. Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395,
1400 (10th Cir. 1992).
FN43.A/. at 1399 n. 2, 1402.

FN37. Snell, 920 F.2d at 687-91 (quoting
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976)).
The Court applies a "functional approach" to de-

As explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are absolutely immune from
all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. Ms. Cunningham
is likewise entitled to absolute immunity with re-
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gard to her decision to file the Verified Petition, but
is not so entitled with regard to the rest of the conduct alleged in the Jensens' Complaint
Ms Eisenman Ms Eisenman argues that she is absolutely immune from the Jensens' claims arising
from functions performed in her role as an advocate
or in fulfillment of her duties as an officer of the
Juvenile Court The Jensens claim that Ms Eisenman engaged in a number of harmful activities outside the scope of her advocate role, which are
grouped as follows for purposes of analysis (I)
factual misrepresentations and omissions made to
the Juvenile Court, (2) misrepresentations to Ms
Cunningham, Mr Anderson, and Utah Attorney
General Shurtleff, FN44 (3) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the District Attorney's
Office; and (4) other investigative activities Additionally, although not discussed by the Jensens, Ms
Eisenman contends that she is immune from claims
arising from the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic in which Ms Eisenman informed the
Clinic of the custody order and forbade the clinic
from providing any treatment to P J The Court
finds that Ms Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to all of the Jensens § 1983
claims
FN44 The Jensens also claim that a misrepresentation was made to the Guardian
ad Litem, but offer no citation to evidence
that would support this assertion
Ms Eisenman is absolutely immune with regard to
the first group-misrepresentations made to the Juvenile Court Even assuming that Ms Eisenman intentionally misrepresented facts to the Juvenile
Court, those misrepresentations were made in her
role as an advocate There is no evidence that any
of the alleged misrepresentations were made under
oath or as a witness

communications with these persons were all directly related to the Juvenile Court proceedings Ms
Cunningham and Mr Anderson from DCFS were
Ms Eisenman's clients Attorney General Shurtleff
was Ms Eisenman's co-prosecutor, whose name
was on the Juvenile Court pleadings The parties
have not cited, nor has additional research uncovered, any cases dealing with the question of
whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for communications with her clients and cocounsel Nonetheless, these communications are
directly related to a prosecutor's ability to present
the State's case, satisfying the guiding principle of
prosecutorial immunity-proximity to the "judicial
process and the initiation and presentation of the
state's case" FN4S A prosecutor must be able to
freely speak with her chent-the very person for
whom he is advocating-and the other prosecutors
assigned to the case without fear that their communications may later form the basis of a civil suit
These communications likely include discussions
of, among other things, trial preparation and
strategy, discussion of applicable law, as well as
plea and settlement opportunities Allowing claims
to proceed against a prosecutor based on information shared (or not shared) during the course of discussions with his client and/or his fellow prosecutor
would interfere with the prosecutor's ability to
present the State's caseFN46 Thus, the public
policy behind the prosecutorial pnvilege-"to allow
functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to
perform their tasks absent the threat of retaliatory
litigation" FN47-fiilly supports Ms Eisenman's entitlement to absolute immunity with regard to her
communications with Ms Cunningham, Mr Anderson, and Attorney General Shurtleff
FN45 Scott, 216 F 3d at 908.
FN46 Id
FN47 Snell. 920 F 2d at 686-87

The Court likewise finds that Ms Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to the
second group-misrepresentations to others involved
in the Juvenile Court proceedings Ms Eisenman's

*13 The Court also finds that Ms Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to the third
category-misrepresentations made to the District
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Attorney. The Jensens have submitted sufficient
evidence to show that Ms. Eisenman provided the
District Attorney's Office with factual information
that led to the criminal charges against the Jensens.
In the absence of other considerations, this would
render Ms. Eisenman a complaining witness, absolving her of prosecutorial immunity with regard
to the criminal case.FN48 However, the Juvenile
Court had ordered that DCFS take protective custody of P.J. Despite being apprised by their attorney
of the Juvenile Court's custody order, the Jensens
refused to return to Utah and produce P.J. Seeking
to effectuate the Juvenile Court's order, Ms. Eisenman provided information to the District Attorney's
office which led to the initiation of criminal
charges. It is clear to this Court that these actions
were intimately connected with her duties to the Juvenile Court.FN49 For these same reasons, Ms. Eisenman^ actions in drafting and sending the August
2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic were also intimately connected with the Juvenile Court proceedings. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to
the Jensens' claims related to her providing allegedly misleading information to the District Attorney's Office and to her drafting and sending the
August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic.
FN48. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31.
FN49. Cf Burrows v. Cherokee CountySheriffs Office, 38 Fed. Appx. 504, 506
(10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2002) (granting immunity to prosecutor for his actions in
seeking extradition order) (unpublished decision).
With regard to the fourth grouping-investigative
activities-the Jensens point to two examples of investigative activities engaged in by Ms. Eisenman:
(I) providing documents to Dr. Albritton in advance of a July 10, 2003 hearing; and (2) sending
an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she made false
representations regarding the standard of care for
Ewing's Sarcoma treatment. Concerning the former,
the Jensens do not show how providing documents

to a witness in the course of preparing for a hearing
is investigative. With respect to the latter, the Jensens offer the following evidence in support of their
assertion that Ms. Eisenman discovered the standard mentioned in the email to Dr. Birkmayer
through her own investigative efforts: (1) Ms. Eisenman testified that she could not remember where
she got the document containing the referenced
standard; (2) that Dr. Wagner testified that he did
not give it to her; and (3) that P.J.'s guardian ad
litem did not recognize the document. Even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Jensens,
this testimony does not permit an inference that Ms.
Eisenman obtained the document through her own
investigative efforts. A number of doctors participated in DCFS's involvement with PJ.'s situationincluding Drs. Lemons and Albritton, both pediatric
oncologists-any one of whom might have provided
this information to Ms. Eisenman. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Ms. Eisenman is absolutely
immune from these claims, which are directly related to Ms. Eisenman's efforts to marshal the evidence and prepare for witness examination.
*14 Dr. Albritton. The Jensens' claims against Dr.
Albritton are based on the following allegations: (1)
that Dr. Albritton stated to Ms. Eisenman, Ms. McDonald, and the Juvenile Court that only a boardcertified pediatric oncologist was qualified to treat
P.J.; (2) that Dr. Albritton misrepresented the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic to the
Juvenile Court; and (3) that Dr. Albritton failed to
disclose to the Juvenile Court and others that genetic testing was routinely conducted at PCMC on
cases of suspected Ewing's Sarcoma.™50 Each of
these allegations are directly tied to Dr. Albritton's
role as an expert witness in which she opined as to
the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors
and facilities were capable of providing it. This was
precisely what Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to
testify about. Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr.
Albritton is entitled to absolute immunity from the
Jensens' § 1983 claims.
FN50. In opposing absolute immunity, the
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Jensens also point to circumstantial evidence that they claims shows Dr. Albritton
provided false information to Dr. Johnston.
The Jensens argue that this makes Dr. Albritton a complaining witness. However,
nowhere in their briefs do the Jensens rely
on this evidence to support their constitutional claims. The Jensens make no effort
to show how Dr. Albritton's alleged conversation with Dr. Johnston violated their
constitutional rights.
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens base their § 1983
claims against Ms. Cunningham on her failure to
investigate PJ.'s referral before filing the Verified
Petition and on the factual misrepresentations she
allegedly made to the Juvenile Court. Ms. Cunningham contends that she is absolutely immune from
each of the claims asserted by the Jensens because
she performed only prosecutorial functions.
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham is entitled to
absolute immunity, but only with regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition. The Verified Petition
was
filed
with
an
accompanying
"Verification" in which Ms. Cunningham swore under oath that the "matters stated [in the Petition] are
true." ™51 Although Ms. Cunningham surely exercised prosecutorial discretion in electing to file
the petition, she acted outside the scope of any prosecutorial function by attesting under oath to the allegations in the Verified Petition as a complaining
witness.™52 Thus, although Ms. Cunningham is
entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to
file the Verified Petition, she is not immune from
the Jensens' claims based their contention that the
Verified Petition contained misrepresentations and
omissions. For the same reasons, Ms. Cunningham
is not immune from the Jensen's claims arising
from the submission of her August 2003 affidavits,
which the Jensens claim contained factual misrepresentations and omissions.
FN51. Verified Petition, Docket No. 345,
Ex. 43, at 6.
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FN52. Kalina. 522 U.S. at 129-31.
Finally, Ms. Cunningham is not absolutely immune
from the Jensens' claims arising from her alleged
failure to properly investigate PJ.'s referral because
this duty did not sufficiently relate to the judicial
proceedings. Certainly, prosecutorial immunity may
be had for actions in "obtaining, reviewing and
evaluating evidence" prior to initiation of a criminal action. FNSX However, this is because these investigative actions "are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an officer of the
court." FN54 Although a judicial proceeding might
result from its fulfillment, Ms. Cunningham's duty
to investigate reports of child neglect is for the purpose of protecting the children who are the subject
of those reports. FN55 Therefore, it cannot be said
that fulfillment of this duty is intimately associated
with the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court
will deny Ms. Cunningham's request for summary
judgment based on absolute immunity.
FN53. Snell, 920 F.2d at 693.
FN54. Id.
FN55. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-409.

C. Qualified Immunity
*15 Each of the Defendants also asserts qualified
immunity with respect to the Jensens' § 1983
claims. Where a state actor raises a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment,
"the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict
two-part test: first, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff must show that this
right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue." FN56 "If, and only if, the plaintiff
meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear
the traditional burden of the movant for summary
judgment-showing that there are no genuine issues
of material fact and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FN57
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FN56. Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219,
1222 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Nelson v.
McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th
Cir.2000).
FN57. Id
A right is clearly established where "it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation.11 ™S8 This determination
must be made "in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition.11 ™59
That a right was clearly established can be shown
by controlling case law in the Tenth Circuit or by
the weight of authority in other circuits.™60 Notably, though, the Supreme Court has held that
"officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.11 ™61
FN58. Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108,
1114 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).

P.J. proceeds only on his familial association claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ." ™6' In addition to procedural protections, the Due Process
Clause also provides two forms of "substantive11
protection: (1) protection against government action
that "shocks the conscience11 and (2) protection of
fundamental liberty interests.™64 In the case of
Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, the Tenth Circuit recently clarified that these two "strands of the substantive due process doctrine11 are not mutually exclusive.™65 Rather, "by satisfying either the
'fundamental right1 or the 'shocks the conscience1
standards, a plaintiff states a valid substantive due
process claim." FN66 The Seegmiller court admonished: "Courts should not unilaterally choose to
consider only one or the other of the two strands.
Both approaches may well be applied in any given
case.11 FN67
FN63. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1.

FN59. Id. (quoting Katz, 533 U.S. at 201).
FN60./rf.at 1114-15.
FN61. Id. at 1115 (quoting Hope v. Peizer,
536 U.S. 730,741(2002)).

FN64. Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528
F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.2008).
FN65. Id at 767, 769.
FN66. Id. at 767.

In their § 1983 claims, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their substantive due process
rights and their rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.

I. Substantive Due Process
In their first and second causes of action, the Jensens ™62 claim that each of the Defendants engaged in substantive due process violations of the
Jensens' rights to familial association and to direct
P.J.'s medical care.
FN62. In its June 2006 Order, the Court
dismissed P.J.'s claims for violation of his
right to refuse unwanted treatment. Thus,

FN67. Id. at 769.
A substantive due process claim based on arbitrary
and oppressive government action is established
where the conduct in question is so egregious that it
"shocks the conscience of federal judges.11 FN68
Mere negligence is clearly insufficient to meet this
standard.™69 For that matter, even an intentional
or reckless abuse of power that causes the plaintiff
injury does not, of itself, meet the "shocks the conscience11 standard.FN7° Rather, there must be "a
degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.11 ™7«
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FN68. Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929,
938 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d
1036, 1040 (10th
Cir.2006)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
FN69. Id. at 937.
FN70. Id. at 937-38.

the conscience" standard to the substantive due process claims of two parents against the state for infringing on their right to direct the medical care of
their children.FN77 Although it ultimately declined
to delineate the applicable standard due to the scant
record before it, the court included a parent's right
to direct the medical care of his or her children
among those fundamental rights for which a substantive due process claim may be stated without
meeting the "shocks the conscience" standard.™78

FN71./rf. at 938.
*16 A substantive due process plaintiff asserting a
fundamental liberty interest must narrowly articulate its scope.™72 The Court must then determine
whether the asserted interest is "objectively, deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." FN73 Should both of these hurdles be
cleared, the plaintiff must then show that the government actor's conduct infringed on the plaintiffs
fundamental liberty interest and was "not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." FN74
FN72. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 769
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702,721 (1997)).
FN73. Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 775-76 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
FN74. Seegmiller, 528 FJd at 767.
The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on
their right to direct P.J.'s medical care and their
right to familial association. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the Due Process Clause
"protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children." FN75 This "fundamental right"
encompasses both of the liberty interests asserted
by the Jensens, calling for application of the compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard. In
Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,™16 the Tenth Circuit
reversed a district court for applying the "shocks
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FN75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66
(2000) (plurality opinion).
FN76. 336 FJd 1194 (10th Cir.2003).
FN77. Id at 1202-03.
FN78. Id.
Dr. Wagner contends that the Jensens have not narrowly articulated their right to direct P.J.'s medical
care and, therefore, are not entitled to application of
the compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard.
More specifically, Dr. Wagner argues that the Jensens' claim to absolute autonomy in directing the
medical care decisions of their son conflicts with
the " 'Constitution's notions of ordered liberty,'
which have always protected a child's right to treatment whenever it has been unreasonably denied by
a parent." FN79 The Court agrees with this general
proposition. However, with a few notable exceptions that are discussed below, the Court does not
read the Jensens' claimed right so broadly. The Jensens do not claim a right to direct P.J.'s medical
care free of any State interference. Rather, they
claim that the State cannot interfere with their right
to direct P.J.'s medical care by making deliberate
and material factual misrepresentations and omissions to state courts and other decision makers during the process by which that interference is accomplished. As the Court recognized in its June 2006
Order, when the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care is placed in this context, it is not only fundamental, but is also clearly established ,FN8°
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FN79. Docket No. 381, at 2.

FN83. Griffen, 983 F.2d at 1547.

FN80. Docket No. 52, at 22, 34, 41 (citing
Pierce
v. Gilchrist,
359 F.3d
1279,
1297-99 (10th Cir.2004); Dubbs, 336 F.3d
at 1202-03).

FN84. Id. at 1548.

*17 The proper standard for claims of familial association is more complicated. As a fundamental
liberty interest,™81 the right to familial association between a parent and his or her child would
logically be governed by the same standard applicable to other fundamental rights. However, the
Tenth Circuit has consistently applied a balancing
test to claims for infringement of the familial association right.FN82 In Griffen v. Strong, the Tenth
Circuit called for a balancing test to determine
whether a state actor's conduct "constituted an undue burden" on a plaintiffs right to familial association.™83 A court applying the undue burden test
should balance the plaintiffs right to familial association against the relevant interests of the state,
considering the "severity of the alleged infringement, the need for the defendant's conduct, and any
possible alternatives." FN84 This standard clearly
involves lower scrutiny than the compelling interest/narrowly tailored test applicable to other fundamental rights. Indeed, the Griffen test requires
the plaintiff to show that the state actor directed his
conduct at the familial relationship "with knowledge that the ... conduct will adversely affect that
relationship." FN85

FN85. Id.
In its June 2006 Order, the Court opted to apply the
Griffen standard as it remains good law in the Tenth
Circuit, but noted the conflict between the compelling interest/narrowly tailored and undue burden
standards. As the Seegmiller decision had no occasion to specifically consider the right to familial association in the child-welfare context or the long
line of Tenth Circuit cases applying the undue burden test, the Court will continue to apply the Griffen standard to the Jensens' familial association
claims.
Clearly, "the right to associate with one's family is
a very substantial right." FN86 However, this right
"has never been deemed absolute or unqualified."
FN87
It is clear that the state may interfere with the
right to familial association, even without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, where such action is needed to ensure the safety of a child. FN88
Thus, the Court must weigh the State's interest in
protecting children against the Jensens' interest in
familial association, given the factual record
presented, to determine whether the State's interference constituted an undue burden on the Jensens'
right to familial association.
FN86./&

FN81. Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122,
1127 (10th Cir.2006) (reciting parents' fundamental right to "care, custody and control of their children" in removal context).

FN87. Martinez v. Mafchir,
1490 (10th Cir. 1994).

35 F.3d 1486,

FN88. Gomes, 451 F.3d at 1128-29.
FN82. See, e.g., Griffen v. Strong, 983
F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1993) (applying
"undue burden" balancing test to substantive due process claim based on right of familial association between husband and
wife); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx.
647, 656 (10th Cir.2006) (applying Griffen
undue burden test) (unpublished decision).

With this framework in mind, the Jensens' substantive due process claims against Dr. Wagner, Ms.
Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson are considered below. FN89
FN89. As discussed above, Ms. Eisenman
and Dr. Albritton are entitled to absolute
immunity on all of the Jensens' § 1983
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claims.
Dr. Wagner. The Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process rights based on
the following allegations: (1) Dr. Wagner refused to
perform genetic and molecular testing despite the
Jensens' requests; (2) Dr. Wagner made this decision because of his desire to enroll P.J. in a clinical trial, which he did not disclose to the Jensens; (3)
Dr. Wagner discouraged the Jensens from seeking a
second opinion and then attempted to influence that
opinion; (4) Dr. Wagner did not inform Dr. Lemons, Dr. Albritton, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Lowichik, Dr.
Corwin, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, or the
Juvenile Court of his refusal to order genetic and/or
molecular testing; and (5) Dr. Wagner told Ms.
Cunningham that P.J. could be dead in five days in
order to persuade her to skip the normal investigative process.
*18 Having closely examined the record, the Court
finds the Jensens have not established that Dr.
Wagner violated their substantive due process
rights. It is undisputed that Drs. Lowichik and
Coffin diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's Sarcoma after
performing imrnunohistochemical testing. According to Dr. Coffin, this diagnosis was rendered with
near certainty. Dr. Lowichik estimated her level of
certainty "in the high 90 percent." FN90 Dr. Coffin
told Dr. Wagner that she was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. This,
according to Dr. Wagner, coupled with the need for
immediate treatment, was the reason he did not order additional testing. When the Jensens would not
agree to begin treatment that he believed was necessary to save P.J.'s life, Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s
case to DCFS. The Jensens offer no competent
evidence to place these facts in dispute. Rather, the
Jensens ask the Court to draw a number of unreasonable inferences, which the record plainly will not
support, in order to attribute a more dubious purpose to Dr. Wagner's actions.
FN90. Docket No. 345, Ex. 16, at 31.

was an administrator of a clinical trial for which
P.J. might have been eligible, arguing that this was
the reason behind Dr. Wagner's refusal to order
more testing and his insisting on immediate chemotherapy treatment. Even assuming that it was inappropriate to refuse further testing and that Dr. Wagner did refuse the testing with the study in mind,
the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P.J. to
another facility and another doctor for further testing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further
testing did not, of itself, violate the Jensens' right to
direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable
state interference.
Moreover, outside of P.J.'s possible eligibility to
participate in the trial, the Jensens have produced
no evidence that Dr. Wagner's decisions were motivated based on a desire to enroll PJ. in the trial.
Indeed, the record would not permit such an inference. It is undisputed that the trial required enrollment within 30 days of the diagnostic biopsywhich, in P.J.'s case, occurred on May 2, 2003.
Thus, on June 2, 2003, P.J. was no longer eligible
to participate in the trial. If Dr. Wagner's refusal to
order the tests and his push to immediately begin
chemotherapy were motivated by a desire to enroll
P.J. in the clinical trail, surely his efforts would
have ceased or changed course after June 2, 2003.
However, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner's efforts
to ensure that P.J. received chemotherapy continued
after this date. It was not until after June 2, 2003,
that Dr. Wagner involved Dr. Corwin. At the June
9, 2003 meeting at PCMC, Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need for P.J.'s chemotherapy to begin
immediately before the cancer spread throughout
his body. Finally, it was not until June 16, 2003,
that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS. In
light of these undisputed facts, it is entirely unreasonable to infer that Dr. Wagner's motivation for not
ordering further testing and seeking immediate
treatment was to enroll P.J. in the clinical trial.
*19 The Jensens next contend that Dr. Wagner discouraged them from seeking a second opinion and
then attempted to interfere with that opinion. In

First, the Jensens point to the fact that Dr. Wagner
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support of this claim, the Jensens testified that Dr.
Wagner told them that insurance companies would
often not pay for a second opinion, which would require the Jensens to pay for it. The Jensens also cite
an email sent by Dr. Wagner to the oncologist who
was to perform the second opinion, in which he
stated,
Dear Dr. Grier,
( am a pediatric oncologist sat [sic] the University
of Utah, and I was wondering if you could
provide consultation for a patient being followed
in our clinic. This 12-year-old boy underwent excision of a dome-shaped lesion at the floor of the
mouth. After careful review by Cheryl Coffin and
other pathologists here in Salt Lake, the diagnosis
of Ewing's sarcoma has been made. Supporting
this diagnosis are the presence of small round
blue cells which stain for 0 1 3 , FLI-1, and vimentin. There is a weak positivity of S-100. Desmin and actin are negative, as are epithelial
markers, CD3, and CD45. There was no fresh or
frozen tissue to send for RT-PCR for Ewing's
translocations, although this possibly could be
done on archival paraffin-embedded tissue. If
there is significant diagnostic uncertainty, additional fresh tissue could likely be obtained by reexcision, as the margins were clearly positive.
[ have discussed these results with the family, and
expressed my confidence in the thorough histologic work-up that has been done by expert personnel. However, the family is interested in pursuing
a second opinion, and has requested that we sed
[sic] the tslides [sic] and tissue block to you for
further review. I have explained that you are an
oncologist and not a pathologist, etc., and that
further consultations will delay the start of therapy (the child is now 19 days post-resection, as
the tissue was initially sent to a pathologist in
Washington who made a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated malignancy" after performing a limited immunihistovemocal [sic] work-up). Nevertheless, at their request, I am sending by FedEX
the tissue to your institution addressed to you. I
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would greatly appreciate your help in expediting
pathologic review so we can commence with
treatment for this young man.FN9!

FN91. Docket No. 345, Ex. 4 1 , at LMW 8.
This evidence does not rise to the level of a unconstitutional infringement of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Whatever his motivations,
the Jensens have offered no evidence that Dr. Wagner's statement regarding the likelihood of insurance coverage was false. Although Dr. Wagner
clearly expressed confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis, along with his desire to quickly begin treatment, the above email does not support a
reasonable inference that Dr. Wagner attempted to
interfere with the second opinion sought by the Jensens.
Finally, and most important to their substantive due
process claims, the Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner
did not tell others involved in P.J.'s case-including
Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and the Juvenile
Court-of his refusal to order further diagnostic tests
despite the Jensens' requests and that he falsely told
Ms. Cunningham that P.J. would be dead within
five days. With respect to the former, even assuming that Dr. Wagner did in fact fail to tell others
about his refusal to order the genetic and/or molecular tests, there is no evidence that he did so deliberately. Rather, as outlined above, the record
demonstrates that Dr. Wagner believed that those
tests were unnecessary and would delay needed
treatment based on the diagnosis of Drs. Coffin and
Lowichik. To the extent the Jensens claim substantive due process rights that would impose liability
on Dr. Wagner for failing to disclose seemingly irrelevant facts, such rights are not implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, do not
merit protection under the compelling interest/
narrowly tailored standard.
*20 With respect to the latter, it is undisputed that
Dr. Wagner communicated the emergency nature of
P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS. The Jensens have
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not provided any evidence that Dr. Wagner did not
actually believe this to be true. Instead, they contend that Dr. Wagner convinced Ms. Cunningham
to forgo normal investigatory procedures by overstating the immediacy of P.J.'s medical needs,
telling her that P.J. would be dead within five days.
The Jensens base this assertion entirely on Mr. Anderson's deposition testimony. However, Mr. Anderson did not testify that Dr. Wagner made this
statement, but that someone told Ms. Cunningham
that P.J. would die within five days. Although Mr.
Anderson agreed that it was likely the referring
doctors, he "never verified who ... made the statement." FN92 More important, Mr. Anderson's testimony on this point is inadmissible hearsay and,
therefore, must be disregarded.FN93 Accordingly,
the record merely shows that Dr. Wagner communicated his belief to Ms. Cunningham that P.J. required immediate medical treatment to give him the
best chance possible of surviving Ewing's Sarcoma,
as diagnosed by the pathologists at PCMC.
FN92. Docket No. 345, Ex. 2, at 321.
FN93. Argo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.2006).
In summary, the Jensens ask the Court to find that
Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process
rights to familial association and to direct P.J.'s
medical care based on unreasonable inferences that
stretch the record far beyond its actual content. This
does not satisfy their burden of establishing a violation of their constitutional rights.
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct in
providing medical care for P.J. and referring his
case to DCFS after the Jensens would not consent
to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly tailored to serve
the State's compelling interest in protecting children. The record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS after the Jensens refused
to consent to chemotherapy treatment which Dr.
Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save
P.J.'s life. There were, perhaps, additional measures
that Dr. Wagner could have taken that might have

avoided the need to involve DCFS. For example, he
might have ordered the additional tests despite his
belief that they were unnecessary and would delay
needed treatment. However, the constitution does
not place an affirmative duty on him to do so where
he reasonably believed P.J.'s life was in danger. To
the extent the Jensens claim to the contrary, their
substantive due process rights are no longer within
the boundaries of fundamental rights and, therefore,
are only entitled to protection under the shocks the
conscience standard-which Dr. Wagner's conduct
does not do.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it important that any actual interference with the Jensens' substantive due process rights was accomplished by referring the case to DCFS, filing the
Verified Petition, and presenting P.J.'s case to a
neutral judge-not by simply removing P.J. from his
parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy.
Indeed, the Jensens received ample opportunities to
present their side of the story to the Juvenile Court.
They were represented by counsel throughout the
Juvenile Court proceedings. The Jensens correctly
contend that the Constitution would not permit interference with their substantive due process rights
by means of intentional misrepresentations to the
Juvenile Court. However, as outlined above, the
Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from
which the Court can conclude that Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented the events and circumstances surrounding P.J.'s medical care to either the
Juvenile Court or others involved in P.J.'s case.
*21 For these same reasons, the Court finds that Dr.
Wagner's conduct did not unduly burden the familial association rights of the Jensens and P.J. Dr.
Wagner's decision to refer P.J. to DCFS minimally
infringed the Jensens' familial association rights,
preserving ample opportunity for the Jensens to
present their interests to the Juvenile Court. Perhaps
further discussion might have led to a more amiable
solution, but in light of the perceived need for immediate treatment, it was entirely reasonable to
submit P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS authorities.
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Again, the Jensens are correct that intentional and
material factual misrepresentations and omissions
on the part of Dr. Wagner to either DCFS representatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have
interfered with their associational rights on a much
grander scale. However, the record simply does not
sustain these allegations. Accordingly, the Court
will grant Dr. Wagner's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the Jensens' substantive due
process claims.
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their substantive due process
rights in two ways: (I) by failing to properly investigate PJ.'s referral; and (2) by making deliberate
factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court.
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham did not violate the Jensens' constitutional rights by failing to
investigate the representations of Drs. Wagner and
Corwin. The Jensens' claims have important similarities to the Eighth Circuit case of Thomason v.
SCAN Volunteer Services, /nc.FN94 The plaintiff in
Thomason brought a substantive due process claim
against a state social worker for violation of her
right to "the care, custody and management" of her
infant child.FN95 The social worker received a report from a doctor who was treating the plaintiffs
child, including two letters and an article from the
Journal of Pediatrics, which stated his concern that
the plaintiff might be suffering from a psychological disorder that causes her to partially suffocate her
child in order to garner the attention of health care
professionais.FN% Without investigating the allegations, the social worker removed the child from
the plaintiffs custody and "arguably mischaracterized" the doctor's report in an affidavit to the juvenile court. FN97 The Eighth Circuit held that the social worker's failure to investigate did not violate
the parent plaintiffs constitutional rights where she
relied on the doctor's "reasonable suspicion that
life-threatening abuse [was] occurring in the
home." FN98
FN94. 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir.1996).

FN95. Id. at 1370.
FN96. Id. at 1368.
FN97.W. at 1372.
FN98./tf. at 1373.
Similar to the social worker in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham relied on the information provided to her
by PJ.'s treating physician in filing the Verified Petition. The Jensens have produced no evidence that
Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect the information and opinions given to her by Drs. Wagner and
Corwin were misleading. Rather, the Jensens contend that if Ms. Cunningham would have fulfilled
her duties under Utah law to investigate PJ.'s referral, she would have discovered the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made to her by the
doctors. However, any duty to investigate that Ms.
Cunningham may have had under State law cannot
form the basis of a § 1983 claim for violation of
substantive due process.FN99
FN99. See Jones v. City and County oj
Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th
Cir.1988) ("Section
1983 does not,
however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only for those violations of federal law done under color of
state law.").
*22 In this emergency situation, like the one in
Thomason, Ms. Cunningham was reasonable in relying on the information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of any further investigation. Dr. Wagner communicated to Ms. Cunningham that PJ.'s situation was a medical emergency
and that PJ.'s life was in danger, thus implicating
the State's compelling interest in PJ.'s safety. The
means used by Ms. Cunningham to address the
State's compelling interest in the emergency medical situation were narrowly tailored. Ms. Cunningham did not seek to immediately remove PJ. from
the home. Rather, she filed the Verified Petition,
thus instituting a state court proceeding where the
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Jensens would have an opportunity to rebut the
doctor's allegations If the situation had been represented to Ms Cunningham as something less than
an urgent medical emergency, perhaps a duty to in
vestigate could be constitutionally required Such a
duty may be needed in non emergency situations in
order to curb "overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and
government officials," which "may have the effect
of discouraging parents and care takers from communicating with doctors or seeking appropriate
medical attention for children with real or potentially hfe-threatenmg conditions" FNI0° However,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms
Cunningham did not reasonably believe the doctors'
contentions that P J 's life was in danger and immediate action was necessary to ensure his welfare
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have
not established a constitutional violation of either
their right to familial association or their right to
direct P J's medical care with respect to Ms Cunningham's actions in failing to investigate P J 's referral and in filing the Verified Petition
FN 100 Thomason, 85 F 3d at 1373
The Court also finds that the Jensens have not established a constitutional violation based on Ms
Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court As an initial matter, the
Court notes that the Jensens have failed in their op
position memorandum to point out the specific factual misrepresentations and omissions on which
they base their claim against Ms Cunningham As
the Jensens bear the burden of establishing a constitutional violation of the their substantive due process rights, this failure alone entitles Ms Cunningham to qualified immunity FNl01
FN 101 "Judges are not like pigs, hunting
for truffles buried in briefs" US v
Gnebel. 2008 WL 1741503, * 4 (10th Cir
Apr 14, 2008) (quoting Gross v Burggraf
Constr Co, 53 F 3d 1531, 1546 (10th
Cir 1996))

Nonetheless, having carefully reviewed their opposition memorandum, the Jensens appear to base
their substantive due process claims on three instances in which they contend Ms Cunningham
made factual misrepresentations and omissions to
the Juvenile Court (1) the Verified Petition, and (2)
an August 8, 2003 affidavit, and (3) an August 18,
2003 affidavit The Jensens have not brought forth
any evidence that Ms Cunningham knew that the
information contained in the Verified Petition was
misleading or deficient As outlined above, Ms
Cunningham had no constitutional duty to investigate the information provided her by PCMC doctors
before filing it Thus, Ms Cunningham's statements
in the Verified Petition do not establish a violation
of the Jensens' substantive due process rights Accordingly, the Jensens' substantive due process
claims depend entirely on the misrepresentations
and omissions allegedly made by Ms Cunningham
in her August 2003 affidavits
*23 Assuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the
"misrepresentations and omissions" made by Ms
Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits do not
establish a constitutional violation The Jensens
claim that Ms Cunningham made the following
misrepresentations and omissions in both her August 8 and August 18 affidavits (I) stating that a
sample of P J 's tumor was sent to Dana-Farber for
a second opinion without stating that the second
opinion was never given, (2) stating that P J underwent a CT and Bone Scan without stating that these
tests were normal, (3) stating that the Jensens
wanted to use IPT to treat P J when they were actually no longer interested, (4) omitting to state that
the "controlling" genetic tests were not yet complete, (5) omitting to state that she had not actually
spoken with Dr Coffin, (6) referring to Dr Birkmayer as a man rather than as a doctor, and (7) stating that Dr Tishler recommended in the July 28,
2003 hearing that P J should begin chemotherapy
when Dr Tishler had actually reserved his final
opinion until all the testing was complete
Upon close inspection of the circumstances in
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which Ms. Cunningham submitted her August 2003
affidavits, the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, consequence. Of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions listed
above, only numbers 4 and 7 have any potential
significance. However, the record clearly reveals
that they cannot support the Jensens' claims.
In the hearing held on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile
Court clearly ordered that P.J. begin chemotherapy
by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not begin P.J.'s
chemotherapy by that date. Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits were submitted with the State's
application to take P.J. into protective custody as a
result of the Jensens' failure to begin P.J.'s chemotherapy.
The hearing transcript shows that Dr. Tishler did in
fact recommend that P.J. begin chemotherapy at the
July 28 hearing and that any burden to place further
test results before the Juvenile Court was on the
Jensens. At the July 28 hearing, Mr. Nakamura
clearly advocated the Jensens' concern that some of
the testing was not yet completed. Dr. Tishler indicated that there was no question that P.J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy and
that the remaining pathological and radiological
tests would merely serve to clarify what type of tumor he had. Upon hearing and accepting this, the
Juvenile Court ordered that P.J.'s chemotherapy be
commenced before August 8, 2003, without regard
to the test results. The Juvenile Court also stated in
the July 28 hearing that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the Jensens were free to bring that to the court's attention.
Thus, numbers 4 and 7 were not misrepresentations
or omissions at all, as demonstrated by the hearing
transcript itself.
The other alleged misrepresentations and omissions
were plainly immaterial. Numbers one, two, and
three are listed in Ms. Cunningham's August 18 affidavit as information provided to her by Dr. Wagner around June 16, 2003. Although this information
provided useful background information, it was
clearly not material to the issues before the Juvenile

Court in mid-August 2003. Those issues centered
on the Jensens' failure to comply with the Juvenile
Court's order that P.J. begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. With respect to number 5, Ms. Cunningham did not state that she spoke with Dr.
Coffin. Rather, she merely states that according to
Dr. Coffin, the Jensens had Dr. Christensen do a
second oral surgery on P.J.'s mouth resulting in an
additional sample that was sent to the University of
Washington-a fact that the parties do not dispute.
Finally, and exemplary of the "misrepresentations
and omissions" the Jensens allege Ms. Cunningham
made, Ms. Cunningham's reference to Dr. Birkmayer as a man rather than a doctor was not material to
the matters before the Juvenile Court at that time.
*24 The Court finds that the misrepresentations and
omissions allegedly made by Ms. Cunningham
were completely immaterial to the issues before the
Juvenile Court and, therefore, did not interfere with
the Jensens' substantive due process rights, even
under the compelling interest/narrowly tailored
standard.™102 As outlined above, Ms. Cunningham instituted process before a State court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against the Jensens. In this proceeding,
the Jensens' fundamental rights to direct the custody, care, and control of their son were carefully
balanced by a neutral judge. There is simply insufficient evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately
misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Juvenile Court.
FN 102. Accordingly, the Court also finds
that Ms. Cunningham's actions did not violate the Jensens' substantive due process
rights under the undue burden and shocks
the conscience tests.
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens allege that Mr. Anderson violated their rights to familial association and
to direct P.J.'s medical care by (1) interfering with
their ability to select their doctors; (2) refusing to
withdraw the Verified Petition; (3) intentionally
failing to disclose material facts to the Juvenile
Court; and (4) failing to properly train and super-
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vise DCFS case workers. The Court finds the Jensens have not established that Mr. Anderson violated their substantive due process rights.
First, the Jensens claim that Ms. Anderson violated
their right to direct PJ.'s medical care by insisting
that the State select the doctor who would treat PJ.
According to the Jensens, a parent is entitled to
choose the doctor who will provide medical treatment to their child as long as the alternatives are
reasonable. They contend that Mr. Anderson "took
the position that the State could force the parents to
go to the court and let the court decide which physician was 'better,' " FNI03 thus preventing the Jensens from placing P.J. under the care of either Dr.
Birkmayer or Dr. Simone.
FN103. Docket No. 340, at 9.
The Court finds, based on the circumstances of the
case, that this does not amount to a constitutional
violation of the Jensens' right to direct PJ.'s medical care. Mr. Anderson's involvement with PJ.'s case
did not begin until late August 2003. By this time,
the Juvenile Court had already held a number of
hearings to determine the medical care that was in
PJ.'s best interest. To that end, the Juvenile Court
ordered PJ. to begin chemotherapy administered by
a board-certified pediatric oncologist by August 8,
2003. The Jensens did not meet this deadline and
the Juvenile Court granted protective custody of
P J. to the State. It was at this point that Mr. Anderson become involved in the case, attempting to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. In his negotiations, Mr. Anderson took the position that PJ.
must be treated with chemotherapy by a boardcertified pediatric oncologist. This position was in
accord with both the Juvenile Court's order and the
opinion of Dr. Tishler who had evaluated P J. Most
important, as even the Jensens' acknowledge, Mr.
Anderson's position was that if the Jensens wanted
a different doctor, they could make their request to
the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court was readily
available to hear and determine whether the Jensens' desire to have a different doctor treat PJ. was
in his best interest. In light of these undisputed
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facts-particularly the fact that the negotiations were
conducted during the course of the Juvenile Court
proceedings, which provided ample process-Mr.
Anderson's "position" that having a board-certified
pediatric oncologist treat PJ. was in his best interest was narrowly tailored to serve the State's
compelling interest in protecting PJ. Accordingly,
such does not amount to a constitutional violation.
*25 The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their constitutional rights by refusing to withdraw the medical neglect allegations despite his admission that the Jensens were not neglectful parents. The Jensens base this assertion on their depositions, in which they testified that during negotiations with Mr. Anderson in late August 2003, Mr.
Anderson said, "I understand you're a great parent.
I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't
have it over. It's gone too far." FNI04 The Jensens
ask the Court to infer from this that Mr. Anderson
knew the Jensens were not guilty of medical neglect but chose to maintain the Verified Petition anyway for political reasons.
FNI04. Docket No. 345, at % 382.
These statements do not establish a violation of the
Jensens' substantive due process rights. The negotiations between the Jensens and Mr. Anderson
began in late August 2003, after the Juvenile Court
had already granted protective custody of PJ. to the
State and ordered that he undergo chemotherapy to
treat the cancer that multiple medical professionals
indicated he had. Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho in
an attempt to negotiate an amiable resolution with
the Jensens. The above statements were allegedly
made during the course of these negotiations. Upon
this background of undisputed facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Mr. Anderson's alleged
statements that the medical neglect allegations were
baseless, that Mr. Anderson knew it, and that he admitted as much to the Jensens. Mr. Anderson's attempt to negotiate a workable solution to the outof-hand situation in no way interfered with the Jensens' right to familial association or their right to
direct PJ.'s medical care.
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The Jensens also allege that Mr Anderson violated
their substantive due process rights by intentionally
failing to inform the Juvenile Court of the following (I) definitive testing had never been performed
on P J ' s tissue, and (2) Dr Johnston had materially
breached his agreement to refrain from rendenng a
diagnosis before completing the independent test
mg
These allegations provide neither a factual nor legal
basts to find that Mr Anderson violated the Jen
sens' substantive due process rights With regard to
first alleged omission, the Jensens have not directed
the Court to evidence that Mr Anderson knew the
Juvenile Court was unaware of the possibility for
genetic testing or that genetic tests were
"definitive" Rather, they cite to the deposition
testimony of P J 's guardian ad litem in which she
indicates that she was unaware of the possibility for
genetic testing until September 4, 2003 This does
not show that Mr Anderson intentionally withheld
information about genetic testing from the Juvenile
Court Moreover, the Jensens repeatedly stated their
desire for further testing during the Juvenile Court
proceedings
With respect to the second alleged omission, the
Jensens contend that Mr Anderson was aware that
Dr Johnston had determined to recommend chemotherapy before receiving the results of the genetic
tests in violation of the September 5, 2003 stipulation and that Mr Anderson failed to inform the Juvenile Court of this fact Mr Anderson testified that
he understood Dr Johnston would perform an independent evaluation of P J 's medical condition, including independent testing, before rendenng a final treatment recommendation Mr Anderson also
testified that he was aware the genetic tests were
not finished when Dr Johnston determined to re
commend chemotherapy However, there is no
evidence that Mr Anderson understood that render
mg a diagnosis before completion of the genetic
testing breached the September 5 stipulation The
deposition testimony cited by the Jensens only
refers to "independent testing" FM0S There is no

indication in either Mr Anderson's testimony, or in
the wntten stipulation, that Dr Johnston could not
have sufficiently confirmed the diagnosis through
independent testing, like the pathological testing
conducted by Dr Coffin, even though the genetic
testing was not complete Moreover, there is no
evidence showing that Mr Anderson intentionally
withheld the fact that the genetic testing was incomplete from the Juvenile Court The Court cannot find that Mr Anderson was deliberately withholding information from the Juvenile Court based
merely on the fact that he knew the genetic testswhich Dr Johnston testified were immaterial to his
treatment recommendation-were not yet complete
Most important, the Jensens have failed to show
how Mr Anderson's alleged failure to disclose this
information interfered with their right to direct
P J 's medical care The Jensens refused to follow
Dr Johnston's treatment recommendations, which
lead to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly
thereafter The only action taken by the Juvenile
Court subsequent to Dr Johnston's recommendation
was to dismiss the case
FN 105 Docket No 345, Ex 2, at 249
*26 Finally, the Jensens argue that Mr Anderson
should be liable for failure to adequately train and
supervise DCFS case workers Presumably, although it is far than clear, the Jensens claim that
Mr Anderson is liable for the injuries resulting
from Ms Cunningham's actions in failing to properly investigate P J's referral because he failed to
tram her The Jensens cite to the case of City of
Canton v Hams™106 for the proposition that a
supervisor who acts with deliberate indifference in
failing to train and supervise subordinates is subject
to liability under section 1983
FN106 489 U S 378(1989)
The Jensens' failure to tram and supervise claim
fails for two reasons First, the Jensens have not
brought any evidence to the Court's attention that
could show Mr Anderson acted with "deliberate indifference" FN107 to the nghts of others in failing
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to train Ms. Cunningham. Second, the Jensens have
not established that Ms. Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional rights, a prerequisite to
Mr. Anderson's liability for failure to train her. FN,°8
FN107.A/.at388.
FN108.A/. at39l.
In sum, the Court finds that none of Mr. Anderson's
actions during his involvement with P.J.'s case interfered with the Jensens' substantive due process
rights.

procedural due process/"*m
FN 109. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
FNI 10. Docket No. 52, at 23 ("[T]he Due
Process Clause also encompasses ... a
guarantee of fair procedure.") (quoting
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FNlll./rf.

2. Procedural Due Process
The Jensens claim that each of the Defendants violated their procedural due process rights. Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and Mr. Anderson present
argument on these claims. Dr. Wagner incorporates
these arguments by reference. However, as Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton enjoy absolute immunity,
the Jensens' procedural due process claims against
them are not discussed.
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural due process
rights by failing to properly investigate P.J.'s referral and by intentionally misrepresenting facts to the
Juvenile Court.
At its most basic level, due process ensures that a
person may not be deprived of an interest in life,
liberty, or property without "the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." FNI09 As noted by the Court in its June
2006 Decision, the Due Process Clause also requires that "the notice and hearing ... be fair."
FNno Accordingly, in considering the Defendants'
motions to dismiss in June 2006, the Court found
that the Jensens' allegation that "[Ms. Cunningham]
intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the
Jensens' case, including the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court" was sufficient to state a claim for violation of their rights to

However, as set forth above, the Jensens have
failed to submit evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately made material misrepresentations and
omissions to the Juvenile Court. Rather, the Jensens
merely nitpick Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits. These alleged misstatements are not the
type of intentional falsities that would render an
otherwise procedurally sound judicial proceeding
"unfair." FNn2 Rather, these misrepresentations,
which dealt with facts known to the Jensens, were
more properly addressed by the Jensens' counsel at
the August 8, 2003 hearing before the Juvenile
Court. For example, the Jensens' counsel could, if
desired, easily have pointed out to the Juvenile
Court that Dr. Birkmayer was more than just a
"man." Thus, the Jensens have not established a violation of their procedural due process rights with
regard to the alleged factual misrepresentations and
omissions.
FNI 12. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (finding due process violation where witness gave perjured
testimony that he had received no promise
in return for his testimony when in reality
he had).
*27 Additionally, the Court finds that the Jensens'
had no liberty interest in the investigation of child
abuse claims required of DCFS case workers under
Utah law and, therefore, cannot establish a viola-
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tion of their procedural due process rights by virtue
of Ms. Cunningham's failure to carry out that investigation. "Protected liberty interests may arise
from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and
the laws of the States." FNN3 A State may create a
liberty interest "by establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making ... and by
mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met." FN"4
Both of these elements are necessary for the creation of a liberty interest. Thus, where state law requires the fulfilment of specified substantive predicates but does not mandate a certain outcome,
there is no liberty interest.™115
FN 113. Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quoting Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
FN114. Id. at 462 (quoting Hewitt, 459
U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
FNl 15./rf. at 464-465.
"State-created procedures ... do not create such an
entitlement where none would otherwise exist."
FN! i6 A S stated by the Supreme Court: "Process is
not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to
protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." FNM7
For example, in Pierce v. Delta County Department
of Social Services, the plaintiffs argued that Colorado's Child Protection Act created a liberty interest
by mandating that acts of child abuse be reported
and properly investigated.™118 The court rejected
this contention, finding that the Colorado statutes at
issue merely mandated procedure without dictating
"a particular substantive outcome or guarantee." FNM9
FN 116. Pierce v. Delta County Dept. oj
Soc. Servs., 119 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1152-53
(D.Colo.2000).

FN 117. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238,250(1983).
FNl 18. Pierce, 119 F.Supp.2d at 1153.
FNll9./tf.
The Jensens contend that Utah law, by statue, imposes mandatory duties to perform specific investigative actions before doing anything that might affect parental rights. Even assuming that this is the
case, the Jensens merely assert a liberty interest in
process, not in substantive outcomes. The Jensens
do not point to any section of the Utah Code that
sets forth a specific substantive predicate that, when
fulfilled, dictates a specific substantive outcome.
This does not create the sort of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms.
Cunningham violated their procedural due process
rights.
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens claim that Mr. Anderson implemented a policy whereby case workers
would not investigate allegations of medical neglect
when made by doctors from PCMC and that this
policy violated their due process rights. FNi2° The
Jensens also claim that this policy violated their
right to equal protection. However, because they
did not plead an equal protection claim, and apparently asserted it for the first time in the summary
judgment briefing, the Court will not consider this
argument.
FN 120. At some point, the Jensens also
claimed that Mr. Anderson made factual
misrepresentations and omissions to the
state courts. However, the Jensens have not
pursued this theory in their summary judgment briefing and have submitted no evidence to support it.
The Jensens have failed to submit any evidence that
DCFS actually had a policy of not investigating
medical neglect allegations if they were made by
PCMC doctors. Rather, the Jensens ask the Court to
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infer that such a policy was instituted by Mr. Anderson based on the following: (I) Ms. Cunningham did not investigate PJ.'s referral; (2) Ms. Cunningham testified that she believed her actions were
consistent with DCFS policy; and (3) Ms. Cunningham testified that Mr. Anderson told her she
handled P.J.'s case appropriately. This evidence is
simply not enough to show that DCFS had a policy
of never investigating medical neglect allegations
made by PCMC doctors. Ms. Cunningham's alleged
failure to investigate PJ.'s referral took place in a
situation that was represented to her by Dr. Wagner
as a medical emergency requiring prompt action.
To the extent that her alleged failure to investigate
did represent DCFS policy, it merely shows that
DCFS policy allowed case workers to File a custody
petition with a juvenile court of competent jurisdiction without further investigation when presented
with objectively reasonable allegations of emergency medical neglect made by a doctor charged
with the child's medical care. As explained in detail
above, such a policy would not violate a parent's
rights under the Due Process Clause. Moreover,
even if DCFS did have a policy of never investigating referrals submitted by PCMC doctors, such a
policy did not harm the Jensens in P.J.'s emergency
case. Thus, the Court finds the Jensens have failed
to establish that Mr. Anderson violated their procedural due process rights.
*28 Dr. Wagner. As the Jensens received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, any procedural
due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be
based on his alleged misrepresentations and omissions. However, as set forth above, the Jensens
have not submitted competent evidence that Dr.
Wagner deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Juvenile Court or others involved
in the case. Moreover, any misrepresentations and
omissions allegedly made by Dr. Wagner did not
make the Juvenile Court proceedings unfair. The
record demonstrates that the Jensens received
ample opportunity to present their desire for further
testing in the Juvenile Court. In fact, these desires
were heard and decided upon by that court. The

Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights.

3. Malicious Prosecution
In their third cause of action, the Jensens FNI21 allege that each of the Defendants FNM22 violated
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by instituting and continuing a
"malicious prosecution." Each of the Defendants
has moved for summary judgment on this claim.
Notably, the Jensens have failed to respond to Mr.
Anderson's motion on this point. Accordingly, the
Court will grant his motion with respect to the
Fourth Amendment claim.
FN121. As the Court dismissed P.J.'s
Fourth Amendment claim in its June 2006
Order, Mr. and Ms. Jensen proceed without
him on this claim.
FNI22. The Jensens' malicious prosecution
claims against Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are not discussed in light of their
absolute immunity.
Under Tenth Circuit law, analysis of a § 1983 claim
for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is guided by the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.™123
However, "the ultimate question in such a case is
whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a
constitutional right." FNI24 As recently stated by
the Tenth Circuit in Wilkins v. DeReyes,
FN 123. Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904,
913-14 (iOthCir.2007).
FN 124. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790,
797 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Novitsky v.
City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257-58
(10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim includes the following elements: (1) the de-
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fendant caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable
cause supported the original arrest, continued
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant
acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained
damages.™125
FN125.W. at799.
The Jensens seek damages for malicious prosecution arising from both the Juvenile Court proceedings and the criminal case.

a. Juvenile Court Proceedings.
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff
must show that a seizure actually occurred.™126
In Becker v. Kroll, the Tenth Circuit considered a §
1983 plaintiffs claim that she was seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though she
"was never arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise
placed under the direct physical control of the
state." FNl27 The plaintiff-who was charged with a
felony offense in a state court-argued that investigation into her alleged criminal activity "imposed
burdens on her time, finances, and reputation by requiring her to travel to and attend meetings, pay
legal costs, and eventually, face criminal charges"
and, therefore, constituted a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.™128 The court declined
"to expand Fourth Amendment liability in cases
where the plaintiff has not been arrested or incarcerated." FNl29 Specifically, the court noted that
were it to impose Fourth Amendment liability in
cases that lacked a traditional seizure, "every charging decision would support a § 1983 malicious
prosecution-type claim no matter the context." FN,3°

FN129. W. at 915.
FNl30. Id.
*29 It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms.
Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise
placed under the direct physical control of the State
as a result of the proceedings in the Juvenile Court.
Recognizing this, the Jensens argue that the Court
should expand the Fourth Amendment concept of
"seizure" to accord with that proposed in Justice
Ginsberg's
concurrence
in
Albright
v..
Oliver.™1*1 The Jensens contend
that they
suffered "significant, ongoing deprivation[s] of
liberty as a result of the Juvenile Court proceedings," which constitute a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, as follows:
FN13L 510 U.S. 266(1994).
rhe Jensens were unable to return to the state of
Utah (their home) without the threat of arrest and
removal of their child. They were unable to take
their child for an evaluation in Houston, and to
other physicians of their choosing, because the
State forbid it. They were subjected to mandatory
court appearances. They were ordered to give up
their passports. [Mr. Jensen] lost his job, and was
exposed to serious diminishment of other employment prospects, both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to
devote his time, finances, energy and efforts to
attempting to protect his and his family's rights.
The Jensens were subjected to close media scrutiny and held up to public ridicule and contempt.
Finally, the Jensens endured the horrible financial
and emotional strain of defending their family
from neglect proceedings that were based entirely
upon misrepresentations and deceit. ™'32
FN 132. Docket No. 342, at 15-16.

FN126. Becker, 494 F.3d at 914.
FN127.Mat915.
FN128.A/. at 914.

Although acknowledging the burdens experienced
by the Jensens in defending themselves, the Court
simply cannot find that they experienced a Fourth
Amendment seizure as a result of the Juvenile
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Court proceedings Tenth Circuit precedent clearly
mandates the contrary Accordingly, the Court Finds
that the Jensens have failed to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation related to the Juvenile Court
proceedings

b Criminal Case
With regard to the criminal case, the Defendants focus their challenges on the first and third prongs
above causation and probable cause Because it is
clear that neither Dr Wagner nor Ms Cunningham
caused the prosecution of the criminal action
against the Jensens, analysis of probable cause is
unnecessary
In order to establish a constitutional violation, the
Jensens must show that Dr Wagner and Ms Cunningham "caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution" F N m In Pierce, the Tenth
Circuit held that this element reaches more than just
those who actually initiate a criminal action FN134
Surveying both the common law and cases interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the
court concluded that a forensic analyst who fabricated inculpatory evidence and withheld exculpatory
evidence, thereby leading prosecutors to indict and
prosecute" the plaintiff, sufficiently caused the
plaintiffs continued prosecution for purposes of the
plaintiffs § 1983 claim, even though she did not
formally initiate the chargesFNM5 In each of the
examples used by the Pierce court to reach this
conclusion, the state actor's conduct was closely
connected to either the initiation or continuation of
the prosecutionFNI36 Notably, the principles described by the Pierce court closely resemble the
definition of a complaining witness provided in Anthony v Baker*^1 for purposes of determining
the applicability of prosecutorial immunity "The
term 'complaining witness' describes the person (or
persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the
prosecution of the plaintiff" FN,3S
FN133 Wdlans. 528 F 3d at 799

FN 134 Pierce. 359 F 3d at 1291-92
FN135 Id at 1291-94
FN 136 Id at 1292 ("[A] private person
who takes an active part in continuing or
procuring the continuation of criminal
proceedings initiated by himself or by an
other is subject to the same liability for
malicious prosecution as if he had initiated
the proceedings") (citing Restatement
(Second) Torts § 655), id (citing Robinson
v Maruffi, 895 F 2d 649, 655-56 (10th
Cir 1990) (finding "sufficient evidence for
the jury to find that the [defendant police
officers] purposefully concealed and misrepresented material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced his decision to prosecute [the plaintiff]")), id
("If police officers have been instrumental
in the plaintiffs continued confinement or
prosecutions, they cannot escape liability
by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors
or grand jurors, or magistrates to confine
or prosecute him") (quoting Jones v City
of Chicago, 856 F 2d 985 (7th Cir 1988))
FN137 955 F 2d 1395 (10th Cir 1992)
FN138 Id at 1399 n 2
*30 The Court finds that Dr Wagner did not cause
the initiation or continued prosecution of the criminal case The Jensens' claims with regard to Dr
Wagner relate entirely to information provided to
DCFS, its representatives, Ms Eisenman, and the
Juvenile Court In fact, Dr Wagner moved to Ohio
in late June 2003 during the pendency of the Juvenile Court proceedings and before any change in
P J's legal custody Dr Wagner's final involvement
with the Juvenile Court proceedings was his execution of an affidavit dated July 22, 2003, outlining
basically the same information provided previously
to DCFS in his case summary Dr Wagner executed the affidavit at Ms Eisenman's request The
affidavit was to be used in connection with the Ju-
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venile Court proceedings. There is no evidence that
Dr. Wagner ever had contact with anyone from the
District Attorney's Office. Initiation and continuation of the criminal case were dependant on multiple intervening events, including, most notably,
the Jensens failure to comply with the Juvenile
Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the
initiation or continuation of the criminal case based
solely on his referral of PJ.'s case to DCFS and his
limited participation in the Juvenile Court proceedings.
The Court likewise Finds that Ms. Cunningham did
not cause the initiation or continued prosecution of
the criminal case. The Jensens argue that Ms. Cunningham's participation in the criminal case is
shown by the fact that her name appears on the
probable cause statement on which the criminal
charges were based and that Ms. Eisenman testified
that Ms. Cunningham provided information to Officer Peterson, who authored that statement. Even if
this were true, FNI39 it does not provide an evidentiary basis on which the Court could conclude
that Ms. Cunningham caused the prosecution of the
criminal case. The Jensens do not indicate what information Ms. Cunningham may have provided nor
its relevance to the criminal charges-nor do they indicate the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham
provided the information. Accordingly, the Court
finds the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms.
Cunningham caused the initiation or continuation
of the criminal prosecution.
FN 139. In reality, the Court cannot assume
Ms. Eisenman so testified because the deposition pages cited by the Jensens were
left out of their exhibits, despite receiving
an opportunity to supplement the record.
See Docket No. 375 (ordering the Jensens
to provide any materials inadvertently
omitted from their exhibits).
The Jensens argue that the Court should apply principles of concurrent causation to hold all of the Defendants liable for the malicious prosecution. In the
§ 1983 context, "[w]here multiple forces are act-

ively operating ... plaintiffs may demonstrate that
each defendant is a concurrent cause by showing
that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing [the injury] about." FN,4° Where concurrent causation is established, the burden of proof
shifts to each defendant to prove that his conduct
was not the cause of the harm.FN,4, Should a defendant fail to do so, he is liable for the whole injury under principles of joint and several liability.™142
FN 140. Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204,
1219 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Northington
v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1568-69 (10th
Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN141. Northington, 102 F.3d at 1568.
FN142. Id. at 1569.
The Jensens have not shown that principles of concurrent causation should apply to their Fourth
Amendment claim. The Jensens have not submitted
any evidence that Dr. Wagner or Ms. Cunningham
provided information to the District Attorney's Office or that their involvement in the Juvenile Court
case led to the initiation or continuation of the
criminal charges. In fact, this is not even consistent
with the Jensens' version of the facts: "Eisenman
was driving the criminal charges effort, not McDonald or Cunningham." FNI43 Accordingly, there
is no evidentiary basis on which to apply principles
of concurrent causation and joint and several liability to the Jensens' claim for malicious prosecution
of the criminal case. Therefore, the Court finds that
the Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner
and Ms. Cunningham violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
FN143. Docket No. 342, at 20.
D. State Law Claims
*31 The Court does not have original jurisdiction
over any of the Jensens' state law claims. As this
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Order disposes of all of the Jensens' federal claims,
and as their Utah constitutional claims present important questions of state law, the Court declines to
further exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims and will remand them to the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, from which this case was removed.FNI44

D.Utah,2008.
P.J., ex rel. Jensen v. Utah
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 4372933
(D.Utah)
END OF DOCUMENT

FN 144. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§
1367(c)(1), (2); 1447(c).

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Richard Anderson's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 324],
Defendant Kari Cunningham's Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 326], Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 329], and Defendants Wagner and Albritton's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 332]
are GRANTED IN PART with respect to Claims 1,
2, and 3 of the Complaint. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Consolidated Statement of
Fact [Docket No. 349], Defendant Wagner's and
Albritton's Motion to Strike References to P.J.'s
Current Condition [Docket No. 353], Defendants
Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Hearsay [Docket No. 356], and Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence
Without Expert Testimony [Docket No. 358] are
DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ORDERED that the Jensens' state law claims
(Claims 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10) are REMANDED to the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. It is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed
to close this case forthwith.
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Plaintiffs Parker, Barbara, and Daren Jensen hereby submit the following Memorandum
in Opposition to (1) Defendants Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2)
Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) Defendant Kari Cunningham's
Motions for Summary Judgment; and (4) Defendant Richard Anderson's Motion for Summary
Judgment.l
INTRODUCTION
In their motions, Defendants argue that the Court has no discretion in ruling on their
motions, that this Court 4s decision on plaintiffs' state law claims has already been made by the
federal court judge when he ruled on plaintiffs' federal law claims. Had Judge Stewart actually
addressed any of plaintiffs' state law claims, defendants might have a point. But he expressly
declined to do so, stating that Plaintiffs' "Utah constitutional claims present important questions
of state law," and remanding those questions to state court for determination. Stewart Ord. at 62.
When viewing the disputed facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of
Plaintiffs as the Court must do, Quaid v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2007 UT 27, U 8, 158 P.3d 525, it
is apparent that the conduct of all of the named Defendants herein violated of Article I, Sections
1, 7, and 14, of the Utah Constitution, and that Defendants caused intentional infliction of
emotional distress and wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process against the Jensens. At
the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and summary judgment should be denied.

1

A consolidated memorandum reflects the fact that most of the defendants' arguments apply to
all defendants, and defendants have incorporated by reference each other's arguments. It also cut
out several pages of duplication.

v

FACTS
Only defendants Cunningham and Eisenman have submitted a numbered statement of
facts as required by U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A).2 Pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(B), plaintiffs have
submitted a verbatim restatement of those facts that are controverted. See Exhibits A and B
hereto. Also pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3))(B), plaintiffs have filed a separate Statement of
Additional Facts in dispute. (Due to the length of the additional statement of facts, which
encompasses all five defendants, the statement has been filed as a separate document and is
incorporated herein pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 10(c).)

2

Wagner & Albritton and Anderson attach their federal court memoranda (which did set forth
separate fact paragraphs) as exhibits to their motions for summary judgment before this Court.
Although this is not compliant with Rule 7, for clarity of the record, Plaintiffs attach as Exhibits
C and D their disputations of Defendants Wagner & Albritton's and Defendant Anderson's
federal court motions for summary judgment statements of fact.
vi

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS (1) WAGNER & ALBRITTON AND
(2) ANDERSON SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THEY HAVE FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(C)(3)(A), WHICH REQUIRES
THE MOVING PARTY TO SET FORTH A SEPARATELY STATED AND
NUMBERED STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
SUPPORTED BY CITATION.

Under U.R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A), a party moving for summary judgment "shall" set forth an
independently numbered statement of individual material facts for which that party claims there
is no dispute.

Each factual statement is required to be "supported by citation to relevant

materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Id. There are reasons for this requirement.
It is essential to the identification of material fact disputes, and without it, the Court and other
parties are forced to sift through unsupported narrative. Utah appellate courts have repeatedly
recognized that it is well within a trial court's discretion to enforce the plain language of Rule
7(c)(3).

Bluffdale City v. Smith, 156 P.3d 175, 2007 UT App 25, ^ 8-12 (Utah App. 2007).

Accordingly, the Court should deny Wagner & Albritton and Anderson's motions under Rule 7.

3

By failing to provide a record upon which this Court may rely in resolving the pending motions,
defendants Wagner, Albritton, and Anderson have chosen an all-or-nothing position with respect
to their motions: The Court must either defer entirely to the federal court, without engaging in
an independent evaluation and assessment of the record under U.R.C.P. 56(c), or deny the
defendants' motions. There is no middle ground. Therefore, because res judicata does not apply
to the "important questions of state law" that Judge Stewart expressly declined to address (see
infra), Wagner & Albritton and Anderson's motions must be denied.
1

IL

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW
CLAIMS.

A.

The Utah Constitution Provides Broader Protection than Its Federal Counterpart.

The primary argument in defendants' motions is that plaintiffs' state law claims are all
barred by Judge Stewart's rulings on the federal law claims. While it suffers from other defects
(see pp. 23-37, infra), a fundamental problem with defendants' argument is that it incorrectly
assumes that the Utah Constitution offers no greater protection than the federal constitution when
applied to rights of familial association, the direction of a child's medical care, and to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Citing Oman v. Davis School District, 194 P.3d 956, 2008 UT 70, defendants argue that
plaintiffs must demonstrate that their rights guaranteed under the Utah constitution are greater
than and separate from those protected by their federal counterparts. While Oman does not
actually stand for such a proposition (claims under the Utah Constitution were not even at issue
in that case), defendants' arguments fail because the rights and guarantees under Utah's
Constitution are separate and distinct from, and greater than, the protections offered to Plaintiffs
under the federal constitution.
i.

Utah Constitutional Analysis in general.

In earlier days, evaluation of state constitutional claims typically began with an analysis
of federal law, followed by a determination of whether any particular reason existed to stray
from whatever federal courts had opined at the time. This variation on the "lockstep" theory (in
which state constitutions are presumed to have the same meaning and scope as their federal

2

counterpart) was initially endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d
803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) (recommending analytical process from State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233,
236-38 (Vt. 1985)); Christine M. Durham, "Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah
Courts," UTAH

BAR

JOURNAL 25, 26 (Nov. 1989), citing concurrence of Justice Handler in State

v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 959-969 (N.J. 1982)); . Both Jewett and Hunt began with the federal
constitution, then applied various criteria to decide whether a different result was called for
under the state constitution. See also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986).4
Over time, state courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of abdicating the
responsibility to construe their own state's constitution to a court charged with construing a
national constitution. See Christine M. Durham, "What Goes Around Comes Around: The New
Relevancy of State Constitution Religion Clauses;' 38 VA. U. L. REV. 353, 366, 369 (2004)
("When state courts rely on their own constitutions to provide substantive protections for
individual rights, they are reinforcing the sovereignty of the individual state in its power to
guarantee to its citizens freedoms greater than those protected under federal law alone");
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 16 (Tex. 1992) ("Our Texas Forbears surely never
contemplated that the fundamental state charter, crafted after years of rugged experience on the
Various factors cited in the analysis of state constitutional claims have included: textual
differences in the federal and state constitutions; legislative history; state law predating U. S.
Supreme Court decisions; differences in federal and state constitutional structures; whether the
subject matter is of particular state or local interest; particular state history or traditions; and
public attitudes in the state, Hunt, supra; "historical and textual evidence, sister state law, and
policy arguments," Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6 (Utah
1993); and "the common law, our state's particular . . . traditions, and the intent of our
constitution's drafters." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994). A
number of those factors are addressed below.
3

frontier and molded after reflection on the constitutions of other states, would itself veer in
meaning each time the United States Supreme Court issued a new decision"); State v. Watts, 750
P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts").
A state court construing its own construction "do[es] not share the strong limitations
perceived by [the U. S. Supreme Court] in its ability to enforce constitutional protections
aggressively. Those limitations arise from the structure of our federal system, the Court's role as
final arbiter of at least the minimum scope of constitutional rights for a vastly diverse nation, and
the Court's lack of familiarity with local conditions. These difficulties do not similarly limit
state courts." Hunt, 450 A.2d at 359; see also John W. Shaw, "Principled Interpretations of State
Constitutional Law-Why Don't the Primacy States Practice What They Preach," 54 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1019, 1028 (1993) ("Primacy allows strategic tailoring of state constitutional protections to
match the values of the state citizenry that created the state constitution, rather than enforcing the
lowest common denominator of broadly shared national values").
ii.

"Legislative " history and intent of the Framers.

Relatively little history is available regarding adoption of the 1895 Utah Constitution, and
particularly the Declaration of Rights. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 929 ("There was
little discussion or controversy regarding any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights").
Those rights were so fundamental, so uncontroversial, that there was nothing to debate.
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Utah's Declaration of Rights is not identical to that of any of the other forty-four state
constitutions, copies of which had been provided to each of the delegates. The Utah Supreme
Court has concluded that much of the final document derives from earlier Utah constitutions and
those of other states, Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York in particular. Id. at 928; see
also John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of Utah's
Constitution," 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311,311 (Illinois, New York, Nevada, Washington, and Iowa);
Paul Wake, Comment, "Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free Government: Do
Utahns Remember How to Be Free?" 1996

UTAH

L.

REV.

661 (Washington); Kenneth R.

Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 14," 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 267, 267 (1991) (Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, New York and
Washington).
The Framers' foremost concern was achieving statehood after a frustrating and painful
forty-year quest. Delegates knew that noncompliance with Congress's expectations would put
statehood at risk. "It is natural, under such circumstances, for men to proceed with caution."
State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 990 (1898). Accordingly, the Framers borrowed
heavily from the constitutions of other states that had been approved by Congress.
From that fact, defendants the suggestion has been made that it is difficult to say the 1895
Constitution was written by Utahns for Utah. See C. Albert Bowers, "Divining the Framers'
Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings under the State Constitution,"
2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 148 (summarizing contention). That does an injustice to the Framers.
Rather than simply copying verbatim from a single constitution, the Framers carefully selected
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and rejected portions of various documents as suited their frame of mind. See, e.g., 1 Official
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention at 423 (1898) (B. H. Roberts,
questioning adoption of Wyoming's provision on female suffrage rather than that of Virginia,
New York, Ohio, or Indiana); 483 (John Murdock: "I don't wish to refer to what older states
have done; they have done as they pleased, and I hope the people of Utah will do as their best
judgment will dictate to them, and I am not afraid of innovation"); 776 (David Evans:
mentioning constitutions of Kentucky, North Dakota, Maine, Colorado, and California).
Choosing from among different options reflects intent, just as a court's choice of
quotations from other cases is no less a statement of its own intent. Moreover, some Framers
expressed a view that Utah was unlike any other state, and/or that their goal was for Utah to be
more progressive than other states.

See, e.g., id. at 433-34 (Andrew S. Anderson: urging

delegates to "show to the world that Utah is in the advance march of progress and civilization,
and in those life-endearing principles of liberty and justice"); 545 (Andrew Kimball: "the people
of Utah through their circumstances are different to any other people in the United States").
When it came to basic human liberty, the Framers were unwilling to sacrifice their
principles even at the cost of the great prize.

Including women's suffrage in the State

Constitution would "dig a grave for statehood," Representative B. H. Roberts warned. Id. at
425-28. Such concerns for expediency could "go to the dogs," delegates declared:
They tell us woman suffrage in the Constitution will imperil statehood. I do not
believe it. But if it should, what of it? There are some things higher and dearer
even than statehood. I would rather stand by my honor, by my principles, than to
have statehood, if I must sacrifice my honor and my principles to obtain it. If
Utah is to be immolated for standing by her principles, for enlarging the borders
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of liberty, let the sacrifice be made, let her be bound upon the altar, let the high
priest of tyranny come forth and plunge the knife into her breast. She cannot
perish in a nobler cause than that of freedom and equal rights.
Id. at 738 (Orson F. Whitney); Id. at 499 (Alma Eldredge) ("[D]o I want statehood at the
sacrifice of honor?").
The Framers of the Utah Constitution did not see their months-long labor as makework
(as it would be if construction of the federal Constitution were always dispositive). The Framers
viewed and intended the state constitution to be the supreme fundamental law of the State of
Utah. See, e.g., id. at 434 (Samuel Thurman); 479-80 (Charles Varian); 502 (Eldredge); 561
(Karl G. Maeser); 572 (Charles Crane); 737 (Whitney); State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986,
987 (1898) (Framers intended state constitution to constitute the "fundamental law of the state");
Eldredge, 76 P. at 339 (state constitution is the "will of the sovereignty expressed in the supreme
law.")
The assumption that the Utah Constitution would form the primary basis of protection for
Utah residents is reinforced by the fact that, at the time of the Convention, none of the
protections of the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first to be applied was in 1897. Chicago B. & O.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897) (takings). First Amendment protections, for example, were not held applicable to the
states until 1925; the Fourth Amendment not until 1949. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652
(1925); Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
To reinforce their intent, the Framers retained a provision, first adopted in 1882 in the
shadow of polygamy prosecutions, that was contained in relatively few other constitutions (and
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not in the federal Constitution), which provides: "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." Article I,
§ 27. When the purpose of such a provision was questioned, future governor Heber Wells
explained the committee's view that it was necessary "because the tendency of the times might
be as it has been in the past, not to recur very often to fundamental principles. When the people
are oppressed and do not get their rights, it may be necessary to recur to fundamental principles."
1 Proceedings at 362.
Consistent with the intent of the Framers, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the federal Constitution sets the floor, but not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for
Utah residents. See, e.g., Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 940; Anderson v. Provo City
Corp., 2005 UT 5, % 17, 108 P.3d 701; West, 872 P.2d at 1007 ("Above this floor, states may
balance the need to redress injuries to reputation with guarantees of free expression in a distinct
way, thereby accounting for the unique history, needs, and experiences of their residents").
The Jensens' state constitutional claims should thus be reviewed independently of the
federal claims. See, e.g., West, 872 P.2d at 1007 (adopting "primacy" approach in free speech
claim under state constitution, accepting federal law only to the extent it is persuasive). This
approach is more consistent with the intent of the drafters, who sought to place as much power as
possible in the hands of the state's residents. The Framers, who had fought so long for home
rule, intended that "the agencies by which power was to be exercised should be brought as close
as possible to the subjects upon which the power was to operate . . . ." State v. Eldredge, 27
Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339-40 (1904) ("'Local self-government/ says Judge Cooley, 'having
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always been a part of the English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition in any
such instrument.'"). Matters involving the family are of exclusively local interest, In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890), as are concerns about the integrity of a state's judicial system.
Hunt, 450 A.2d at 366.5
From the time of its ratification, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the state
constitution is to be construed liberally. "A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or
technical principles, but liberally, and on broad, general lines, in order that it may accomplish the
object of its establishment, and carry out the great principles of the government." North Point
Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896);
Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964) (court must "give recognition in the
highest possible degree to all of the rights assured by all of the Constitutional provisions").
There is little substantive difference in wording between Article I §§ 1, 7, and 14 and
their federal counterparts. The key structural distinction between the two constitutions, however,
is that the federal Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the government, whereas the
provisions of state constitutions are limitations upon sovereign power.

Courts typically

characterize this difference in the state constitution as "a guarantee of those rights rather than as
a restriction on them." Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812.
iii.

Article I § I (inherent and inalienable right to liberty)

5

As the Framers were aware, it is easier to amend a state constitution than the United States
Constitution. See, e.g., 1 Proceedings at 500 (Eldredge; constitution could be amended).
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Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, "All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties[.]"
The Utah Supreme Court has not construed the meaning of "happiness'" as used in
Section 1. However, the court deems instructive the interpretation of similar provisions by other
courts. State v. BriggsL 46 Utah 288, 146 P. 261 (1915)). The right to pursue happiness as
guaranteed by a state constitution has been recognized as "include[ing] the right of privacy, the
right to marital privacy and choice . . . [and] the right to protect one's health." 16A CJ.S.
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS § 737 (citations omitted).

In Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed a claim that a statute violated Section 1 and Section 7 of Article I. With respect to
both sections, the court wrote:
These constitutional provisions constitute the supreme law of the commonwealth
upon this subject. To that law the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
departments of the government alike must bow obedience, as well as every
subject. It forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and immunities of
all citizens. Under its mandate no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, and every person is entitled to the equal
protection of the laws, and may acquire property, possess and protect it, as well
as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent and inalienable rights of
citizens, and are constitutional guaranties.
76 P. at 24; see also id. at 25 (forbidding an individual or class the right of acquisition or
enjoyment of property "in such manner as should be permitted to the community at large would
be to deprive them of liberty in particulars of primary importance to their 'pursuit of
happiness'"), 26 (right to pursuit of happiness includes right to pursue business or vocation).
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These rights are implicated when a government actor impinges upon an individual's
liberty. Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937) ("These [Section 1]
rights are invaded when one 'is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which
he may subject his property (or use or employ his time or talents), or the manner in which he
may enjoy it").
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the right of "liberty" encompassed within Section 1
as not just the absence of physical restraint, but as "a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces
not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but
also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block, supra, at 24-25. See also
State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964) (The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, "and as a corresponding and accompanying right, the right to privacy in his own
home," is a "just claim, God given, or innate as a human").
From the facts set forth in plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants' deliberate misrepresentations
and omissions prevented Plaintiffs from seeking medical care, maintaining their familial
relationship, and otherwise pursuing their right to happiness under Section 1.

Defendants'

misconduct would be deemed a violation of Section 1 for the same reasons that it violated Article
I, § 7 (see pp. 40-69, infra, summarizing aspects of defendants' conduct).
iv.

Article I § 7 (due process)

Article I, Section 7 provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Section 7 is a "constitutional guarantee," one of the "inherent and
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inalienable rights of citizens."

Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24-25 (1904).

"Liberty," as employed in Section 7, "is not restricted to mere freedom from imprisonment, but it
embraces the right of a person to use his God-given powers, employ his faculties, [and] exercise
his judgment in the affairs of life . . . The word 'liberty,' as thus employed in the Constitutions
and understood in the United States, is a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not only
freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but also all our
religious, civil, political, and personal rights ....'* Id.
It has long been recognized that the Utah and federal due process clauses are not coextensive:
The prohibition of this amendment is directed to the constitution, and cannot
mean the state must observe the due process of the law of some other jurisdiction
over which it has no control. Neither can it refer to due process of law under the
law of the United States, for the United States has only stated offenses limited to
the subjects over which it has jurisdiction. The constitution of the United States
cannot, as to the states, be held to be the sole unbending rule as to the method of
procedure, when dealing with the life, liberty, and property of individuals in the
several states. Such a rule would deprive the states of their right to regulate its
procedure, laws, and rules of practice in their own courts, so as to protect life,
liberty, and property by such due process of law as should be enacted with
reference to the constitution of the United States which was "framed for an
undefined and expanding future, and for people gathered, and to be gathered,
from many nations and many tongues.
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23, 26-27 (1899); see State v. Briggs,

P.3d

, 2008 WL

5191446, 2008 UT 83, U 24 ("While the text of the two provisions is identical, we do not
presume that federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the
meaning of identical provisions in the Utah Constitution.
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In fact, we have not hesitated to

interpret the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than
similar federal provisions where appropriate.)(internal citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is an accepted premise in American
jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is
fundamentally unfair and totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" Walker v.
State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981). The same principle applies to use of such testimony to
interfere with the parent-child relationship.
It has also been held repeatedly that Section 7 "guarantees parents a fundamental right to
sustain relationships with their children." In the Matter ofK.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 294 (Utah App.
1987) ("the Supreme Court has declared that under the Utah Constitution the parental interest is
a 'fundamental' right to be invaded only to the extent necessary to promote a 'compelling' state
interest"); In the Matter of the Adoption of B.B.D^ 1999 UT 70, % 10, 984 P.2d 967; Wells v.
Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah 1984).
This recognition is consistent with the intent of the Framers that the common law be
employed to interpret the state constitution. American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d
1235, 2006 UT 40, % 43, 48; Deseret Irr. Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628, 629 (1898).
Under the common law, no relationship was afforded greater protection than that of parent and
child. A right that has "strong roots in the common law" suggests greater protection under the
state constitution. West, 872 P.2d at 1013.
Unlike any other state in the West, "Utah was settled primarily by two-parent families . . .
." Carrie Hillyard, "The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in State Constitutions,"
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10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 122 (1996). From the time of the constitution, Utah recognized a
presumption that a parent will fulfill his duties
by reason of the love and affection he holds for his offspring and out of regard
for the child's future welfare. . . . Indeed, the common law based the right of the
father to have custody and dominion over the person of his child upon the ground
that he might better discharge the duty he owed the child and the state in respect
to the care, nurture, and education of the child. Before the state can be
substituted to the right of the parent it must affirmatively be made to appear that
the parent has forfeited his natural and legal right to the custody and control of
the child by reason of his failure, inability, neglect, or incompetency to discharge
the duty and thus to enjoy the right.
Mill v. Brown,, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907). The Framers shared that view. See I Proceedings at
450 (Richards: "In the brute world we find the mother's love for offspring more strong than the
instinct for self preservation. This is an unfailing passion throughout the whole course of organic
life, whether brute or human").
Both prior to and after ratification of the Utah Constitution, a child could be removed
from the home in Utah only upon a showing of his parent's "habitual intemperance, and vicious
and brutal conduct, or from vicious, brutal and criminal conduct towards said minor child."
Laws 1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII, § 9.

This standard was re-enacted by the first state

legislature, see Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3, § 82, indicating that it was consistent with the Framers'
intent. See P.LE. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1988)
(noting that many of the first legislators were delegates to the constitutional convention); Salt
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) (re-enactment of statute is
evidence that framers intended the law to remain as it was).
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In Washington, to which the Framers looked when drafting the 1895 Constitution, the
supreme court had expounded a year earlier on the principle that a child cannot be removed from
their parents unless the parents are affirmatively unfit, not merely because the state would prefer
they make different choices. Love 11 v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9 Wash. 419, 37 P. 660, 661
(1894) ("There is such a diversity of religious and social opinion, and of social standing and of
intellectual development and of moral responsibility, in society at large, that courts must exercise
great charity and forbearance for the opinions, methods, and practices of all different classes of
society; and a case should be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong
to meet the condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief
or social standing, before a parent should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child").
At the time of the 1895 Convention, nearly 90 percent of Utah's population were
members of the LDS Church. Richard D. Poll et al., eds., Utah's History (Provo, Utah: Brigham
Young University Press, 1978), p. 393.

Three-quarters (79) of the 107 delegates to the

constitutional convention were Mormon. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928. It is thus
relevant and appropriate to discuss the background and views of Mormon church members at the
time of the convention. See id. at 929 n. 31 (discussing Joseph Smith's attitude toward American
government); P. Bobbit, Constitutional Fate Theory of the Constitution (1984) at 9-11 (relevant
history includes prevailing sentiment at time of adoption); Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236 (relevant
history includes social and political setting in which the constitution was adopted).
LDS Church founder Joseph Smith had expressed concerns about weak constitutional
protections:
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The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not broad enough to cover the
whole ground. Although it provides that all men shall enjoy religious freedom,
yet it does not provide the manner by which that freedom can be preserved, nor
for the punishment of Government officers who refuse to protect the people in
their religious rights . . . . Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of
enforcing them. It has but this one fault. Under its provision, a man or a people
who are able to protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who
have the misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of
popular fury.
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., Encyclopedia of Joseph Smith's Teachings, p. 144
(quoting Sabbath address, Nauvoo, 15 October 1843).
The Framers had strong concerns about government intrusion into the family.

For

decades, LDS Church members had experienced what they viewed as persecution by a
government intent on imposing its own values on the Mormon family structure, culminating in
the famed polygamy prosecutions. See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, \ 32, 996 P.2d 546
(citation omitted) (mentioning prosecutions in construing Section 7).
"[M]any of Utah's constitutional convention delegates had either been pursued
by federal authorities or were well acquainted with people who had. Because of
widespread newspaper coverage, the vast majority of Utah's population was
aware of the prosecutions, and the delegates to the constitutional convention had
an intimate awareness of the problems posed by systematic oppression by the
federal government. . . . Prior to becoming a state, the framers of the Utah
Constitution suffered heavily at the hands of the federal government. These
memories were fresh in the minds of the framers . . . ."
"Divining the Framers' Intent," 2000

UTAH

L. REV. at 151, 169. For example, the President of

the Convention, John H. Smith, an apostle in the LDS Church, had himself been the target of a
polygamy prosecution. See Wallentine, supra.
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The anti-polygamy campaign was directly targeted at the disruption of families, and was
pursued to devastating effect.

Fathers, mothers, and sometimes children were imprisoned.

Children were left without support when their parents were jailed or forced into hiding.
Conditions were harsh for those targeted by the government. See Martha S. Bradley, "'Hide and
Seek': Children on the Underground," 51 UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953), pp. 133-153.
In 1882, as deprivations caused by the prosecutions were on the rise, a new provision was
added to the state's draft constitution, declaring that "The blessings of free government can only
be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." This language was restated in the 1887 version.
Significantly, when its inclusion was questioned in 1895, Heber Wells stated the committee's
view that it was needed in light of the abuses "in the past."
That the Framers would have been repulsed by the state forcing particular health care
providers on a parent is further suggested by the writings of the Hon. Thomas Cooley of the
Michigan Supreme Court, considered "the foremost constitutional authority in the world,
perhaps," by the drafters. 1 Proceedings at 447 (Richards); American Bush, 2008 UT 40 at f^f
13, 49 n. 16, 51 (citing Judge Cooley).6
In Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878), a family committed the plaintiff to
an insane asylum. Concurring in a decision to order a new trial, Judge Cooley wrote, "I cannot
admit that because one is a practitioner of medicine, it is therefore proper or safe to suffer him to
6

The "eminent jurist" Cooley had been cited in 35 Utah cases prior to ratification of the Utah
Constitution, and was cited an additional 35 times in the next five years. Cooley was also cited
by the Framers. See, e.g., I Proceedings at 464, II Proceedings at 1739.
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decide upon mental disease, and consign people to the asylum upon his judgment or certificate."
If "differences of opinion among those who are called to give scientific evidence" exist, he
wrote, it would be intolerable for the patient's fate to hinge on whether "one physician rather
than another happened to be called in as the adviser." Id. at 132.
Consistent with common law and statutory history in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held
long ago that, to be constitutional, removal of a child from his parent's custody requires an
affirmative showing of unfitness. Mill, 88 P. at 613; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83
(1926) ("[T]he unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of the child must be
positive and not merely comparative, or merely speculative"); In re B.R., et ai, 2006 UT App
354, f 87, 144 P.3d 231 (Under Utah Constitution, "a parent is entitled to a showing of unfitness,
abandonment, or substantial neglect before his or her parent rights are terminated") (court's
brackets omitted), rev'd on other grounds, In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 171 P.3d 435. See also pp.
60-63, supra (similar holdings by sister states).7
Construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
defendants knew that their sole complaint was comparative in nature {i.e., that the Jensens
preferred to follow the recommendations of a health care provider other than Wagner). They
knew that they could force the removal of Parker under that standard.

Accordingly, they

employed misrepresentation and half-truth in order to create an appearance of positive unfitness.

7

The defendants were not seeking permanent termination of the Jensens' parental rights.
However, they were seeking transfer of physical and legal custody, and for a purpose that was
permanently life altering and potentially lethal.
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In view of the common law, statutory, and constitutional history of Utah's due process provision,
the Utah Supreme Court would unquestionably find a state actor's attempt to establish parental
neglect through misrepresentations and material omissions prohibited under Section 7.
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized a separate protected right of children in
their familial relationship. Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) (recognizing right of
minor "to be a member of the father's family, to be with her little sister, and ultimately to reap
the fruits of that relationship, whatever they may be"). The above analysis would apply with
equal or greater force to Parker's own constitutional rights.
B.

Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure)

The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures "is one of the most cherished
rights guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005
UT 13, % 15. The Utah Constitution's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
'"the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men' that demands an independent and proper judicial determination."

State v.

DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, f 32, 996 P.2d 546 (citation omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated on several occasions that the scope of protections
afforded by Article I, Section 14 are greater than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^ 12 (citations omitted); State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
Commentators concur.

In "Divining the Framers' Intentions," supra, at 147, for

example, C. Albert Bowers argues that "several unique facets of Utah's history" suggest that
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state constitutional requirements for testimonial immunity do not mirror the federal.

"Most

important is Utah's early settlement by religious refugees and the subsequent tension between
the local territorial government and the United States government.

Additionally, many

prominent territorial citizens witnessed first-hand the problems that arise when the government
can compel testimony from a witness without adequate protection."
As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "Mormon delegates likely viewed the
territorial government-controlled by federally appointed non-Mormons-as oppressive. They had
experienced the attempted control and suppression of their religious beliefs and practices by the
federal government, often operating through territorial officials. . . . Both groups of delegates
could claim that some form of authority, be it federal or local, had denied them freedom of
conscience, and both were acutely aware of the threat government power presented to that
freedom." Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 935.
The employment of falsehoods by government officials, as alleged here, would have been
especially disturbing to the Framers. From their perspective, LDS Church members had suffered
extraordinary harm as the result of false testimony. In 1838, for example, Missouri governor
Lilburn Boggs issued the notorious "extermination" order expelling Mormons from the state
three days after the execution of a false affidavit by Thomas B. Marsh and Orson Hyde that
claimed, among other things, that Joseph Smith intended to conquer the United States. Gary J.
Bergera, "The Personal Cost of the 1838 Mormon War in Missouri: One Mormon's Plea for
Forgiveness,"

MORMON HISTORICAL STUDIES

(Spring 2003), p. 139. A month later, Missouri

officials used the affidavit as a basis to jail Smith for treason. Id.
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Seven years later, Smith was again pursued by government officials, this time in Illinois.
In reliance upon a promise of security by Governor Ford, Smith and other Mormon leaders
voluntarily surrendered. Instead, Smith and his brother Hyrum were allowed to be murdered in
their jail cell in Nauvoo.

See Whitney, History of Utah, Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; History of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Deseret News: 1932), Vol. VII, p. 172 (Smith was arrested through "false pretense").
In 1857, William Drummond, an appointee to the territorial supreme court, made a false
report to the attorney general that Brigham Young had murdered territorial leaders, and that the
Mormons had burned territorial records and committed acts of treason. He urged immediate
military intervention. See Andrew L. Neff, History of Utah (ed. Leland H. Creer, Salt Lake
City: Deseret News, 1940), Vol. 1, pp. 448-51. President Buchanan, with whom LDS Church
leaders were already at strife, cited Drummond's assertions as evidence that the Mormons were
in rebellion, and dispatched the Army to Utah to replace Young as governor by force. Id.
Young issued a proclamation decrying, again, deception by government officials: "For
the last twenty five years we have trusted officials of the Government, from Constables and
Justices to Judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in derision, insulted and
betrayed." Proclamation, August 5, 1857; id. ("We know these aspersions are false, but that
avails us nothing"). More than 30,000 Mormons evacuated northern Utah in anticipation of
invading forces. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Utah 1540-1886 (San Francisco, The History
Company: 1889), p. 535.
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In 1871, Brigham Young was indicted by territorial officials for an 1857 murder based
upon the false affidavit of a man named William Hickman, who was "in collusion with the
crusading officials to bring trouble upon his former brethren". Whitney, History of Utah, pp.
629-640. Young was refused bail and spent four months under house arrest; two of his alleged
co-conspirators spent six months in jail. Bancroft, History of Utah, pp. 663-64.
These and other examples of victimization through government falsehoods would have
lent special force to the Framers' adoption of the requirement in Article 14 that searches and
seizures be "supported by oath or affirmation."

Utah Supreme Court opinions predating the

constitution also reflected a need for protection from fabricated testimony of government
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 8 Utah 29, 28 P. 957, 958 (1892) ( "We think no man
can be found guilty of a fraud against the government on the mere certificate of any officer of the
government, even if a statute of the congress authorizes it. Such statute is in violation of natural
right, and of that clause of the constitution that provides that a man cannot be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; for it is not due process to find a man guilty of a
fraud without any evidence whatever of his guilt"); see also Merchants' Nat. Bank of Kansas
City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) (person who signs a certificate of stock containing
false information is liable; "[t]hese views are so fundamental, and so consonant with honesty and
fair dealing, that they need no authority in their support").
The federal constitution is only a "floor," a minimum level of constitutional protection.
See, e.g., Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 940; Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^1
17, 108 P.3d 701; West, 872 P.2d at 1007. In this case, Sections 1, 7, and 14 of Article I provide
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protection that is separate and greater than the federal constitution. Accordingly, there is no
basis for defendants' argument that the federal court's rulings on federal law bind this Court's
hands on state law.
III.

CLAIM PRECLUSION IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN ANY EVENT.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' state law claims are barred under the doctrine of claim
preclusion, a subset of the doctrine of res judicata. Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re
General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water), 1999 UT 39, % 15, 982 P.2d 65
("[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion."). "In general terms,
claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully
litigated previously." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678,
2005 UT 19 {quoting Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 108, \ 12, 44 P.3d 642).
When a party asserts the application of claim preclusion based upon a prior federal judgment,
Utah courts apply federal res judicata law to the determination of whether claim preclusion
applies. See Massey v. Board of Trustees of Ogden Area Community Action Comm., 86 P.3d
120,2004UTApp27,TI6-7.
Under federal law, claim preclusion only applies if the party asserting the doctrine
satisfies three elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) identity of
parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits." Pelt v.
Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 200S)(quoting MACTEC Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821,
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831 (10th Cir.2005). In the present case, claim preclusion is inapplicable for at least three
independent reasons.
A.

There was no earlier action.

The doctrine of claim preclusion looks to the causes of action that were filed in an earlier
proceeding. Pelt, supra, at 1281; see Oman, 2008 UT 70, ^[ 31. Here, there was no "earlier
proceeding." All of the claims were filed in the same lawsuit in the same court at the same time.
It was Defendants who elected to remove the matter from state court to federal court. That did
not somehow convert this single case into two cases. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161
F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998)(reversing federal district court application of res judicata to
claims removed to federal court based on state court's dismissal of other claims before removal,
concluding that "this situation does not involve two separate lawsuits, one in state court and
another in federal court. Rather, it involves one suit that originated in state court and that was
removed to federal court."); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir.
2000)("Res judicata does not speak to direct attacks in the same case, but rather has application
in subsequent actions.") Because the claims presently pending before this Court were filed at the
inception of this action, they do not constitute, after remand, a subsequent proceeding. As a
result, claim preclusion is inapplicable.
B.

There was no "final judgment on the merits" on Plaintiffs' state law claims.

If this Court believes that claim preclusion applies despite the existence of only one case,
the test for claim preclusion nonetheless is not satisfied because there was no final judgment on
the merits of Plaintiffs' state law claims. Defendants assert, with no supporting analysis, that
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Plaintiffs' state law claims were the subject of a final judgment on the merits in the federal court
proceeding. However, it has long been recognized that res judicata does not apply if a court
dismissed the prior claims for want of jurisdiction, or if the claim was disposed of on any ground
that did not go to the merits of the action. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 232, 71
U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303(1866).
In other words, "jurisdictional dismissals are not 'on the merits,'" and as a result, claim
preclusion does not bar the subsequent litigation of claims dismissed on such basis. Park Lake
Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F .3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004)(quoting Nilsen v. City of
Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Whitesell v. Newsome, 138 S.W.3d 393
(Tex.App.2004)("...we reject Whitesell's argument that the federal court's dismissal of the statelaw claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction - acknowledging that the state-law claims
could be pursued in state court - was equivalent to a final judgment on the merits.'')(c//mg Home
Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir.1998); Thacker v.
City of Kyatsville, 762 A.2d 172 (Md. App. 2000) ("As a general rule, when a federal court
dismisses federal claims on the merits before trial, and then declines to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over related pendent state claims that were removed along with the federal claims,
principles of res judicata or claim preclusion do not bar litigation of the remanded state claims in
state court."); Benton v. Louisiana Pub. Facilities Authority, 672 So.2d 720, 722 (La.App. 1996)
(reversing state trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor on defendants based on claim
preclusion, concluding that, where federal court had dismissed state law claims for lack of
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pendent jurisdiction, "[t]here ha[d] never been a ruling, nor the opportunity for a ruling, on the
merits of the state law claims.")
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that, where a federal district court
dismisses a plaintiffs state constitutional and common law claims without prejudice and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, neither claim or issue preclusion applies.

Snyder v.

Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325, 2003 UT 12, ^[ 36. Here, the federal court never reached
the merits of Plaintiffs' state law claims; rather, it expressly declined jurisdiction to do so.
Stewart Ord. at 62. Because the federal court's remand was premised on a jurisdictional ground
that did not resolve the substantive merits of Plaintiffs' state law causes of action, claim
preclusion does not apply, and the federal court decision cannot be invoked to defeat Plaintiffs'
state law claims pending before this Court.
C.

Plaintiffs' state law causes of action presently pending before this Court are

separate and distinct from the federal law causes of action ruled upon by the federal court.
Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' state law causes of action are identical to the
federal causes of action dismissed by the federal court is without merit. Defendants argue that,
because Plaintiffs rely on the same underlying facts to support their claims under the Utah
Constitution as were relied upon in federal court, the causes of action under state and federal law
must be "identical," thus meriting the application of claim preclusion to bar Plaintiffs' state law
claims. However, plaintiffs have more than met their burden of analyzing how and why the Utah
Constitution is different and broader from the federal constitution in this case. See State v. Earl,
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716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) ('it is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on
relevant state constitutional questions").
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of claim preclusion utilizes the "transactional
approach" to defining a cause of action, which "provides that a claim arising out of the same
'transaction, or series of connected transactions' as a previous suit, which concluded in a valid
and final judgment, will be precluded." Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th
Cir.l999)(emphasis added). "What constitutes the same transaction or series of transactions is 'to
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding
or usage.'" Id. {quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). Therefore, "[u]nder
the transactional test, a new action will be permitted only where it raises new and independent
claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on the new facts." Hatch v. Boulder Town
Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1150(Utah 2006)(emphasis added).
If Plaintiffs were attempting to bring new claims after the federal claims had been
dismissed, defendants' argument might have merit under the transactional approach. But this
aspect of claim preclusion is inapplicable when there is only one case, one Complaint, one
record, and where the state constitutional and common law claims were filed at the same time as
the federal claims. Defendants have been on notice from the inception of the litigation that they
would be required to defend against the state law claims, and had to know that the federal court
was unlikely to take upon itself the resolution of "important questions of state law."
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D.

The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim preclusion are not present in

this case.
'The fundamental policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion)
are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive litigation and forum-shopping, and 'the
interest in bringing litigation to an end.'" Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir.
2000)(quoting May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer & Storage, Inc., 899 F.2d 1007, 1009 (10th
Cir. 1990)). These fundamental policies are not achieved in this case. First, any policy related to
finality is not implicated by the procedural stance of this case, because Plaintiffs' state law
claims have been pending since the inception of the case, and have never been ruled upon by any
court.
Neither is judicial economy at risk.

Plaintiffs do not seek to waste scarce judicial

resources; Plaintiffs ask only for their day in court on their state law claims. No judicial energy
was expended on Plaintiffs' state law claims by the federal court, as the state law claims were not
addressed. As to the policy of preventing repetitive litigation and forum shopping, plaintiffs
have filed only one action in one court. It was not Plaintiffs who sought to remove this case to
federal court (a tactic more akin to "forum shopping"), but rather Defendants. Finally, the policy
related to "bringing litigation to an end" is inapplicable here, because Plaintiffs' state law claims
have been pending since the inception of this case, and were never considered by the federal
court. Plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court, and claim preclusion should not be applied to
deprive them of that entitlement.

28

Finally, in cases involving state constitutional claims, such as the case at present, a state
court interpreting the state constitution must always undertake an independent analysis when one
of the parties attempts to assert res judicata based on a federal court's decision. The need for
independent evaluation is particularly cogent when other case has not made it though the
appellate process. Here, the Jensens are appealing the federal court's decision. Accordingly,
because interpretation of this state's highest law is at issue, and because the federal decision is
being appealed, policy justifications mandate that this Court engage in its own independent
evaluation and analysis of Plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims.

29

IV.

ISSUE PRECLUSION IS INAPPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

Defendants also argue that the second prong of res judicata, issue preclusion, should bar
plaintiffs' state law claims. "Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage, issue preclusion, 'means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.'"
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) {quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)). Again, however, this
component of res judicata does not apply because this is the same case in which the federal court
claims were originally filed, and there have been no prior or subsequent proceedings. There is no
"future lawsuit" - it is the same lawsuit.
The elements of issue preclusion would not be met in any event. As noted earlier, federal
res judicata law applies if a party is attempting to bind a state court to a federal court ruling.
Under Tenth Circuit law, issue preclusion has four requirements:
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action
in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party,
to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, the issues presented for review are not
identical to the issues decided by the federal court, the prior action was not finally adjudicated on
the merits, and policy justifications do not support applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
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A.

The issues presented for review in this action are not identical to the issues

decided by the federal court.
Foremost, the legal issues before this Court are different than the legal issues considered
and applied in the federal court proceeding. The federal court applied federal law of absolute
immunity, qualified immunity, substantive and procedural due process under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, this Court is applying state law, including
Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and the common law of this state
applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful initiation of civil and
criminal process.
Additionally, as discussed above, the Utah Constitution offers broader protections than
the federal counterpart when applied to the fundamental right to associate with one's family and
to direct the medical care of one's child's. Because the federal court dismissed the Utah claims
without consideration of the merits, and because the rights guaranteed under the Utah
Constitution are broader, the logical conclusion is that the issues pertinent to the additional scope
of protection under the Utah Constitution have not been determined, and as such, are not
identical to any issues decided by the federal court.
Furthermore, the factual issues that were considered by the federal court, and which
defendant urge this Court to follow, are not identical to the factual issues presented in the case at
bar. Factual issues are necessarily implicated by reference to legal standards. In other words,
without reference to a law or legal standard, it is impossible for a Court to determine whether a
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particular fact is material or not. (For example, a statement might be material to a claim for
defamation, while immaterial to a claim for breach of contract)
Consequently, when dealing with causes of action arising under an entirely distinct legal
theory and source of right, the factual issues implicated are different. Therefore, because the
factual issues implicated by Plaintiffs' state constitutional and common law claims are different,
issue preclusion does not apply.
B.

The "prior action" was not "finally adjudicated on the merits."

As discussed above, there was no "prior action" but rather a single case, so this threshold
element of issue preclusion fails. Moreover, again there was no final adjudication on the merits,
at least with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims, because the federal court never reached those
claims. Accordingly, issue preclusion does not apply.
C.

Policy considerations militate against applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The Tenth Circuit recognizes that in certain instances issue preclusion should not be
applied, namely, where the application of issue preclusion "would cdo[ ] nothing to vindicate two
primary policies behind the doctrine, conserving judicial resources and protecting parties from
'the expense and vexation' of relitigating issues that another party previously has litigated and
lost.'" Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Com'n, 327 F.3d 1019,
1030, (10th Cir. (Okla.) 2003).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "collateral estoppel can yield an
unjust outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care." Buckner v. Kennard,
2004 UT 78, T| 15, 99 P.3d 842. Accordingly, courts "must carefully consider whether granting
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preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate." Id. at \ 15. "Collateral estoppel cis not an
inflexible, universally applicable principle^] ... Policy considerations may limit its use where ...
the underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.' " Id. (alterations in original)
{quoting Jackson v. City of Sacramento, 117 Cal.App.3d 596, 172 Cal.Rptr. 826, 829 (1981)).
Such policy considerations are present in this case.

The Utah Constitution is the

"supreme law" of the state of Utah. Under the Supreme Court's "primacy" approach, it routinely
examines state constitutional issues first, and considers federal law of no more persuasive weight
than case law from a sister state. State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49 ^ 33 ("This
court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's
constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, and we owe federal law no more
deference in that regard than we do sister state interpretation of identical state language."); State
v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397, 2007 UT 47, ^ 15.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court would not consider a state court bound by the
federal court ruling in this case because certain findings in that ruling would be impermissible by
a state court judge. As the Supreme Court has noted, the standard for summary judgment in state
court is different from that in federal court, including the parties' evidentiary burdens. See, e.g.,
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.2d 600 (Utah has not adopted federal Celotex standard with
respect to moving party's burden of production ("While this has been the law in the federal
courts for over two decades now, it is not Utah law"); unlike in federal court, in state court a
moving party's own evidence must conclusively establish absence of any fact issues).
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Under Utah law, on a motion for summary judgment, "the facts and all reasonable
inferences [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference, 2008 UT 88, ^f 12. "[A] reasonable
inference is a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. This conclusion must be a rational
and logical deduction from facts admitted and established by the evidence, when those facts are
viewed in the light of common experience.'" D Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App.
\992){quoting Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah App.l987))(internal quotations
omitted).
A state court is precluded from granting summary judgment "if the facts shown by the
evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but conflicting
inference on a pivotal issue in the case ... particularly if the issue turns on credibility or if the
inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent." IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K
Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT 73, U 18 (Utah 200S)(quoting Uintah Basin Med. Ctr.
v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ^ 19, 179 P.3d 786 (emphasis added) (quoting 73 Am.Jur.2d. Summary
Judgment §46 (2001)).
"Moreover, on summary judgment, the trial court [is] required to construe c[d]oubts,
uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of fact ... in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.'" Wasatch Oil & Gas, supra at Tl 35 (quoting Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984)). Issues
involving an actor's state of mind are factual in nature. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT
58,U17.
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Here, the federal court made certain factual determinations that would be impermissible
on summary judgment in Utah. For example,8 with respect to Defendant Cunningham, the
federal court concluded that, although she did indeed make misrepresentations and omissions in
her August 18, 2003 affidavit, those misrepresentations were not material to the issues before the
juvenile court, and hence had no impact on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. However, the Utah
Supreme Court has said that, under Utah law, the question of materiality is generally one best left
for the jury. See, e.g., Yazd v. Woodside Homes Co., 2006 UT 47, ^ 28, 143 P.3d 283; Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980); Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C v.
Reott, 163 P.3d 713, 2007 UT App 223, \ 43 (reversing district court grant of summary
judgment, where district court improperly weighed facts and evidence to determine defendants'
lack of fraudulent intent).
The

federal

court

also

found

that,

although

Cunningham

made

numerous

misrepresentations in sworn legal documents, there was no evidence that she deliberately
misrepresented any facts. This conclusion reflects a failure to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of Plaintiffs, as is required on a motion for summary judgment, and specifically to draw the
reasonable inference that, given the sheer number and context of misrepresentations and

Because Plaintiffs are before this Court on their state constitutional and common law claims,
Plaintiffs have not set forth in full herein each instance of the federal court's findings of fact that
would not be permitted by a state court judge. The examples provided are some of the more
patent examples, offered to explain why this Court must engage in its own independent analysis
and evaluation of the facts and law. The federal court's decision is presently on appeal before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
35

omissions, Cunningham's actions were deliberate, or at the very least, an issue of fact exists in
that regard.
As further examples, the federal court incorrectly concluded that the record evidence
does not permit a reasonable inference that Defendant Wagner deliberately misrepresented facts
about Parker, or the purported diagnosis of Ewing's, to anyone involved in the case. However,
when viewing the record and the evidence (albeit circumstantial) regarding Wagner's
involvement, one rational and logical deduction from those facts is that Wagner deliberately or
recklessly interfered with Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Wagner did not simply fail to conduct genetic and molecular testing on Parker's tissue,
he falsely told the Jensens that there were no confirmatory tests. He told DCFS that the Jensens
had canceled their final meeting when he knew that he had canceled it. He told DCFS that
Parker would be dead in "five days" if treatment did not commence, in order to persuade them to
forgo the required investigation before institution of a juvenile court medical neglect petition.
(Wagner now denies this.) He attempted to influence the second opinion that the Jensens wanted
from Dana Farber. There is evidence - quite a lot, actually - from which a jury could conclude
that his refusal to perform confirmatory testing and other actions were because the opportunity to
enroll Parker in a clinical trial was about to expire. See, e.g., Pis' Statement of Additional Facts,
ffl| 45-86, 109, 136.
At the very least, the evidence presented by Plaintiffs raised a dispute of fact on
Wagner's intent, motivation, credibility, and state of mind. This Court cannot defer to factual
determinations that do not construe "c[d]oubts, uncertainties, or inferences concerning issues of
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fact ... in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment^]'" Wasatch Oil &
Gas, supra at ^ 35.
The federal court's factual findings, particularly with respect to Defendants Wagner and
Cunningham, improperly resolved credibility issues involving the state of mind of Defendants in
favor of Defendants.

Conversely, the federal court refused to draw inferences in favor of

Plaintiffs, all of which hinged upon the subjective thoughts and intents of Wagner and
Cunningham. The evidence presented by the parties at the very least shows "more than one
plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case," thus precluding summary
judgment. D & K Management, Inc., supra, at ^[ 18.
Plaintiffs recognize there is no "smoking gun" to present to this Court, because, not
surprisingly, none of the Defendants have admitted to any malicious motive regarding their
dealings with the Jensens, and nor would they be expected to do so. In such circumstances,
Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to show a reasonable inference that the
defendants acted with the requisite intent rising to the level of violating the Jensens rights
guaranteed under the Utah Constitution.9
This Court should independently evaluate the record and factual and legal issues before it
in resolving the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

"'It is well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence/" State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, U 21, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991))).
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IV.

THE SPACEMAN REQUIREMENTS FOR PLAINTIFFS' STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE SATISFIED, AND THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANTS
FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS GUARANTEED
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE
IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN THAT REGARD.

Under Spackman v. Bd. Of Ed. Of Box Elder County Sch. DisL, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533,
a plaintiff suing under one of Utah's constitutional provisions must satisfy a three-part test before
proceeding on the constitutional claim: first, that the constitutional violation was "flagrant;"
second, that "existing remedies" do not redress his injuries; and third, that "equitable relief, such
as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress his or her
injuries.
A.

Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations of Article h Section 1 & 7

In Spackman, the Court explained the meaning of a "flagrant" constitutional violation:
In essence, this means that a defendant must have violated "clearly established"
constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be
considered clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted).
Spackman, supra at f 23.
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A plaintiff is also required to show that the particular state constitutional provision is selfexecuting. Before proceeding on a claim for damages arising out of a violation of the Utah
Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the constitutional provision is "self-executing."
See Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996); Spackman at U 19. Judge Cassell ruled
previously that Sections 1, 7, and 14 are self-executing, P.J. ex rel. Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL
1702585 at * 14 (D.Utah 2006), and defendants do not claim otherwise in their pending motions.
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For well over thirty years, it has been clearly established in Utah that Article I, Section 7
of the Utah Constitution guarantees both procedural and substantive due process rights. Wells v.
Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984). The right of a parent to associate
with his own child is protected under Section 7. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982)("...we
conclude that the Utah Constitution recognized and protects the inherent and retrained right of a
parent to maintain parental ties to his or her child under Article I, s 7 and s 25...") Furthermore,
because the Supreme Court defined the right of 'liberty" encompassed within Section 1 as not
just the absence of physical restraint, but also, as "a term of comprehensive scope[] ...
embracing] not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of
person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[,]" Block v. Schwartz, 27
Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904), the right to associate with one's family is also guaranteed under
Article I, Section 1.
Shortly after deciding In re J.P., the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "the fundamental
right of parenthood" is protected under Article I, Section 7, and articulated that a violation of that
section is subject to the strict scrutiny standard: a violation results unless the governmental actor
establishes "a compelling state interest" in the result and that the means utilized are "narrowly
tailored" to that compelling interest. Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206-07
(Utah 1984) {quoting In re Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981).
It goes without saying that the State has a compelling state interest in protecting the
health and well-being of children. See In re J.P., supra. However, there is no compelling state
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interest in falsifying or misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court, nor do defendants cite any
authority suggesting otherwise.
Additionally, the Jensens' entitlement to a procedurally sound involvement with DCFS
and the juvenile court is also clearly established under Article I, Section 7. Section 7 has been
interpreted not only to guarantee the substantive right to association with one's family, but also
procedural rights, "notably, notice and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order
to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property."

Wells, supra at 204, {citing

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); State v. Casarez, Utah, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah
1982); Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1982); Lindon
City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981)). "The general test for the
validity of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Id.
Both the substantive and procedural protections of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 were so
clearly established at the time of Defendants' conduct that objective persons in their shoes would
have plainly recognized the unconstitutionality of their actions. The procedural protections of
Article I, Section 7 were so well known in 2003 that "a reasonable official would [have]
understood] that what he is doing violates that right." Spackman at \ 23. Facts illustrating the
flagrancy of each Defendant's conduct are set forth below.
i.

Wagner & Albritton

With respect to Defendant Wagner, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts establishes:
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1.

that Dr. Wagner refused common, definitive testing to confirm a diagnosis of

Parker's condition, even though such testing was routinely conducted at PCMC and was even
recommended by the same pathology report upon which he claims to have relied;
2.

that Wagner refused definitive testing in spite of the Jensens' requests for such

testing and their stated concerns about the diagnosis, and in spite of the fact that everything about
this alleged case of Ewing's Sarcoma was odd, i.e., Parker's case was not consistent with the
clinical presentation of Ewing's observed in the vast majority of other people - location in soft
tissue, location in the mouth, slow/no growth, lack of symptoms, etc.;
3.

that Wagner refused to request the genetic or molecular testing because it would

have jeopardized a 30-day deadline for enrolling Parker Jensen in a clinical trial for which he
was a co-investigator;
4.

that when the Jensens asked for a second opinion from Dana-Farber, Wagner first

attempted to discourage the request, then secretly attempted to influence the opinion;
5.

that Wagner concealed his true motivations from the Jensens;

6.

that Wagner concealed his refusal to order definitive diagnostic testing from his

superior, Dr. Lemons, as well as from Dr. Albritton, from Dr. Coffin, from Dr. Lowichik, from
Dr. Corwin, from DCFS caseworker Cunningham, and from Assistant Attorney General
Eisenman; and,
7.

that Wagner falsely told Kari Cunningham/DCFS that Parker could be dead in

"five days," in order to persuade Cunningham to skip the normal DCFS investigative process.
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With respect to Defendant Albritton, Plaintiffs'

Additional Statement of Facts

establishes:
1.

that Albritton urged and stated that only a board-certified pediatric oncologist was

qualified to treat Parker, while intentionally or recklessly failing to disclose that the reporting
doctor (Wagner) was not himself board-certified in pediatric oncology;
2.

that, as part of the process for obtaining custody and warrants, Albritton

misrepresented to the juvenile court the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic, from
which the Jensens wanted to obtain an evaluation;
3.

that Albritton knew, and intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the court

and others, that genetic testing was routinely conducted at PCMC on cases of suspected
Ewing's Sarcoma.
These facts demonstrate that Wagner and Albritton's conduct amounts to a flagrant
violation of both the substantive and procedural protections of Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the
Utah Constitution, because any reasonable person in Wagner or Albritton's situation would know
that his or her conduct violated the Utah Constitution.
Wagner and Albritton attempt to frame the issue as one of child protection (their actions)
versus child neglect (the Jensens' actions). All they did was make a diagnosis, they say. They
had to report the Jensens when the parents refused life-saving treatment for their son, they say.
In other words, the Defendants want this Court to rule as a matter of law not only what their
actions were, but also what their motives were. The Jensens have presented evidence that
Wagner and Albritton misrepresented P.J.'s condition to the juvenile court, refused to order
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specific medical tests that would have conclusively identified PJ.'s cancer, ignored or
misrepresented evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis, and falsified

or

misrepresented evidence to the juvenile court. (See PI.St.Facts, fflj 45-59, 68-81, 102-107, 126,
132-146, 261-263, 283-284, 322-325.) This conduct amounts to a flagrant violation of the
Jensens' substantive rights guaranteed under Article I, Sections 1 and 7.
By misrepresenting and omitting critical material information from the individuals
involved in the juvenile court proceedings, Wagner and Albritton deprived the Jensens of their
entitlement to "fairness" in that proceeding.

Defendants make much over the fact that the

Jensens purportedly had their day in court before a neutral, objective, and independent decision
maker. What Defendants fail to recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker has nothing
to rely on in reaching his decision but material misrepresentations of fact, the proceeding can
never be "fair." As a result, such conduct violates the procedural component of Article I, Section
7.
ii.

Eisenman.

With respect to Defendant Eisenman, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts
establishes that Eisenman violated Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under
Article I, Section 7.
1.

Eisenman misrepresentations and material omissions related to the
juvenile court proceedings violated Article I, Sections 1 and 7.

The record evidence demonstrates that Eisenman:
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1.

Knew, and failed to disclose, to the court, the DCFS case worker, and the

guardian ad litem, that additional diagnostic tests were available to confirm Parker's diagnosis.
(See PLSt.Facts, ^ 249.)
2.

Knew, and repeatedly failed to disclose, to (a) the juvenile court and (b) the DCFS

case worker, that defendant Wagner was not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. This was a
material omission because the Jensens were ultimately required to consult only with a boardcertified pediatric oncologist, which requirement precluded the Jensens from retaining Dr.
Simone as their primary physician, and instead forced them to choose L.A. Children's and Dr.
Johnston. (PLSt.Facts,ffl{235-236, 284-285, 322.) Cunningham testified that she considered
important the fact (which she learned only after this lawsuit was filed) that Dr. Wagner was not a
board-certified pediatric oncologist, and would have alerted the juvenile court had she known
that he lacked that certification. (PLSt.Facts, ^ 285.)
3.

Intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the court that Dr. Wager was

directing Parker's care under the provisions of a Clinical Trial Protocol. Although Eisenman
claims she was not aware of the real Clinical Trial Protocol, a jury could conclude otherwise
based upon the fact that she affirmatively represented to the juvenile court that another document
was the standard of care under which treatment was being sought. (PLSt.Facts, ^f 76 n.6.)
4.

Intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose to the juvenile court on August 8 that

the "controlling" test results from L.A. Children's were not back. (PLSt.Facts,ffl[273, 287, 290.)
Eisenman knew the test results were not complete because she had been in communication with
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Dr. Tishler of L.A. Children's on August 4, and he never said that that testing was completed.
(Pl.St.Facts, 1| 290.)
5.

Intentionally or recklessly made numerous factual misrepresentations on or about

August 29, 2003, to DCFS director Richard Anderson, who relied on such representations.
Eisenman knew that Anderson and had the authority to terminate DCFS's juvenile court petition,
had he been given accurate information. (Pl.St.Facts, f 384.) Eisenman's misrepresentations to
Anderson included the following (see ^ 385):
a)

Omission of all facts known to Eisenman indicating that the Jensens were

questioning the diagnosis after May 20, 2003, and instead implying that the Jensens' sole
objection was limited to Dr. Wagner's treatment plan;
b)

A misleading implication that the Jensens were pursuing IPT as the sole

treatment for Parker as of July 10, 2003, when she had in actuality been informed more than a
week earlier by the Jensens' attorney that the Jensens were not committed to IPT, and were
instead considering all treatment options;
c)

A misrepresentation that a second opinion was not obtained from Dana

Farber because the Jensens "declined to pay the consultation fee," which was not true;
d)

A misrepresentation that as of May 29, 2003, the Jensens "want[ed] to use

'Insulin Potentiation Therapy,'" and that the referring doctor, Dr. Wagner, asked for time to do
research, which was untrue. PCMC records said otherwise, that it was the Jensens who asked
Wagner to "look into" IPT;
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e)

A misrepresentation that neither Dr. Wagner nor Lara Neiderauer from

Huntsman could find "any reliable research about the therapy," which was a mischaracterization
of the content of Neiderauer's e-mail;
f)

Omission of all discussions at the June 9 meeting evidencing that the

Jensens had questions about the diagnosis of Ewing's;
g)

A misrepresentation that Dr. Thomson at LDS Hospital had performed "a

PET scan and other tests," when he had performed no tests at all, and a misrepresentation that
she (Eisenman) had no records of this consultation, when a copy of a letter from Dr. Thomson
was in DCFS's own file, and the Jensens' attorney had given her a letter from Dr. Thomson
shortly after June 19;
h)

A misrepresentation that Dr. Wagner did not contact DCFS or the PCMC

child protection team until June 12, when DCFS's own records plainly showed that contact was
made as early as June 2;
i)

A misrepresentation that the Jensens had refused to meet with Drs. Corwin

and Wagner, when in fact it was Wagner who refused to have the meeting;
j)

Omission of all statements by the Jensens' attorney at the June 20, 2003

hearing that the Jensens were seeking additional diagnostic testing, again intentionally creating
the impression that treatment was the only issue;
k)

A misrepresentation that she thought the July 10, 2003 hearing before the

juvenile court "was set for evidentiary hearing," when the court's record stated to the contrary,
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and the Jensens' attorney had reminded Eisenman a week earlier that the scheduled appearance
was not an evidentiary hearing;
1)

A misrepresentation that oncologists at PCMC did not know that a second

excision was going to be performed on Parker's tissue, when Wagner had been told of the
Jensens' intent, and the procedure had been cleared with Dr. Muntz at PCMC ahead of time;
m)

An omission that Jensens objected to the juvenile court conducting an

evidentiary hearing on July 10 on Eisenman's petition for removal because Eisenman was
improperly attempting to convert what had been scheduled for a pretrial conference into a fullblown evidentiary hearing, without complying with the juvenile court statutes and rules
regarding notice, and further omitting that the juvenile court refused to conduct her sought
hearing;
n)

An omission that the reason the Jensens were no longer using Dr.

Birkmayer was because Eisenman had taken the inflexible position that only a physician licensed
in the United States was qualified to be Parker's primary care physician, when she knew that the
State was not permitted to take that position;
o)

An omission that, before the Jensens were required to begin treatment,

L.A. Children's was to complete an independent evaluation of Parker's tissue, including genetic
testing, the disclosure of which fact would also have required Eisenman to reveal that the Jensens
were questioning the diagnosis;
p)

A misrepresentation that Parker's lost tissue was found by PCMC "within

48 hours," when Eisenman knew it had been missing for nearly two weeks;
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q)

An omission that L.A. Children's "controlling" test results were not back

at the time she obtained bench warrants in juvenile court on August 8, and that she was on notice
of that fact by virtue of an e-mail from Dr. Tishler at L.A. Children's on August 4 that did not
indicate that results were back;
r)

A misrepresentation that Eisenman contacted the Sandy City Police after a

hearing in juvenile court on August 12 [13], implying it was the police who contacted the
District Attorney's office, when Eisenman herself contacted the police and the D.A.'s office
before the hearing (which was on August 13, not August 12);
6.

Making misrepresentations to her supervisor, Utah Attorney General Mark

Shurtleff, who had the ability to intervene and/or terminate Eisenman's activities had he learned
the truth. (See Pl.St.Facts, 1f 377):
a)

Failing to disclose that DCFS/Kari Cunningham had merely rubber

stamped the reporting doctors' allegations, which Shurtleff would have known to be improper;
b)

Failing to disclose that neither DCFS/Cunningham nor Eisenman had

conducted an objective, thorough, accurate, fair or independent investigation of the medical
neglect allegations, which Shurtleff would have known to be improper;
c)

Failing to disclose that the Jensens had asked for cytogenetic testing at

PCMC and been refused, and that a chromosome (genetic) test was one way of definitively
diagnosing Ewing's;
d)

Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had voluntarily decided not

to use Dr. Birkmayer, which was untrue;
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e)

Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had declined a second

opinion from Dana-Farber because they had been told their insurance would not pay for it, which
was untrue;
f)

Omitting that Dr. Wagner's decisions regarding Parker Jensen, including

the refusal to conduct genetic testing and the intention to leave allegedly cancerous cells in
Parker's mouth, were being driven by the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial, which a jury could
reasonably conclude was known to Eisenman;
g)

Misrepresenting to Shurtleff that the Jensens had "fled" the state after

warrants were issued, which Eisenman knew to be untrue.11
7.

Misrepresenting to the juvenile court on August 13, when seeking warrants for the

Jensens, that the Jensens were not responding to messages on their cell phones, when no such
messages were ever left. (Pl.St.Facts, ^f 339.)
8.

Misrepresenting to the juvenile court on August 13 that she had not been in

communication with Dr. Tishler at L.A. Children's, when she had in fact received a lengthy email from him just the week before. This omission was material because, in that e-mail, Dr.
Tishler (a) did not mention any test results being completed, and (b) made numerous
inflammatory statements about the Jensens and their lawyers that Eisenman knew would reveal

These misrepresentations and omissions were material because they were contrary to
Shurtleff s instructions to his assistant attorneys general to "do everything we can to respect the
rights of parents and preserve families," (Shurtleff depo., pp. 157-158), and because they would
have cast serious doubt on the integrity of Eisenman's actions toward the Jensens.
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him to be unobjective and having formed opinions not based upon the results of independent
testing, as required under the July 10 stipulation. (Pl.StFacts,ffl[290, 339.)
2.

Eisenman misrepresentations and material omissions related to the
criminal court proceedings violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article
I, Sections 1 and 7.

The record contains evidence from which a jury could find that Eisenman:
1.

Misrepresented to the District Attorney's office that the Jensens had fled the state

after the August 8 warrant was issued, which she knew was untrue. (Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 344-345,
364.) This misrepresentation was material, as evidenced by the testimony of Deputy D.A.
Angela Micklos, who said that the felony child-kidnapping charges were based in part on that
information.
2.

(Id^347.){2
Failing to disclose that, at the time the Jensens were alleged to have violated a

juvenile court order, no such order had been entered. (Pl.St.Facts, % 343.)

Arrest warrants were activated nationally only for the felony kidnapping charges.
(Pl.St.Facts, TJ 349.) But-for those charges, therefore, Daren Jensen would not have been arrested
in Idaho, and Barbara Jensen would have been able to join her family there.
13

Eisenman has taken the position that it was immaterial whether an order had actually been
entered, because the judge had made oral statements from the bench. While this ignores Utah
law, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (order has no effect until entered),
there is also a practical reason why written directives are required: because parties - and even
attorneys - often have conflicting memories and/or understandings of what a court said; hence
the frequent wrangling over the language of court orders. In the Jensen case, the guardian ad
litem's notes as to what the judge said and Eisenman's proposed order were materially different.
(Pl.St.Facts, % 288.) No minutes were available for that hearing until August 11, after warrants
had been issued. Eisenman knew that a "proposed" order could not form the basis of a contempt
action, because it might or might not comport with the judge's own notes or memory. It is also
notable that, of the documents that Eisenman provided to the D.A.'s office on August 15, she
omitted copies of the underlying order, on which the ink was barely dry. (Id., % 343.)
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3.

Failed to disclose that the court orders and warrants upon which Eisenman based

her complaint had been procured by misrepresentations and material omissions. (PLSt.Facts, ^flf
197, 201, 214-215, 224-229, 234-236, 249, 283-285, 290-291, 314, 326.)
ill.

Cunningham

With respect to Defendant Cunningham, Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of Facts
establishes that she violated Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under
Article I, Section 7.
1.

Failure to Complete Mandatory Investigation

Cunningham violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Section 1 and Section 7 by failing
to comply with the mandatory, non-discretionary statutes and administrative rules governing her
obligations as a DCFS caseworker to conduct a "thorough preremoval investigation" of the
Jensens and their son prior to taking any action against the Jensens' parental rights. U.C.A. §
62A-4a-409(l)(a)(2003). This conduct violated both Plaintiffs' substantive right to associate
with their family and to direct their son's medical care, but also their procedural right to a fair
involvement with DCFS and the juvenile court.
Analysis of this issue must begin with the recognition that DCFS's enabling statutes
require DCFS and its caseworkers such as Kari Cunningham to give the highest regard to the
family association and parental rights of the citizens of the State of Utah:
(1) (a) Courts have recognized a general presumption that it is in the best interest
and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision of his natural
parents. A child's need for a normal family life in a permanent home, and for
positive, nurturing family relationships will usually best be met by his natural
parents. Additionally, the integrity of the family unit, and the right of parents to
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conceive and raise their children have found protection in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right of a
fit, competent parent to raise his child has long been protected by the laws and
Constitution of this state and of the United States.
(b) // is the public policy of this state that parents retain the fundamental right
and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision, upbringing, and
education of their children who are in their custody.

(3) When the division intervenes on behalf of an abused, neglected, or dependent
child, it shall take into account the child's need for protection from immediate
harm. Throughout its involvement, the division shall utilize the least intrusive
means available to protect a child, in an effort to ensure that children are brought
up in stable, permanent families, rather than in temporary foster placements under
the supervision of the state.
U.C.A. § 62A-4a-201(l)(2003)(emphasis added).
DCFS caseworkers consequently operate under an unambiguous duty to respect and act
in accordance with the parental rights of every Utah citizen. Of course, DCFS' primary purpose
is to protect children from abuse and neglect, § 62A-4a-201(2), but it can only do so by using
"the least intrusive means available," and in undertaking those least intrusive means, it must
protect Utah parents' "fundamental right and duty to exercise primary control over the care,
supervision, upbringing, and education of their children." Id.
The statutes at issue establish a protected liberty interest under Article 1, Sections 1 and 7
of the Utah Constitution.

It is well recognized in the federal arena that state statutes using

"explicitly mandatory language in connection with the establishment of 'specified substantive
predicates to limit discretion" create protected liberty interests. Kentucky Dep 7 of Corrections v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989)(internal quotations
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omitted). Utah's preremoval investigation statutes and administrative rules contain explicitly
mandatory language that required Cunningham to take certain steps as part of a thorough and
accurate investigation prior to taking any action that infringed upon a citizen's parental rights.
Those statutes and rules also contain specific substantive predicates that limit the social worker's
discretion in fulfilling the required investigation.

Accordingly, those statutes create a

constitutionally protected interest in parents reported to have neglected their child.
The DCFS preremoval investigation statutes and rules create a constitutionally protected
liberty interest because they impose mandatory, non-discretionary requirements that DCFS
caseworkers thoroughly and accurately investigate allegations of neglect and abuse before taking
action that impacts parental rights. The preremoval statute and rules explicitly enumerate the
required acts that must compose an investigation. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(2) (2003); § 62A-4a202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003). Acting with the parents' fundamental rights in mind, DCFS is required
under statute to conduct a "thorough pre-removal investigation" whenever it receives a report of
child abuse or neglect.

U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a).

DCFS administrative rules echo the

requirement that a "child protective services caseworker" must complete an "accurate and timely
investigation" following the receipt of a report of abuse or neglect.

UTAH ADMIN.

R. 512-201-1

& 201-4 (2003).
The statutes and rules leave the DCFS caseworkers with no discretion in what steps to
take in completing an investigation, because the statues and rules specifically delineate the acts
that compose the investigation. The statute mandates that DCFS' "investigation shall include"
"a search for and review of any records of past reports of abuse or neglect involving the same

53

child, any sibling or other child residing in that household, and the alleged perpetrator;" a
personal interview with the child, where he or she is older than five years; an interview with the
child's parents; an interview of the person who reported the abuse; "interviews with other third
parties who have had direct contact with the child[;]" an "unscheduled visit to the child's
home[;]" and an independent medical examination, where allegations of medical neglect are at
issue. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(2) (2003); § 62A-4a-202.3(2)(a)-(g) (2003).
The statute goes on to specify exactly how caseworkers should conduct the required
interviews, by specifically delineating when the interview can be conducted without notifying a
parent, the length of an interview when it is completed without notification, those specific
individuals who must be notified prior to conducting an interview, and when a child may have a
support person during the interview. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(9) (2003).
Additionally, by Rule, the caseworker is required to conduct an "assess[ment] [of] the
immediate protection safety needs of a child and the family's capacity to protect the child[,]"
including a "domestic violence assessment^]" an "[assessment of immediate risk, safety, and
protection needs of a child to include an assessment of risk, that an absent parent or cohabitant
may pose to the child[;]" an "assessment of risk, protection, and safety needs for any siblings or
other children residing in the home as sibling or child at risk[;]" an "[assessment of the family's
strengths, needs, challenges, limitations, struggles, ability, and willingness to protect the child[;]"
a "[d]etermination of eligibility for enrollment or membership in a Native American tribe[;]" and
finally, to ensure that "[m]edical or mental health evaluations [are] completed as required by
statute within required time frames[.]"

UTAH ADMIN.

S4

R. 512-201-4 (2003).

Viewing all statutes governing DCFS together, DCFS' compliance with the provisions of
the preremoval statute not only serves to protect the state's parens patriae interest in the safety
of children, but also serves to ensure that the government undertakes the least restrictive means
to protect a child, and that the government does not unconstitutionally and unnecessarily intrude
upon parents' constitutionally protected rights. DCFS can only make the determination that the
state's interests outweigh a parents' interest by first conducting the mandatory, non-discretionary
investigation required by U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409 (2003).
DCFS' mandatory, nondiscretionary requirements create a protected liberty interest in
Utah parents to an accurate, timely, and thorough investigation before the state encroaches upon
their due process rights guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The
undisputed facts show that Cunningham failed to honor her obligations under the aforementioned
statutes and rules. This conduct amounts to flagrant violations of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution, by depriving Plaintiffs of their procedural protections guaranteed under those
sections.

By failing to afford Plaintiffs the pre-removal investigation to which they were

entitled, Cunningham deprived the Jensens of their entitlement to "fairness" in DCFS' and the
juvenile court's involvement in their son's medical care. Defendants make much over the fact
that the Jensens purportedly had their day in court before a neutral, objective, and independent
decision maker. What Defendants fail to recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker
does not have the full breadth of evidence before him, which evidence should have been
marshaled by the involved government actors but was not, in plain dereliction of duty, the
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proceeding can never be "fair." As a result, such conduct presumptively violates Article I,
Section 7.
2.

Cunningham violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections J
and 7 by making material misrepresentations to the juvenile court.

Plaintiffs have presented the following evidence of Cunningham's misrepresentations to
the juvenile court:
Cunningham's verified petition omitted several material facts, including that she had not
done the statutorily required investigation; that tests necessary to confirm the diagnosis had
never been run; that, if Parker did have Ewing's sarcoma, it was an atypical form and
manifestation, which was one reason that the Jensens were questioning the use of a standard
treatment on a non-standard condition; and that Dr. Corwin was a psychiatrist, and not qualified
to provide an "independent assessment" of Parker's medical condition, or render a second
opinion, or opine whether the Jensens were medically neglectful. {See Pl.St.Facts,ffl[165-167.)
Cunningham admitted that her August 18, 2003 affidavit presents only the State's side of
the story.

Cunningham also admits that certain information in the affidavit is false or

misleading. For example, she admits that she knew at this time that tests had not been conducted
at Dana Farber, as implied by the affidavit, and that the CT and bone scans were normal,
contrary to the affidavit's implication, and that the Jensens were no longer interested in IPT,
contrary to the affidavit's assertion. Cunningham also knew at that time that the controlling
genetic tests were in the works at L.A. Children's, did not know whether the test results were
back, and did not ask anyone. She did not have any conversations with Dr. Coffin, as she
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claimed in paragraph 7 of the affidavit. She referred to Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer as a "man," which
she acknowledges is materially different from a doctor. (While Cunningham says that she
"doesn't know" why she referred to Dr. Birkmayer as a man rather than a doctor, one obvious
inference is that she wanted to create the false impression that the Jensens were consulting a
layperson regarding their son's medical treatment, as opposed to a licensed physician.)
Cunningham also falsely stated in her August 8 affidavit that Dr. Tishler had opined on July 28,
2003, that "Parker should commence chemotherapy," when she knew that Tishler had repeatedly
stated that he would not be making final treatment recommendations until all of his independent
testing was in, including genetic testing. (See Pl.St.Facts, ff 317-319.)
On August 18, 2003, DCFS worker Kari Cunningham submitted to the juvenile court
another Affidavit in Support of Warrant to Take Child into Protective Custody. (Exh. 43, August
18 affidavit.) The affidavit restated the same (mis)representations from Cunningham's August 8
Affidavit. (See Pl.St.Facts, ^ 359.)
Cunningham's repeated material omissions and misrepresentations to the juvenile court
amounts to flagrant violations of Plaintiffs' substantive rights under Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution.
3.

Cunningham did not reasonably rely on DCFS medical neglect
policy.

Cunningham argues she reasonably relied on DCFS' emergency medical neglect policy,
and that therefore, she cannot be held accountable for any violations of the Utah Constitution.
What Cunningham neglects to mention is that she never followed the emergency medical neglect
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policy. Even under the emergency medical neglect guidelines, Cunningham was still required to
"meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary compliance with medical treatment
pending or in lieu of court involvement, and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal
to treat." (p. 44 § A.3.) The undisputed evidence demonstrates that she never even attempted to
fulfill such tasks before filing the medical neglect petition. Accordingly, she cannot now claim
reliance on that policy to relieve her from liability for flagrant violations of the Utah
Constitution.
iv.

Anderson
1.

Cunningham's liability has no bearing on Anderson 's liability.

Defendant Anderson asserts that he cannot be held liable for any constitutional violation
or tortious conduct because, he says, defendant Cunningham is not liable. But Anderson's
liability is not contingent upon the acts of Cunningham, because Plaintiffs claim that Anderson
independently violated their rights Article I §§ 1,7, and 14, of the state Constitution, and that he
acted tortiously, by personally engaging in a number of unlawful acts:
1.

Anderson created, encouraged, or perpetuated a policy by which DCFS case

workers did not investigate allegations of medical neglect if the reporting doctor was assigned to
Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC), but instead automatically assumed such reports to
be true;
2.

Anderson imposed an unconstitutional standard on the Jensens that, if parents had

a licensed medical doctor who disagreed with a doctor assigned to PCMC, the parents were not
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permitted to make the call between the two physicians, they were required to follow the PCMC
doctor's recommendations;
3.

failing to train DCFS caseworkers to follow the law and DCFS policy regarding

medical neglect allegations, and exhibiting deliberate indifference with respect to the training
and supervision of defendant Kari Cunningham;
4.

personally refusing to order DCFS to withdraw the medical neglect allegations

and juvenile court petition despite acknowledging that the Jensens were not neglectful parents;
5.

failing to disclosure to the Jensens or the juvenile court his knowledge that a

stipulation in which the Jensens had been promised an independent evaluation by Dr. Martin
Johnston was not being honored.
These are independent acts of Anderson himself, which have nothing to do with
Cunningham's conduct or responsibility for constitutional violations. As a result, her liability
has no bearing on Anderson's liability.
2.

Anderson violated Plaintiffs' substantive rights under Article I,
Sections 1 and 7 by imposing the blatantly unconstitutional
requirement that the state's preferred doctor would trump
Plaintiffs' choice of doctor.

Anderson had the authority to (and eventually did) terminate the medical neglect
proceedings against the Jensens. For the first two months of his involvement, however, he
refused to do so because it was his position that, if a licensed physician consulted by parents and
a licensed physician consulted by the State disagreed, the parents did not get to make the call.
Instead, Anderson took the position that the State could force the parents to go to court and let
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the court decide which physician was "better."

(Pl.St.Facts, ^[ 390-391.)

Accordingly,

Anderson refused to withdraw DCFS's petition regardless of whether the Jensens placed Parker
under the care of a licensed physician. Id. That refusal was plainly unconstitutional.
"Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the wcare, custody, and management' of
their children." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, (1982); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923). That includes the right to direct the medical care of one's minor child. Dubbs
v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003). It has long been settled in this country
that the government cannot interfere with a parent's choice between licensed medical
practitioners merely because the state prefers one over the other (or, as in this case, has instituted
a policy to always enforce a particular provider's recommendations). Similarly, the state cannot
interfere with a parent's choice simply because there is a conflict in medical opinion in a
particular case. This principle was well articulated in In the Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d
1009(1979).
In Hofbauer, 7-year-old Joseph Hofbauer was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease, and his
attending physician, Dr. Cohn, recommended radiation treatment and possibly chemotherapy.
"[A]fter making numerous inquiries," the boy's parents rejected Dr. Cohn's advice and elected to
have their son treated with laetrile at a clinic in Jamaica.
Neglect charges were filed against the Hofbauers for rejecting the first physician's
recommendation. There was a "sharp difference in medical opinion as to the effectiveness of the
treatment being administered to Joseph[:]" two physicians opined that radiation treatment was
necessary; others opined that it was not, that nutritional therapy and other less-invasive measures
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would be appropriate. Id. at 653. The family court found that "Joseph's mother and father are
concerned and loving parents who have employed conscientious efforts to secure for their child a
viable alternative of medical treatment administered by a duly licensed physician," and therefore
concluded that the child was not neglected. Id. at 654.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. While recognizing that the fundamental right
of parents to rear their child is not absolute, the court observed that "great deference must be
accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical treatment to be undertaken and the
physician selected to administer the same." Id. at 655. "In this regard, it is important to stress
that a parent, in making the sensitive decision as to how the child should be treated, may rely
upon the recommendations and competency of the attending physician if he or she is duly
licensed to practice medicine in this State, for '[i]f a physician is licensed by the State, he is
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment.'" Id., quoting Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 199 (1973).
Analysis of a parent's rights to direct medical care cannot be posed in terms of
whether the parent has made a 'right' or a 'wrong' decision, for the present state
of the practice of medicine, despite its vast advances, very seldom permits such
definitive conclusions. . . . Rather, in our view, the court's inquiry should be
whether the parents, once having sought accredited medical assistance and
having been made aware of the seriousness of their child's affliction and the
possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken, have provided for
their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician and which has
not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority.
Id. at 656 (noting that "this is not a case where the parents, for religious reasons, refused
necessary medical procedures for their child . . . [T]his is not a case where the child is receiving
no medical treatment, for the record discloses that Joseph's mother and father were concerned
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and loving parents who sought qualified medical assistance for their child"); see also State v.
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (NJ. 1962) (parents rejecting for religious reasons unanimous medical
opinion as to need for blood transfusions; u[h]ad there been a relevant and substantial difference
of medical opinion about the efficacy of the proposed treatment or if there were substantial
evidence that the treatment itself posed a significant danger to the infant's life, a strong argument
could be made in favor of appellants' position"); In re CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App.
1973) (clinic's report of neglect for mother's withdrawal of child as patient was baseless;
"Whether the mother's reasons for that dissatisfaction [with the clinic] were correct or incorrect
is not the point. The mother had a right to choose between different doctors or institutions for
the purpose of this type of care. So long as the mother was willing and intended to provide
appropriate care in some manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of neglecting the
child"); In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, *3 (Pa. Q. 1912) (court could not substitute its
medical judgment for that of parents absent showing of unfitness; even if defective judgment
were a basis for superseding parents' decision, neglect was not shown where "the science of
medicine and surgery, notwithstanding its enormous advances, has not yet been able to insure an
absolutely correct diagnosis in all cases, and still less an absolutely correct prognosis"). Cf.
Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 1978) ("no dispute" as to diagnosis and
need for chemotherapy; emphasizing that parent's refusal "was not based on the parents' view
that another medically effective form of treatment could be found," but merely upon 'hope' of
child's recovery).
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Anderson cites no authority for the proposition that he could force parents to choose the
"best" doctor, or the State's preferred doctor, and all authority is to the contrary. Regardless of
his alleged pure motives, Anderson imposed a blatantly unconstitutional standard on the Jensen
family. As a result, the medical neglect proceedings were extended another two months. The
Jensens could not go home for another two months. They could not take Parker to Dr. Peterson
for the long-overdue margin for another two months.

They could not go back to work for

another two months.
3.

Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections J and
7 by admitting that the Jensens were not neglectful parents, yet
refusing to order withdrawal of the medical neglect petition.

Anderson is also incorrect in asserting that he did not possess authority to unilaterally
terminate the juvenile court neglect proceedings. The record demonstrates that he could and did
do that very thing. Pis' St. Add'l Facts, SOF ^ 389.
4.

Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections 1 and
7 by making material misrepresentations and omissions to the
juvenile court.

Plaintiffs have further adduced evidence that Anderson omitted and misrepresented
crucial information from the juvenile court. Foremost, Anderson knew of availability of genetic
testing and failed to advise the juvenile court of that fact, or the fact that it had not bee
performed. Furthermore, Anderson know that Dr. Johnson breached a prior stipulation by not
performing independent testing, but he failed to inform the juvenile court of such fact.
record reflects:
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The

1) As of September 4, 2003, Anderson knew that definitive diagnostic
testing had never been run on Parker Jensen's tissue, and that the juvenile court was unaware of
that fact. Yet he did not disclose that information to the court at hearings on September 3 or
September 5, 2003. (Pl.St.Facts, ^ 397.)
2) As of September 23, 2003, Anderson was informed by Dr. Martin
Johnston that (a) Johnston intended to recommend chemotherapy even though the results of his
independent testing was not in yet, and (b) he (Johnston) was going to wait a couple of days to
tell the Jensens his conclusions. (Pl.St.Facts, ^416.) Anderson knew that, under a stipulation
between DCFS and Jensen, Johnston was not to decide on the diagnosis or treatment unless and
until he had completed independent testing. (Id., ^f 417.) In spite of his knowledge that the State
had materially breached the stipulation, Anderson did not inform the juvenile court.
Anderson asserts that there is no evidence he had any way of knowing that Johnston's
diagnosis of Parker before the completion of genetic testing was a violation of the stipulation.
But Anderson admits that he understood that the entire purpose of Johnston's evaluation was to
obtain an independent, neutral evaluation of Parker's condition, and that Johnston was not going
to arrive at any treating recommendations until the results of independent testing were recieved.
(Pl.St.Facts, % 401). Contrary to the stipulation, however, Johnston told Anderson he had a
strong inclination to follow the treatment recommendations made by the other doctors. This was
a clear violation of the September 5 stipulation. Anderson's failure to inform the Court of that
fact, standing alone, violated the Jensens' rights to family association and to direct their son's
medical care guaranteed under Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Utah Constitution.
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5.

Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections I and
7 by failing to train DCFS caseworkers like Kari Cunningham.

With respect to training, Anderson had a statutorily imposed duty to ensure that DCFS
employees were fully trained to comply with the law. U.C.A. § 62A-4a-105.5(1) (2003) ("The
director shall ensure that all employees are fully trained to comply with state and federal law,
administrative rules, and division policy in order to effectively carry out their assigned duties and
functions;'); see also U.C.A. § 62A-4a-107(1) (2003) (Child Welfare Training director is
appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the director of DCFS). An issue of fact exists as to
Anderson's authority with regard to training his subordinates, and whether he fulfilled his
statutory duties to do so.
6.

Anderson violated Plaintiffs' rights under Article I, Sections 1 and
7 by instituting, affirming, or allowing a DCFS policy of not
investigating medical neglect allegations from doctors at PCMC

Anderson is liable for DCFS' policy of not investigating allegations of medical neglect
from PCMC doctors. Anderson asserts that he had no authority to change, modify, or adopt
DCFS policy.

Therefore, he says, he cannot be held responsible for implementing an

unconstitutional policy. Anderson gives himself too little credit. He admitted in his deposition
that he had the ability to "influence" how DCFS practices were carried out. (Anderson depo., p.
30.) In the Jensen case, where there was no written policy addressing the circumstance of
medical neglect allegations made by specific institutions such as PCMC, the carrying out of the
policy is the policy.
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Furthermore, Anderson interpreted Division policy as permitting DCFS case workers to
forego an investigation of medical neglect allegations if the reporting doctor was assigned to
PCMC.

(Cunningham depo., pp. 212-213 (Anderson told Cunningham that she had acted

appropriately in her handling of the case; Cunningham's understanding was that her actions were
consistent with DCFS policy).) Such a policy violates both Sections 1 and 7 by impermissibly
interfering with the parent-child relationship and the right of family association.
B.

Article I Section 14

The defendants' actions described above involving material misrepresentations and
omissions caused the imposition of both custodial and noncustodial seizures of Plaintiffs.
Custodial seizure is, as the term suggests, a physical arrest.

A continuing seizure is one that

results from state-imposed conditions that seriously, but not physically, restrict liberty.
The continuing seizure concept was originally articulated by Justice Ginsburg in her
concurring opinion in the case of Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994). Justice
Ginsburg recognized that a citizen who is released from physical custody may be subject to state
imposed conditions that restrict liberty, including conditions of bail, mandatory court
appearances, restrictions on freedom to travel, diminishment of employment prospects,
reputational harm, and "the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense." Id. at 278. In
such a case, the person remains "seized" for trial, "so long as he is bound to appear in court and
answer the state's charges." Id. at 279. Justices Souter's and Stevens' concurring opinions in
Albright expressed agreement with Justice Ginsburg's view that "the initial seizure of petitioner
continued until his discharge." Id. at 307.
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Holding in accordance with Justice Ginsberg's opinion in Albright, the Second Circuit
has concluded that non-custodial seizures that impose serious restraints on liberty are seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. In Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2nd Cir. 1997), for
example, the Second Circuit concluded that a post-arraignment order prohibiting an arrestee
from leaving the State of New York and requiring that he attend court appointments amounted to
a "seizure" within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
Other circuit courts have concluded that, where the conditions of release are more severe
than the typical case, a Fourth Amendment seizure takes place. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856,
860-61 (5th Cinl999)(overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th
Cir.2003))(holding that a plaintiff had alleged Fourth Amendment seizure where, in addition to
being summoned to appear and answer to charges, plaintiff was forced to sign personal
recognizance bond, and was required to report regularly to pretrial services and obtain
permission before leaving the state); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3rd
Cir. 1998) (finding seizure where plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bond, attend all court
hearings, maintain weekly contact with pretrial services, and refrain from traveling outside New
Jersey and Pennsylvania); DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601-603 (3rd Cir.
2005)("...some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure.")
Several federal district courts have relied upon Murphy, as well as Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence in Albright, to conclude that a plaintiff who suffers significant restrictions, even in
the absence of travel restrictions, may nevertheless assert fourth amendment violations. See,
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e.g., Kirk v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2001 WL 258605 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Sassower v.
City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Willner v. Town of North
Hempstead, 977 F.Supp. 182, 189 (E.D.N.Y.1997); Martinez v. Gayson, 1998 WL 564385
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
The Utah Supreme Court would similarly construe the protections of Section 14,
particularly given the Framers' experience with the polygamy prosecutions. Many members of
the Church had been forced into hiding or to abandon their families during the 1880s, which was
no less an infringement of their physical liberty than an arrest. (In 1887, less than a decade
before the Utah Constitution was drafted, LDS President John Taylor had died while in hiding.)
The Framers would have been very aware that a deprivation of freedom by the government can
take forms beyond physical restraint.
In this case, the Jensens suffered such "significant, ongoing deprivations] of liberty" as a
result of the juvenile court proceedings that it is clear they were seized for Section 14 purposes.
Justice Ginsberg recognized in Albright that numerous kinds of conditions imposed by
government can effectuate a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, including 1) bail
payments, 2) mandatory court appearances, 3) restrictions on freedom to travel, 4) diminishment
of employment prospects, 5) reputational harm, and 6) the "financial and emotional strain of
preparing a defense." Albright, supra, at 279. The government imposed all of these conditions
on the Jensens during the course of the juvenile proceedings:
The Jensens were unable to return to the state of Utah (their home) without the threat of
arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for an evaluation in
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Houston, and to other physicians of their choosing, because the State forbade it. They were
subjected to mandatory court appearances. They were ordered to give up their passports. Daren
Jensen lost his job, and was exposed to serious diminishment of other employment prospects,
both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his time,
finances, energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights.
The Jensens were held up to public ridicule and contempt, and subjected to close media
scrutiny. They Jensens endured an enormous financial and emotional strain of defending their
family from neglect proceedings that were based upon deceit. These facts rise to the level of a
seizure under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
C.

Existing Remedies

Defendants assert that plaintiffs' state constitutional claims are precluded because the
relief available to plaintiffs under federal law sufficiently redresses their injuries incurred as a
result of defendants' violations of the Utah Constitution. Of course, according to defendants,
there is no relief under federal law, which would seem to preclude that argument.
Moreover, defendants' argument disregards the suggestion in Spackman that a plaintiff
need only demonstrate that existing state law remedies, not federal remedies, are insufficient to
redress his or her injuries. Spackman at ^f 24, n. 10 ("We do not reach the question of whether
existing federal law remedies should preclude a state court from awarding damages for a state
constitutional tort," and citing Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 707-08 (1998)(Callahan, C.J.,
concurring) for proposition that "the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff lacks a state
remedy"); see also, Brokaw v. Salt Lake County, 2007 WL 2221065 (D.Utah 2007)(declining to
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dismiss state constitutional claims based upon second Spackman element and rejecting
defendants' argument that federal section 1983 claims sufficiently redressed plaintiffs injuries,
and recognizing that ic[t]he issue of whether existing federal law remedies provide sufficient
redress for a state constitutional claim is still an open question.")
In answering this question, the Court should uphold the long-recognized principles of
federalism by giving the Utah Constitution its full import and enforcement.

See State v.

Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 33, 162 P.3d 1106 ("it is part of the inherent logic of federalism that
state law be interpreted independently [from] ... federal questions....By looking first to state
constitutional principles, we also act in accordance with the original purpose of the federal
system.")(internal quotations and citations omitted).
It is important to note that, in deciding to require a plaintiff to demonstrate an insufficient
existing state remedy, the Spackman Court relied on United States Supreme Court cases
declining to allow a federal constitutional claim against federal agents, where Congress, the
federal legislative body, has enacted federal statutory schemes providing redress for the alleged
federal injuries. Spackman, supra, at % 24, citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425, 108
S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76
L.Ed.2d 648 (1983).
If this Court concluded that the existence of a federal remedy precludes a claim for
damages for a violation of an independent right guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, thereby
determining that remedies available under the United States Constitution supplant remedies
under the Utah Constitution, this Court will greatly weaken the efficacy of the Utah Constitution.
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Such a ruling would place a chilling effect on future plaintiffs who have suffered injuries as a
result of governmental violations of rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, and as such, will
curtail the development of any meaningful jurisprudence for Utah's constitution.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have sufficient redress for their state constitutional
violations through their common law claims. Anderson MSJ Memo at 13; Eisenman MSJ Memo
at 13-14. No supporting analysis is provided, nor does any come to mind. Moreover, any
remedy available under a common law tort is insufficient to remedy the flagrant violations of the
supreme law of the State of Utah that occurred in this case. Foremost, allowing ordinary
common law claims to trump state constitutional claims evinces a disregard for the import of our
state Utah Constitution. As the Honorable Chief Justice Marshall observed in the Supreme
Court's seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, a right without a remedy is not a right. 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
For longer than this country has been organized as a collective union, legal scholars have
recognized the importance of providing a remedy for the violation of a constitutional right. In
Federalist Paper No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
... there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. ... No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government
to restrain or correct the infractions of them.
Without the availability of a remedy, a constitutional right is but a hollow shell protecting
the citizenry in name only. In the absence of a means to punish the government for violating a
provision of a state constitution and to provide Utah citizens with redress for Utah constitutional
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injury, Utah's constitution will never deter egregious conduct or protect the rights of citizens.
This Court should conclude that any available common law remedies are insufficient to redress
the myriad of violations of the Utah Constitution effectuated by Defendants.
D.

Equitable Relief

Defendants also suggest that unspecified "equitable relief might have fixed everything
for the Jensens. The Defendants do not indicate what equitable procedure would have compelled
them to stop making misrepresentations, or gotten Daren Jensen his job back, or unlocked the
handcuffs on his wrists, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or reimbursed their bond, or salvaged
their reputation, or erased their emotional distress. No form of equitable relief could or can
compensate the Jensens for their losses. It has been recognized that violation of constitutional
rights cannot always be effectively remedied by injunctive relief. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, f
25. id., citing Bott ("if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief
may not be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries") and citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (damages were appropriate remedy for unconstitutional termination in light of fact that
her former employer was no longer a Congressman). In Spackman, the Supreme Court cited the
court's observation in Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway,
503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 1986) that "damages are an inappropriate remedy for a constitutional
violation where the alleged injury 'can be undone' by the judiciary." The harm suffered by the
Jensens cannot be "undone"; they can only be made whole after the fact, as the Framers would
have intended. See Deseret Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398 , 52 P. 628, 629 (1898)
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("All wrongs are regarded as merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy is to put the
injured party in the same position as he was before the wrong was committed").
VI

EISENMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FOR HER
ACTIONS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN
THAT REGARD.

Eisenman contends that she is entitled to absolute immunity for all of her actions in this
case, because they stemmed from her job as Assistant Attorney General. In support of her
arguments regarding absolute immunity, Eisenman cites to the decision of the federal court on
Plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims. However, as explained above, this Court must engage in
its own independent analysis and evaluation of the record and facts before it, and may not rely on
the federal court's decision.
When analyzing Eisenman's conduct under Utah law, it becomes apparent that she is not
entitled to absolute judicial immunity for any of her conduct in this case. Utah recognizes
judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals who perform "functions closely
related to the judicial process." Sanders v. Leavitt, 37 P.3d 1052, 2001 UT 78, \ 19. "Whether a
person or entity should be afforded judicial immunity depends upon the specific work or function
performed." Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993). Although judicial
immunity extends to acts closely related to the judicial process, judicial immunity does not
extend to administrative or investigatory functions. Cline v. State, Div. of Child and Family
Sendees, 142 P.3d 127, 2005 UT App 498, % 40.
Although neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed
the specific issue, this Court should conclude that a prosecutor is not entitled to judicial
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immunity for actions involving wrongful misrepresentations and material omissions. In Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the United States
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor who engages in misrepresentations and omissions is not
entitled to absolute immunity under federal law. The result would be the same under the Utah
Constitution, particularly in light of the unique hardships visited upon early Utahns by
misrepresentations and false testimony by government actors. See pp. 2-23, supra.
As discussed at pp. 43-51, above, Eisenman's conduct was replete with material
misrepresentations and omissions. Accordingly, she is not entitled to absolute immunity for
flagrant violations of the Utah Constitution.

Furthermore, a fact issue exists as to whether

Eisenman's conduct was investigatory in nature, which would also preclude any entitlement to
absolute immunity.

There is evidence in the record that Eisenman conducted her own

investigation in the Jensen case, which she deliberately skewed. For example, when Eisenman
faxed certain records to Dr. Albritton prior to the July 10 hearing, she omitted all documents
supportive of the Jensens' questions about the diagnosis, such as: the original PCMC pathology
report, which suggested that cytogenetic testing might be informative; the original LabCorp
report, which had a different diagnosis than PCMC; and Dr. Birkmayer's letters, which explained
why he questioned whether Parker had Ewing's at all. (Pl.St.Facts,ffl[228-229.) Eisenman also
represented in an e-mail to Dr. Birkmayer that the American Academy of Pediatrics had enacted
a standard of care for the United States, which she knew was untrue. {Id,, ^ j 214-215.)
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VII

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS REGARDING DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT
SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A
GENUINE DISPUTE OF FACT THAT THAT REGARD.

A plaintiff proves intentional infliction of emotional distress by demonstrating that the
defendant acted (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable
person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality. Gulbraa v. Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ, 159 P.3d 392, 2007 UT App 126 (Utah App. 2007). Moreover, pursuant to the Utah
Model Uniform Jury Instructions Reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the state of mind
requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is sufficient that:
the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress, or acted with reckless
disregard of the probability of causing that distress. This means that the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's conduct (1) was for the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress, or (2) that a reasonable person would have known that
emotional distress would result.
Utah Model Uniform Jury Instruction 22.4.
If a jury believes plaintiffs' evidence, it will conclude that the defendants relied on
misrepresentations and half-truths to force a 12-year-old boy to have unnecessary chemotherapy.
Defendants' alleged actions would offend any generally accepted standard of decency and
morality, and a fact issue exists in that regard.
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VIII

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFFS' MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM, OR AT THE
LEAST, THERE IS A DISPUTE OF FACT IN THAT REGARD.

A.

Utah does not recognize absolute immunity as a defense to malicious prosecution

claims for social workers like Cunningham who make wrongful misrepresentations and
omissions.

Utah has established judicial immunity for judicial officers and those individuals who
perform functions closely related to the judicial process. Sanders, supra, at \ 19. Although
neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the specific issue, a
child social worker is not entitled to judicial immunity for actions involving wrongful
misrepresentations and material omissions. Additionally, judicial immunity does not extend to
administrative or investigatory functions. Cline v. State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 142
P.3d 127, 2005 UT App 498, ^ 40. As set forth in pages #-#, above, Cunningham's conduct was
replete with material misrepresentations and omissions that flagrantly violated Article I, Sections
1, 7, and 14, and was investigatory in nature. Cunningham is not entitled to absolute immunity
for flagrant constitutional violations for investigative activities.
B.

Criminal Proceedings
i.

The criminal proceedings were not supported by probable cause.

Eisenman and the other defendants argue that the criminal charges against Barbara and
Daren Jensen were supported by probable cause, and therefore cannot form the basis of a
malicious prosecution claim. That is a contested issue. For example, one component of the

criminal charges was the false statement (by Eisenman, apparently) that the Jensens had "fled the
state" after entry of an order. See Pis' St. Factsffif344-346.
Defendants' argument is that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the criminal charges
against were not supported by probable cause, because Barbara and Daren entered into pleas in
abeyance and, defendants argue, in so doing admitted the existence of probable cause. See
Eisenman Memo at 21, Anderson Memo at 17.
Initially, plaintiffs note that both Barbara and Daren Jensen were arrested on the criminal
charges. {See Pl.St.Facts, % 401.) In any event, however, Judge Cassell ruled that the plea
bargains do not bar the Jensens' claims, so long as evidence is offered that: (1) the criminal
charges were a result of misrepresentations or omissions; and/or (2) Barbara and Daren were
coerced into signing it. PJ. ex rel Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL 1702585 at * 11 (D.Utah 2006).
Such evidence has been adduced. (Pl.St.Facts, 1ffl 328, 344-345, 347, 427.)
Furthermore, the Jensens never admitted that the juvenile court's orders were based upon
truthful allegations, they never admitted that any of the Defendants' conduct did not violate their
constitutional rights, they never admitted that they were not justified in declining compliance
with the juvenile court's custody order, and they never admitted that they did not have any
otherwise cognizable defenses to the criminal charges. (See Pl.St.Facts, % 428) (plea bargain
does not concede absence of defenses to elements of offense).) Accordingly, defendants may not
now claim that Plaintiffs' pleas in abeyance preclude them from establishing that the criminal
charges were not supported by probable cause.
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ii.

Eisenman and Cunningham were complaining witnesses in the criminal
court proceedings.

Cunningham contends that she was not a complaining witness in the criminal case against
the Jensens, and that as a result she cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Cunningham
testified that she did not say anything to the Deputy District Attorney before or during the
meeting with Ms. Micklos. However, defendant Eisenman contends that Officer Peterson, who
provided the probable cause statement for the criminal proceedings, obtained some of his
information from Cunningham (Eisenman depo., pp. 230-231), and Cunningham's name does
indeed appear on the statement.

Therefore, unless defendant Eisenman concedes that

Cunningham did not provide any of the information that led to the criminal charges, a factual
basis exists on which a jury could find Cunningham at least contributed to the charges. There is
also no dispute that Eisenman was a complaining witness, as identified on Officer Peterson's
statement. Pis' St. Facts, ^ 349.i4
iii.

Barbara was arrested and otherwise seized in the criminal proceedings.

Defendants also argue that Barbara Jensen was never arrested and therefore never seized,
but that is factually incorrect. Barbara was booked into jail for the felony kidnapping charges on
September 10, 2003. Pis' SOF ffij 400. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court would recognize
that the substantial restrictions on her liberty rose to the level of a seizure. See pp. 66-69, supra.

14

Cunningham would also be liable for the criminal charges under a theory of inseparable
liability, given that her actions combined with the other defendants' to produce a single result,
and as a foreseeable consequence of her conduct in the juvenile court case.
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iv.

Plaintiffs are not judicially estopped from disputing certain facts related
to the criminal proceedings.

Defendants, by incorporation, assert that plaintiffs should be judicially estopped from
making certain factual allegations in the course of their constitutional claims, because plaintiffs
allegedly admitted the elements of the crime of custodial interference in the criminal court
proceedings. Defendants' argument fails because, in Utah, judicial estoppel is only available
against a party who has acted in "bad faith." See Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 2008 UT 2, f
11, n. 1. ("...the purpose of judicial estoppel is not served 'where there is no evidence that the
party against whom judicial estoppel is sought knowingly misrepresented any facts in the prior
proceeding and where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had equal or better access to
the relevant facts""){citing Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731 (Utah
1995)).
There is no evidence in the record that Daren or Barbara Jensen acted in bad faith or
misrepresented any facts in the criminal proceedings.

Rather, as demonstrated by plaintiffs'

statement of facts, there is little doubt that the Jensen family was railroaded by defendants, and
that defendants' affirmative misrepresentations and material omissions made to the juvenile
court, the District Attorney's Office, and the criminal court, all caused independent violations of
the Jensens rights guaranteed under the Utah Constitution. As a result, Defendants are precluded
from asserting that any factual admissions made in the course of the criminal proceedings affect
Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim.
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v.

Plaintiffs are relieved from showing that the criminal proceedings
terminated in their favor because their pleas in abeyance were coerced.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim fails because the criminal proceedings did not
terminate in their favor. Defendants argue that, under the common law, the general rule is that
dismissal of charges pursuant to agreement by the defendant does not establish termination of
those charges in the individual's favor. However, Defendants fail to recognize that, if a jury
finds that Plaintiffs' pleas in abeyance to the criminal charges were procured by coercion, they
are relieved from showing a favorable termination relative to those proceedings. Defendants'
theory works this way: Eisenman and Cunningham, through material misrepresentations and
omissions, were able to induce Salt County to file groundless felony kidnapping charges as well
as misdemeanor custodial interference charges. Child kidnapping was a first-degree felony for
which Utah law imposed mandatory imprisonment upon conviction "of not less than 6, 10, or 15
years and which may be for life." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003). (The presumptive
minimum sentence was the middle of the three, 10 years. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7)(a).)
"Custodial interference" was a Class A misdemeanor for which the court had discretion to order
no imprisonment, or for no more than one year.

Unlike felony kidnapping charges, the

misdemeanor charge was eligible for a plea in abeyance, pursuant to which no conviction would
be entered, and the plea would be withdrawn and the charge dismissed after 12 months. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-201(2), 77-2a-l, et seq. Because the Jensens ultimately agreed to
plead in abeyance to the misdemeanor, Defendants say, they are precluded from claiming
malicious prosecution as to either of the criminal charges.

SO

All general rules have exceptions, and the Defendants' argument overlooks a big one:
The rule upon which they rely does not apply if the individual's agreement was procured
unfairly, such as through fraud, duress, or coercion. See PJ. ex rel Jensen v. Utah, 2006 WL
1702585, *11 (D.Utah 2006); see also Robertson v. Bell, 57 Wash.2d 505, 358 P.2d 149 (Wash.
1961)(Rule that favorable termination of a criminal proceeding may not be made a basis of
action for malicious prosecution if termination is predicated upon a dismissal without regard to
merits as result of compromise or settlement of parties is not applicable if settlement was not
voluntarily and understandingly made but was made under coercion or duress, nor where
dismissal is not shown to have been the result of a valid compromise or settlement.); Kostrzewa
v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001); Blase v. Appicelli, 489 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Mich.
1992) ("Although no published opinion in Michigan has addressed this issue, other jurisdictions
have held that a settlement or compromise brought about by duress or coercion will not bar an
action for malicious prosecution"); Garrick v. Kelly, 649 F.Supp. 607, 611 (E.D. Va. 1986)
("weight of authority" is that invalid compromise does not bar malicious prosecution claim; "the
defense of compromise is for the jury unless it is uncontested as a factual matter"); Gowin v.
Heider, 386 P.2d 1, 13-14 (Or. 1963) (recognizing general rule, but noting that "[I]f... a
settlement is not the free and voluntary act of the plaintiff in malicious prosecution, but is
brought about by duress practiced upon him by the defendant, the rule just stated is without
application"); Robertson v. Bell, 358 P.2d 149, 153 (Wash. 1961) ("The [general] rule is not
applied in cases where the settlement was not voluntarily and understandingly made, but was
made under coercion or duress, nor where the dismissal is not shown to have been the result of a
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valid compromise or settlement"); George v. Leonard, 71 F.Supp. 665, 666 (E.D.S.C. 1947)
(compromise not voluntarily or freely made, or made under duress or coercion, does not bar
malicious prosecution claim); Piechowiak v. Bissell, 9 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Mich. 1943) (plea
bargain is not conclusive evidence of probable cause on charge to which party pled guilty if
"such plea was accomplished by fraudulent means"); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 240 N.W. 177, 181
(Wis. 1932) (agreement entered into by woman to avoid being taken to jail on arrest warrant did
not bar later malicious prosecution action; recognizing exception to general rule "where the
procurement or compromise was induced by duress"); Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 84
S.E. 744 (W. Va. 1915) allowing malicious prosecution claim by plaintiff who was wrongfully
arrested at instigation of his landlord and who procured release by signing agreement not to sue;
"Such wrongs ought not to occur in a free country, governed by law. . . . [Plaintiff] had a right,
under the circumstances of this case, to prove that he signed it in order to obtain his liberty");
White v. InVl Text-Book Co., 136 N.W. 121, 123, 124 (Iowa 1912) ("exceptions [to general rule]
are created to the effect that the settlement must have been voluntarily and understandingly
made. . . . if the settlement is procured by fraud or duress, the dismissal of the proceedings by the
prosecutor is such a termination of the case as will authorize an action for malicious
prosecution"); Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24, 27-28 (1867) (regarding allegation that resolution of
underlying proceedings by agreement barred malicious prosecution claim, "[t]he same legal
consequences do not follow acts done under duress of arrest and protest, as when done freely and
voluntarily,—under the abuse, as under the legitimate use of legal process . . . The law does not
make successful wrong a shield to protect its perpetrator from liability to afford redress to the
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injured party"); Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 506 (1810); 52 AM JUR 2D MALICIOUS PROSECUTION §
38.
To illustrate, New York's high court once offered this hypothetical:
Take a case like this: A poor and helpless woman is arrested and the police
justice informs her before he makes his final decision that he is inclined to hold
her to bail, and she being friendless and unable to furnish bail, promises good
behavior in the future if he will discharge her, and then he enters a discharge.
What reason can there be for holding in such a case, if she can show that the
criminal proceeding was instituted maliciously and without probable cause, that
she may not maintain her action for malicious prosecution? . . . [P]roof that the
discharge was made under such circumstances cannot upon principle furnish an
absolute bar to the action.
Bobbins v. Bobbins, 30 N.E. 977, 978 (N.Y. 1892).
This exception is a corollary of the well-established common law rule that even a
conviction does not preclude a malicious prosecution claim if the plaintiff can show it was
obtained through fraud or duress. See Bestatement (Second) of Torts, § 667; see also Kennedy v.
Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 327 (1919) (conviction "procured by fraud, perjury, or other
undue or unfair means employed by the defendant" in malicious prosecution case is "worthless
as evidence of probable cause"); Olson v. Independent Order of Foresters, 7 Utah 2d 322, 324
P.2d 1012 (1958) (order binding individual over does not establish probable cause for offense if
it was "obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means . . . or was procured through by false
testimony offered by the prosecutor or given in his behalf).
The common law exception also relates to the principle that, when two charges or civil
claims are brought for which probable cause exists only as to one, a malicious prosecution claim
is not barred on the unfounded charge. The courts' concern in that instance is that parties who

83

initiate wrongful proceedings should not be able to insulate themselves from liability by
trumping up the charges, knowing that the other party will likely be coerced into pleading to the
far less serious offense. Thus, the Second Circuit has rejected an argument that a conviction on a
lesser charge bars a plaintiff from alleging malicious prosecution on a more serious charge:
As disorderly conduct is a lesser charge than resisting arrest and assaulting an officer, . . .
we should not allow a finding of probable cause on this charge to foreclose a malicious
prosecution cause of action on charges requiring different, and more culpable, behavior.
If the rule were the one followed by the district court, an officer with probable cause as to
a lesser offense could tack on more serious, unfounded charges which would support a
high bail or a lengthy detention, knowing that the probable cause on the lesser offense
would insulate him from liability for malicious prosecution on the other offenses.
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2nd Cir. 1991).
Quoting from earlier state and extra-jurisdictional decisions, the California Court of
Appeal summarized the reasoning of these decisions:
The authorities show . . . that, in order to maintain an action like this [malicious
prosecution'], "it is not necessary that the whole proceeding be utterly
groundless, for, if groundless charges are maliciously and without probable
cause, coupled with others which are well founded, they are not on that account
the less injurious, and, therefore, constitute a valid cause of action.

Indeed, it would seem almost a mockery to hold that, by uniting groundless
accusations with those for which probable cause might exist, the defendants could
thereby escape liability, because of the injured party's inability to divide his
damages between the two with delicate nicety. Such, we think, is not the law.

[L]itigation that is groundless and motivated by malice . . . has no place in our
judicial system, and we are therefore unwilling to bear its costs. After careful
consideration, we see no reason to reach a different result when the litigation in
question is the assertion of baseless and malicious grounds of liability in a single
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lawsuit: in both instances the balance tips in favor of the policy of making whole
the individuals harmed by such abuse of our courts.
Mabie v. Hyatt, 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 590, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 675 (1998), review denied (emphasis
added; citations omitted); see also Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 529 P.2d 608, 619
(Calif. 1974) (We see no reason for permitting plaintiffs . . . to pursue shotgun tactics by
proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should know to be groundless").
In accordance with the above principles, the Sixth Circuit recently followed the common
law rule and noted that a plea bargain "procured by unfair means" would not bar a malicious
prosecution suit:
Thus, if the state threatened to prosecute Kostrzewa on a charge not supported by
probable cause and promised to drop that charge if he pleaded guilty to another
offense, the resulting plea bargain should not serve as a shield for an officer later
charged with malicious prosecution. If Sergeant McWilliams charged plaintiff
with obstructing a police officer simply because he demanded medical attention
when at the police station, we cannot conclude that it is beyond doubt that there
was probable cause to support this obstruction charge. Furthermore, if this
charge, potentially devoid of probable cause, was used to procure Kostrzewa"s
guilty plea for driving without a valid license, then plaintiffs malicious
prosecution claim would survive the motion to dismiss despite the existence of a
plea agreement.
Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 643 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
The concerns expressed by the above federal and state courts are manifest here. By
falsely telling Salt Lake County that the Jensens had kidnapped a child, defendants Eisenman
and Cunningham ensured the filing of felony charges that carried mandatory imprisonment and
high bail. They did so with the knowledge and/or for the reason that virtually anyone in the
Jensens' position would be forced to plead to the relatively minor offense joined with it.
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An issue of fact exists with regard to whether plaintiffs can show that their agreement to
the plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor charge was involuntarily, and/or procured by fraud,
coercion, duress, or other "unfair means."

The extent of Defendants' misrepresentations

(analogous to fraud) has been addressed above. With respect to duress, the court must look to
the standards articulated in Sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 175176. See Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
Section 175 states that an agreement may be found to have resulted from duress "if a
party's manifestation of assent is inducted by an improper threat by the other party that leaves
the victim no reasonable alternative." Andreini, 860 P.2d at 921. "[W]hether duress existed and
was sufficient to void consent is a mixed question of law and fact[.]" In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App
99, 68 P.3d 1021 (applying Andreini in case challenging voluntariness of consent to adoption).
Under Section 175, duress can be shown "[i]f a party's manifestation of assent is induced
by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative . . . ." In
analyzing the "threat" component, the Restatement notes that "[t]he threat may be expressed in
words or it may be inferred from words or other conduct. Past events often import a threat.
Thus, if one person strikes or imprisons another, the conduct may amount to duress because of
the threat of further blows or continued imprisonment that is implied." Id., cmt. a.
A threat is improper if "what is threatened is a crime or a tort . . . [or] a criminal
prosecution." Id., § 176(1). A threat may also be improper "if the resulting exchange is not on
fair terms, and (a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit
the party making the threat, (b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of
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assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or (c)
what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends." Id., § 176(2). The threats
with which the Jensens were confronted fall under all of these provisions.
When considering whether a reasonable alternative exists, "[t]he standard is a practical
one under which account must be taken of the exigencies in which the victim finds himself[.]"
Id., cmt. b. Whether the victim has a reasonable alternative is a mixed question of law and fact,
to be answered by the court only in "clear" cases. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court's application of these criteria in Andreini is instructive. In that
case, the plaintiff argued that he had signed a physician's waiver of liability under duress,
because the doctor knew he needed surgery on his hands but was unwilling to perform it without
the release. The Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had made an improper threat
or inducement, in the form of an alleged promise to correct the plaintiffs medical condition, and
whether the "resulting exchange" - a failed surgical procedure for the plaintiff versus a release of
all claims for the defendant - was "not on fair terms". Id. at 922. The court likewise found a
question of fact regarding the allegation that the doctor knew the condition of the plaintiffs
hands was worsening and that he needed surgery immediately, which a jury could find to have
constituted "unfair dealing that significantly increased the effectiveness of [the defendant's]
threat not to undertake the corrective surgery." Id.
Having found a fact issue as to whether the defendant made an improper threat, the court
next concluded that a fact issue also existed as to whether the plaintiff had reasonable
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alternatives. "[T]he victim does not need to be in a life-threatening situation for a jury to find
that there were no reasonable alternatives," the court noted. Id. at 923, citing an observation in
the Restatement that "courts originally restricted duress to threats involving loss of life, mayhem
or imprisonment." Under the modern approach, the reasonable-alternative standard "has been
greatly relaxed and, in order to constitute duress, the threat need only be improper." Id.

In

Andreini, the plaintiffs alternative was not to have this doctor perform the surgery. The jury
could find that to mean he had no reasonable alternatives, the court held.
In this case, by October 2003, Daren Jensen had lost his job because of the Defendants'
actions, and would be unable to look for one while charges were pending. The Jensens owed
thousands of dollars in attorney fees that they already could not pay. They had been booked into
jail on arrest warrants and forced to pay more than $5,000 in bonds to be released. They had no
money and no health insurance for their family. Evidence had consistently been fabricated or
manipulated against them by the government official Defendants. They had been excoriated in
the media. They had been asked to turn in their LDS Temple recommendation cards because of
the pending felony charges. They were facing the potential loss of their children if the State
went after them as a result of the criminal charges that the State had procured in the first place.
As most people would be compelled to do under such circumstances, the Jensens took the
plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor charge.15 Under the particular circumstances of this case,

15

See Docket, Case No. 031905430, Third District Court, Oct. 2, 2003. (As the University
Defendants have stated, court proceedings referenced in the Complaint may be considered within
the bounds of a motion to dismiss.) Plaintiffs also note that, although the County filed the
charges, as the complaining witnesses and parties, Defendants exercised control over the
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a question of fact exists as to whether the Jensens' plea in abeyance was completely voluntary,
and/or whether it was procured by unfair means, fraud, duress, coercion, or other wrongful act.
Plaintiffs have adduced evidence to demonstrate coercion through unfair means:
1.

The felony charges were filed due to defendants' intentional and/or

reckless misrepresentations to the District Attorney's office. (Pl.St.Facts, fflj 197, 201, 214-215,
224-229, 234-236, 249, 283-285, 290-291, 314, 326.) That the felony charges were "trumped
up" due to defendants' misrepresentations is further evidenced by the fact that, in attorney
Nakamura's experience, it is rare for a plea bargain to drop a first-degree felony charges in
exchange for a misdemeanor plea, essentially a three-step reduction. (Id., % 427.)
2.

The felony charges carried mandatory jail time that exceeded the

minimum sentence for first-degree murder. (Pl.St.Facts, f 348.)
3.

Going to trial on a first-degree felony case would have cost the Jensens

thousands of dollars, even if they won, and the Jensens were out of money. (Pl.St.Facts,ffl[395,
426.)
Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' wrongful
initiation of criminal process claim as it relates to the criminal proceedings.
C.

Juvenile court proceedings
1.

The juvenile court proceedings terminated in the Plaintiffs 'favor, or
alternatively, "unusual circumstances "justify dispensing with such
requirement.

disposition of those charges. See, e.g., Tape of Hearing, Sept. 3, 2003 (DCFS/State arranging for
county warrants to be suspended during appearance of Jensens in court).
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In Utah, the wrongful use of civil proceedings "consists in instituting or maintaining civil
proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis." Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT
65,1) 19, 981 P.2d 841. "One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or
procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful
civil proceedings if (a) he [or she] acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other
than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based, and
(b)... the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought." Id.
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674).
In seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for wrongful initiation of the juvenile court
proceedings, Anderson asserts out that he was not involved in initiating the juvenile proceedings
originally, and therefore, that he cannot be held liable for wrongful initial of civil process.
Although it is true that Anderson was not involved until after the juvenile court proceedings
commenced, as noted above, a complaining witness is not only a witness who encourages or
initiates the filing of a proceeding, but also includes a person who takes part in the continuation
or perpetuation of a proceeding.

Anderson continued and perpetuated the juvenile court

proceedings by failing to order withdrawal of the medical neglect petition.
Apparently recognizing that principle, Anderson argues that, even though he was
Director of DCFS, he did not have the authority to unilaterally drop DCFS's neglect petition.
That is directly contradicted by the evidence. Anderson did unilaterally drop the petition. He
testified that he had the authority to sign off on the dismissal, and that he did so. (Pl.St.Facts, \
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389.) He cannot now deny the same authority that he (1) exercised in 2003, and (2) admitted in
his deposition. At the very least, a question of fact exists as to his authority.
Finally, Anderson's allegations to the contrary, the juvenile court proceedings terminated
in favor of the Jensens. The medical neglect petition was dismissed and the state's and DCFS's
involvement in the Jensen family ceased. Anderson argues that the dismissal of the juvenile
court petition was not "on the merits," as is required for a wrongful initiation of civil process
claim under Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774, Utah App.,2004, 2004 UT App 378, f 29. In Hatch,
the Utah Court of Appeals considered whether a proceeding must always be terminated in favor
of the plaintiff and "on the merits," or whether the Utah Supreme Court intended to allow a
plaintiff to proceed with a claim in "the most unusual circumstances," as the Utah Supreme
Court had previously indicated would be allowed in Baird v. Intermountain School Federal
Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976). The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that
the Supreme Court's statement that a wrongful initiation of civil process claim could survive a
termination not on the merits in "unusual circumstances" was merely "dicta." Hatch at % 29.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has cited Baird for the "unusual circumstances" exception
when analyzing the elements of a wrongful initiation of civil process claim, in order to note how
Utah law varies from the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Gilbert, 1999 UT 65 at
f 19.

The Gilbert Court did not note any concerns about the viability of the unusual

circumstance exception, and presumably the Supreme Court would have noted disagreement
with the exception if it had any.
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Even if the juvenile court proceedings had not terminated in plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs
should still be allowed to proceed with their wrongful initiation of civil process claim under the
"unusual circumstances" exception to the favorable termination element.

The nuances of

procedure and practice in the informal juvenile court must be considered in evaluating the
importance of a favorable termination on the merits. Although the juvenile court's order of
dismissal followed the state's decision to withdraw, the guardian ad litem had not so stipulated,
and the dismissal did not occur until after an evidentiary hearing at which the GAL elicited
evidence as to the Jensens' alleged neglect. The dismissal was, given the unique procedural
structure of juvenile court, "on the merits" for purposes of the Jensens' claim.
Additionally, the misrepresentations Defendants made in the course of the juvenile court
proceeding also give rise to unusual circumstances that relieve the Jensens from proving a
favorable termination. In other words, but for the misrepresentations and material omissions of
Defendants, Plaintiffs would have been able to obtain a favorable termination on the merits. As
a result, even if there was not a technical and formal termination on the merits in favor of the
Jensens in the juvenile court proceedings, they should nonetheless be allowed to proceed with
their wrongful initiation of civil process claim due to the unusual and unique circumstances
presented by the juvenile court procedure.
ii.

The juvenile court proceedings were not supported by probable cause.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' wrongful initiation of civil process claim related to the
juvenile court proceedings must be dismissed because the juvenile court proceedings was
supported by probable cause and brought for a proper purpose. In this case, the purpose for
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which the proceedings were brought is a hotly contested issue of fact. Moreover, any alleged
probable cause is vitiated by the defendants' material omissions - a half truth can be equally or
more misleading than an overt misrepresentation.16
IX.

CUNNINGHAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE GROUND THAT SHE ALLEGEDLY RELIED UPON ADVICE OF
COUNSEL.

In her motion, defendant Cunningham acknowledges that no Utah case has ever held that
a social worker may claim reliance on advice of counsel to overcome claims that he or she
violated rights guaranteed under the Utah Constitution. The only support cited for her argument
is federal law, which is not binding upon this Court.
Moreover, even if advice of counsel were available in constitutional claims, Cunningham
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Advice of counsel is an affirmative
defense upon which the defendant bears the burden of proof. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.,
811 P.2d 151, 159-160 (Utah 1991). The defense is only available if the defendant proves that
she acted in good faith and made a full disclosure of all material facts to the attorney. Id. at 160.
See Perkins v. Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 437, 503 P.2d 1212, 1212 (1972); Potter v. Utah DrivUr-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand Union
Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 189, 299 P.2d 622, 623 (1956); Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah at 218, 241
P. at 312.

16

As an example of this, see Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306
(10th. Cir. 1999).
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Here, Cunningham did not provide all material information to her attorney. For example,
attorney Eisenman assumed that Cunningham had performed the statutorily required
investigation, Pis' SOF ^f 196, which Cunningham admits was not true. Cunningham did not
disclose that tests necessary to confirm the diagnosis had never been run; that, if Parker did have
Ewing's sarcoma, it was an atypical form and manifestation, which was one reason that the
Jensens were questioning the use of a standard treatment on a non-standard condition; and that
Dr. Corwin was a psychiatrist, and not qualified to provide an "independent assessment" of
Parker's medical condition, or render a second opinion, or opine whether the Jensens were
medically neglectful. (See Pl.St.Facts, ffl[ 165-167.) These failures - which explain some of the
glaring misstatements in the affidavits prepared for her by counsel - preclude Cunningham's
advice-of-counsel defense, or an issue of fact exists in that regard.
XL

WAGNER AND ALBRITTON ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
DEMONSTRATE THEY ACTED WITH FRAUD OR MALICE, OR
ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL
FACT.

In 2003, a governmental actor was not entitled to governmental immunity where he or
she acted with fraud or malice, or where he or she gave false testimony under oath. U.C. A. § 6330-4(b)(2003). As set forth above, there is ample evidence upon which this Court may conclude
that Defendants Wagner and Albritton acted with fraud and malice, and that they gave false
testimony to the juvenile court under oath. Because Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence
of fraud or malice in addition to false testimony, or at the least have raised a dispute of fact in
that regard, summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity must be denied.
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XL

PLAINTIFFS HAVE SET FORTH SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

The evidence set forth in Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts, and as elaborated
upon above, is more than sufficient to demonstrate reckless or wanton misconduct. See pp. 4069, suprp.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2009.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

/s/ Karra J. Porter
Roger P. Christensen
Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Attorneys for Defendant Kari Cunningham
Kristin A. VanOrman
Jennifer R. Carrizal
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